Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] Guy Robinson on Thomas Kuhn
Rosa, Marxist philosophy without theses ? Without theory ? CB http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/theses/index.htm Theses On Feuerbach The main defect of all hitherto-existing materialism — that of Feuerbach included — is that the Object [der Gegenstand], actuality, sensuousness, are conceived only in the form of the object [Objekts], or of contemplation [Anschauung], but not as human sensuous activity, practice [Praxis], not subjectively. Hence it happened that the active side, in opposition to materialism, was developed by idealism — but only abstractly, since, of course, idealism does not know real, sensuous activity as such. Feuerbach wants sensuous objects [Objekte], differentiated from thought-objects, but he does not conceive human activity itself as objective [gegenständliche] activity. In The Essence of Christianity [Das Wesen des Christenthums], he therefore regards the theoretical attitude as the only genuinely human attitude, while practice is conceived and defined only in its dirty-Jewish form of appearance [Erscheinungsform][1]. Hence he does not grasp the significance of ‘revolutionary’, of ‘practical-critical’, activity. 2 The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory but is a practical question. Man must prove the truth, i.e., the reality and power, the this-sidedness [Diesseitigkeit] of his thinking, in practice. The dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking which is isolated from practice is a purely scholastic question. 3 The materialist doctrine that men are products of circumstances and upbringing, and that, therefore, changed men are products of changed circumstances and changed upbringing, forgets that it is men who change circumstances and that the educator must himself be educated. Hence this doctrine is bound to divide society into two parts, one of which is superior to society. The coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity or self-change [Selbstveränderung] can be conceived and rationally understood only as revolutionary practice. 4 Feuerbach starts off from the fact of religious self-estrangement [Selbstentfremdung], of the duplication of the world into a religious, imaginary world, and a secular [weltliche] one. His work consists in resolving the religious world into its secular basis. He overlooks the fact that after completing this work, the chief thing still remains to be done. For the fact that the secular basis lifts off from itself and establishes itself in the clouds as an independent realm can only be explained by the inner strife and intrinsic contradictoriness of this secular basis. The latter must itself be understood in its contradiction and then, by the removal of the contradiction, revolutionised. Thus, for instance, once the earthly family is discovered to be the secret of the holy family, the former must itself be annihilated [vernichtet] theoretically and practically. 5 Feuerbach, not satisfied with abstract thinking, wants sensuous contemplation [Anschauung]; but he does not conceive sensuousness as practical, human-sensuous activity. 6 Feuerbach resolves the essence of religion into the essence of man [menschliche Wesen = ‘human nature’]. But the essence of man is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In reality, it is the ensemble of the social relations. Feuerbach, who does not enter upon a criticism of this real essence is hence obliged: 1. To abstract from the historical process and to define the religious sentiment regarded by itself, and to presuppose an abstract — isolated - human individual. 2. The essence therefore can by him only be regarded as ‘species’, as an inner ‘dumb’ generality which unites many individuals only in a natural way. 7 Feuerbach consequently does not see that the ‘religious sentiment’ is itself a social product, and that the abstract individual that he analyses belongs in reality to a particular social form. 8 All social life is essentially practical. All mysteries which lead theory to mysticism find their rational solution in human practice and in the comprehension of this practice. 9 The highest point reached by contemplative [anschauende] materialism, that is, materialism which does not comprehend sensuousness as practical activity, is the contemplation of single individuals and of civil society [bürgerlichen Gesellschaft]. 10 The standpoint of the old materialism is civil society; the standpoint of the new is human society or social humanity. 11 Philosophers have hitherto only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it. 1. “Dirty-Jewish” — according to Marhsall Berman, this is an allusion to the Jewish God of the Old Testament, who had to ‘get his hands dirty’ making the world, tied up with a symbolic contrast between the Christian God of the Word, and the God of the Deed, symbolising practical life. See The Significance of the Creation in Judaism, Essence of
Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] Guy Robinson on Thomas Kuhn
That project was exemplified in Descartes' Meditations, and it laid two demands on any account of knowledge and the means to knowledge, demands that set the standard and defined the adequacy of any account. There had been urgent reasons for making those demands but the reasons were historical rather than philosophical and came from the individualistic model of humanity that played such a pivotal role in the era's project of eliminating feudalism's remnants in thought and social institutions, and the project of justifying the conceptions and arrangements that were replacing them. That story needs to be elaborated, and will get some elaboration in the next chapter. What is important here is that those demands have been accepted since without serious critique or examination of alternatives. The first of the demands, describable as a democratic or individualistic' one, was that a method be found that was available to each separated individual to apply privately and severally in the search for knowledge. The second, relating to the knowledge thus found, was that the method would lead all who conscientiously applied it to the same, objective and timeless true view of things. ^^ CB: This point on individualistic method is a good one. This is how I define positivism. ___ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis
Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] Guy Robinson on Thomas Kuhn
This is a commonplace analysis of Descartes critique of the whole epistemological tradition that came out of this. However, the disavowal of scientific realism is childish. Speaking of childish, It's worth contemplating the symbiosis between Rosa's juvenile Wittgensteinianism and sectarianism. He differs from Henry Ford in declaring that, not history, but all philosophy, is bunk. And if this doesn't show you that the British far left--if that's what he is--is not at the end of its rope, what does? Now I'm reminded that I need to take a look at Plekhanov see if he's as bad as I'm told he is. On 12/30/2010 10:10 AM, c b wrote: That project was exemplified in Descartes' Meditations, and it laid two demands on any account of knowledge and the means to knowledge, demands that set the standard and defined the adequacy of any account. There had been urgent reasons for making those demands but the reasons were historical rather than philosophical and came from the individualistic model of humanity that played such a pivotal role in the era's project of eliminating feudalism's remnants in thought and social institutions, and the project of justifying the conceptions and arrangements that were replacing them. That story needs to be elaborated, and will get some elaboration in the next chapter. What is important here is that those demands have been accepted since without serious critique or examination of alternatives. The first of the demands, describable as a democratic or individualistic' one, was that a method be found that was available to each separated individual to apply privately and severally in the search for knowledge. The second, relating to the knowledge thus found, was that the method would lead all who conscientiously applied it to the same, objective and timeless true view of things. ^^ CB: This point on individualistic method is a good one. This is how I define positivism. ___ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis ___ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis
Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] Guy Robinson on Thomas Kuhn
I was thinking of the philosophical backwardness prevalent in the Second International. I do like this quote from Plekhanov, however: Strictly speaking, /partisan science/ is impossible, but, regrettably enough, the existence is highly possible of /scientists who are imbued with the spirit of parties and with class selfishness/. When Marxists speak of bourgeois science with contempt, it is scientists of that brand that they have in view. It is to such scientists that the gentlemen Herr Bernstein has learnt so much from belong, /viz./ J. Wolf, Schulze-Gävernitz, and many others. Even if nine-tenths of scientific socialism has been taken from the writings of bourgeois economists, it has not been taken in the way in which Herr Bernstein has borrowed from the Brentanoists and other apologists of capitalism the material he uses to revise Marxism. Marx and Engels were able to take a /critical/ attitude towards bourgeois scientists, something that Herr Bernstein has been unable or unwilling to do. When he learns from them, he simply places himself under their influence and, without noticing the fact, adopts their apologetics. Georgi Plekhanov, *Cant Against Kant, or Herr Bernstein's Will and Testament* (August 1901) http://www.marxists.org/archive/plekhanov/1901/xx/cant.htm There must be a transcription error here: so much from *belong*: doesn't make sense. On 12/30/2010 10:49 AM, c b wrote: On Thu, Dec 30, 2010 at 10:22 AM, Ralph Dumain rdum...@autodidactproject.org wrote: This is a commonplace analysis of Descartes critique of the whole epistemological tradition that came out of this. However, the disavowal of scientific realism is childish. Speaking of childish, It's worth contemplating the symbiosis between Rosa's juvenile Wittgensteinianism and sectarianism. He differs from Henry Ford in declaring that, not history, but all philosophy, is bunk. And if this doesn't show you that the British far left--if that's what he is--is not at the end of its rope, what does? Now I'm reminded that I need to take a look at Plekhanov see if he's as bad as I'm told he is. ^^^ CB: Well, Plekhanov opposed the 1917 October insurrection. That's pretty stupid sectarian. On 12/30/2010 10:10 AM, c b wrote: That project was exemplified in Descartes' Meditations, and it laid two demands on any account of knowledge and the means to knowledge, demands that set the standard and defined the adequacy of any account. There had been urgent reasons for making those demands but the reasons were historical rather than philosophical and came from the individualistic model of humanity that played such a pivotal role in the era's project of eliminating feudalism's remnants in thought and social institutions, and the project of justifying the conceptions and arrangements that were replacing them. That story needs to be elaborated, and will get some elaboration in the next chapter. What is important here is that those demands have been accepted since without serious critique or examination of alternatives. The first of the demands, describable as a democratic or individualistic' one, was that a method be found that was available to each separated individual to apply privately and severally in the search for knowledge. The second, relating to the knowledge thus found, was that the method would lead all who conscientiously applied it to the same, objective and timeless true view of things. ^^ CB: This point on individualistic method is a good one. This is how I define positivism. ___ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis ___ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis ___ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis
Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] Guy Robinson on Thomas Kuhn
And here we have to say that Newton was a lot clearer about the status of what he called axioms and laws of motion than were later generations who looked on them as universal, and perhaps providential, truths about the cosmos. It took Henri Poincaré's hard work and careful analysis to bring out the fact that what was perhaps the most promising candidate of the three laws for empirical status and testable content, the Second Law -- nowadays rendered as Force equals mass times acceleration, -- was not in fact a testable, falsifiable claim about the cosmos or the things in it. Poincaré showed that there was no way of measuring each of the three components, the force, the mass and the acceleration independently in any concrete situation and that therefore no experiment could bring the law to the test. And so too for the other two of Newton's three laws of dynamics. ^^^ CB: This sounds like quantum mechanics . ___ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis
Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] Guy Robinson on Thomas Kuhn
I tried checking the text at leninist.biz, but I found the Plekhanov volume impossible to navigate. I wish someone would make this correction for me, because I would like to use this quote. It looks like I already did some preliminary spadework, viz. . . . Neo-Kantianism, Its History, Influence, and Relation to Socialism: Selected Secondary Bibliography http://www.autodidactproject.org/bib/neokantianism_biblio_1.html There I link to 6 articles by Plekhanov on Kantianism. That entire period in philosophy, and for decades to come in continental European philosophy, was dominated by the Neo-Kantian influence. These debates are a small part of the overall picture. On 12/30/2010 11:14 AM, Ralph Dumain wrote: I was thinking of the philosophical backwardness prevalent in the Second International. I do like this quote from Plekhanov, however: Strictly speaking, /partisan science/ is impossible, but, regrettably enough, the existence is highly possible of /scientists who are imbued with the spirit of parties and with class selfishness/. When Marxists speak of bourgeois science with contempt, it is scientists of that brand that they have in view. It is to such scientists that the gentlemen Herr Bernstein has learnt so much from belong, /viz./ J. Wolf, Schulze-Gävernitz, and many others. Even if nine-tenths of scientific socialism has been taken from the writings of bourgeois economists, it has not been taken in the way in which Herr Bernstein has borrowed from the Brentanoists and other apologists of capitalism the material he uses to revise Marxism. Marx and Engels were able to take a /critical/ attitude towards bourgeois scientists, something that Herr Bernstein has been unable or unwilling to do. When he learns from them, he simply places himself under their influence and, without noticing the fact, adopts their apologetics. Georgi Plekhanov, *Cant Against Kant, or Herr Bernstein's Will and Testament* (August 1901) http://www.marxists.org/archive/plekhanov/1901/xx/cant.htm There must be a transcription error here: so much from *belong*: doesn't make sense. On 12/30/2010 10:49 AM, c b wrote: On Thu, Dec 30, 2010 at 10:22 AM, Ralph Dumain rdum...@autodidactproject.org wrote: This is a commonplace analysis of Descartes critique of the whole epistemological tradition that came out of this. However, the disavowal of scientific realism is childish. Speaking of childish, It's worth contemplating the symbiosis between Rosa's juvenile Wittgensteinianism and sectarianism. He differs from Henry Ford in declaring that, not history, but all philosophy, is bunk. And if this doesn't show you that the British far left--if that's what he is--is not at the end of its rope, what does? Now I'm reminded that I need to take a look at Plekhanov see if he's as bad as I'm told he is. ^^^ CB: Well, Plekhanov opposed the 1917 October insurrection. That's pretty stupid sectarian. On 12/30/2010 10:10 AM, c b wrote: That project was exemplified in Descartes' Meditations, and it laid two demands on any account of knowledge and the means to knowledge, demands that set the standard and defined the adequacy of any account. There had been urgent reasons for making those demands but the reasons were historical rather than philosophical and came from the individualistic model of humanity that played such a pivotal role in the era's project of eliminating feudalism's remnants in thought and social institutions, and the project of justifying the conceptions and arrangements that were replacing them. That story needs to be elaborated, and will get some elaboration in the next chapter. What is important here is that those demands have been accepted since without serious critique or examination of alternatives. The first of the demands, describable as a democratic or individualistic' one, was that a method be found that was available to each separated individual to apply privately and severally in the search for knowledge. The second, relating to the knowledge thus found, was that the method would lead all who conscientiously applied it to the same, objective and timeless true view of things. ^^ CB: This point on individualistic method is a good one. This is how I define positivism. ___ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis
Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] Guy Robinson on Thomas Kuhn
On Thu, 30 Dec 2010 10:22:14 -0500 Ralph Dumain rdum...@autodidactproject.org writes: Itsworth contemplating the symbiosis between Rosa's juvenile Wittgensteinianism and sectarianism. He differs from Henry Ford in declaring that, not history, but all philosophy, is bunk. And if this doesn't show you that the British far left--if that's what he is--is not at the end of its rope, what does? Well, Rosa is a supporter of the British SWP which is still officially committed towards dialectical materialism as the philosophical basis for Marxism. However, she is supported by Richard Seymour who is very much a rising star within that party and the far generally in the UK. Jim Farmelant http://independent.academia.edu/JimFarmelant www.foxymath.com Learn or Review Basic Math Mortgage Rates Hit 2.99% If you owe under $729k you probably qualify for Gov't Refi Programs http://thirdpartyoffers.juno.com/TGL3141/4d1cb3ebbe3883ccf85st05vuc ___ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis
Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] Guy Robinson on Thomas Kuhn
Hasn't the British SWP been an advocate of Islamism? Furthermore, being caught in a struggle between inept arguments pro con diamat--doesn't this drag us back to the 19th century? What progress is there is this? On 12/30/2010 11:30 AM, Jim Farmelant wrote: On Thu, 30 Dec 2010 10:22:14 -0500 Ralph Dumain rdum...@autodidactproject.org writes: Itsworth contemplating the symbiosis between Rosa's juvenile Wittgensteinianism and sectarianism. He differs from Henry Ford in declaring that, not history, but all philosophy, is bunk. And if this doesn't show you that the British far left--if that's what he is--is not at the end of its rope, what does? Well, Rosa is a supporter of the British SWP which is still officially committed towards dialectical materialism as the philosophical basis for Marxism. However, she is supported by Richard Seymour who is very much a rising star within that party and the far generally in the UK. Jim Farmelant http://independent.academia.edu/JimFarmelant www.foxymath.com Learn or Review Basic Math ___ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis
Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] Guy Robinson on Thomas Kuhn
What's interesting about Plekhanov's Cant Against Kant is that in the process of refuting Bernstein's scapegoating of the dialectic, Plekhanov falters at the very moment he first cites/Engels/. If there were a philosophical root of the confusion, here's where it would be. It begins with the merging of the dialectics of nature, society, and thought as one and the same, but this ontologolization of dialectics is a mass of logical confusion. With Plekhanov this also goes by the name of monism. But to lay Plekhanov's error as one of beginning with the wrong philosophy would be to duplicate his own mistake, for there's more to it. Plekhanov makes his first mistake by bypassing Marxism--I mean Marx's approach to analyzing society and the ideological phenomena within it--in favor of analyzing the putative philosophical preconditions or foundation of Marxism--dialectical materialism. This is pure nonsense. Is this where the Soviets got this bad habit from? Another of his blunders is his crude analysis of a probably correct assertion of the petty-bourgeois basis of Neo-Kantianism, which however asserts nothing meaningful unless one proceeds beyond propaganda to explain the connection. Plekhanov combats Bernstein's empirical assertions with his own. He combats metaphysics with metaphysics, empiricism with empiricism. These two elements interplay in an entirely confused fashion. On 12/30/2010 11:29 AM, Ralph Dumain wrote: I tried checking the text at leninist.biz, but I found the Plekhanov volume impossible to navigate. I wish someone would make this correction for me, because I would like to use this quote. It looks like I already did some preliminary spadework, viz. . . . Neo-Kantianism, Its History, Influence, and Relation to Socialism: Selected Secondary Bibliography http://www.autodidactproject.org/bib/neokantianism_biblio_1.html There I link to 6 articles by Plekhanov on Kantianism. That entire period in philosophy, and for decades to come in continental European philosophy, was dominated by the Neo-Kantian influence. These debates are a small part of the overall picture. On 12/30/2010 11:14 AM, Ralph Dumain wrote: I was thinking of the philosophical backwardness prevalent in the Second International. I do like this quote from Plekhanov, however: Strictly speaking, /partisan science/ is impossible, but, regrettably enough, the existence is highly possible of /scientists who are imbued with the spirit of parties and with class selfishness/. When Marxists speak of bourgeois science with contempt, it is scientists of that brand that they have in view. It is to such scientists that the gentlemen Herr Bernstein has learnt so much from belong, /viz./ J. Wolf, Schulze-Gävernitz, and many others. Even if nine-tenths of scientific socialism has been taken from the writings of bourgeois economists, it has not been taken in the way in which Herr Bernstein has borrowed from the Brentanoists and other apologists of capitalism the material he uses to revise Marxism. Marx and Engels were able to take a /critical/ attitude towards bourgeois scientists, something that Herr Bernstein has been unable or unwilling to do. When he learns from them, he simply places himself under their influence and, without noticing the fact, adopts their apologetics. Georgi Plekhanov, *Cant Against Kant, or Herr Bernstein's Will and Testament* (August 1901) http://www.marxists.org/archive/plekhanov/1901/xx/cant.htm There must be a transcription error here: so much from *belong*: doesn't make sense. On 12/30/2010 10:49 AM, c b wrote: On Thu, Dec 30, 2010 at 10:22 AM, Ralph Dumain rdum...@autodidactproject.orgwrote: This is a commonplace analysis of Descartescritique of the whole epistemological tradition that came out of this. However, the disavowal of scientific realism is childish. Speaking of childish, It's worth contemplating the symbiosis between Rosa's juvenile Wittgensteinianism and sectarianism. He differs from Henry Ford in declaring that, not history, but all philosophy, is bunk. And if this doesn't show you that the British far left--if that's what he is--is not at the end of its rope, what does? Now I'm reminded that I need to take a look at Plekhanovsee if he's as bad as I'm told he is. ^^^ CB: Well, Plekhanov opposed the 1917 October insurrection. That's pretty stupid sectarian. On 12/30/2010 10:10 AM, c b wrote: That project was exemplified in Descartes' Meditations, and it laid two demands on any account of knowledge and the means to knowledge, demands that set the standard and defined the adequacy of any account. There had been urgent reasons for making those demands but the reasons were historical rather than philosophical and came from the individualistic model of humanity that played such a pivotal role in
Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] Guy Robinson on Thomas Kuhn
On Thu, 30 Dec 2010 09:40:33 -0500 c b cb31...@gmail.com writes: Rosa, Marxist philosophy without theses ? Without theory ? I think that claim has to be understood within the context of Wittgensteinian philosophy. For Wittgenstein the only genuine propositions are those about the external world since those are the only kinds of statements that can be confirmed or disconfirmed. Therefore, statements in mathematics and logic did not qualify as genuine propositions in Wittgenstein's view since they can be analyzed as being either tautologies if true, or contradictions if false. As Wittenstein put it in the Tractatus: - 6.1 The propositions of logic are tautologies. 6.2 Mathematics is a logical method. The propositions of mathematics are equations, and therefore pseudo-propositions. 6.3 Logical research means the investigation of all regularity. And outside logic all is accident. 6.4 All propositions are of equal value. 6.5 For an answer which cannot be expressed the question too cannot be expressed. The riddle does not exist. If a question can be put at all, then it can also be answered. Later on, Wittgenstein writes: The propositions of logic therefore say nothing. (They are the analytical propositions.) 6.12 The fact that the propositions of logic are tautologies shows the formal -- logical -- properties of language, of the world. That its constituent parts connected together in this way give a tautology characterizes the logic of its constituent parts. In order that propositions connected together in a definite way may give a tautology they must have definite properties of structure. That they give a tautology when so connected shows therefore that they possess these properties of structure. 6.13 Logic is not a theory but a reflexion of the world. Logic is transcendental. Later on also: 6.113 It is the characteristic mark of logical propositions that one can perceive in the symbol alone that they are true; and this fact contains in itself the whole philosophy of logic. And so also it is one of the most important facts that the truth or falsehood of non-logical propositions can not be recognized from the propositions alone. And eventually: 6.53 The right method of philosophy would be this: To say nothing except what can be said, i.e. the propositions of natural science, i.e. something that has nothing to do with philosophy: and then always, when someone else wished to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had given no meaning to certain signs in his propositions. This method would be unsatisfying to the other -- he would not have the feeling that we were teaching him philosophy -- but it would be the only strictly correct method. 6.54 My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally recognizes them as senseless, when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up on it.) He must surmount these propositions; then he sees the world rightly. 7 Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent. -- For Wittgenstein, propositions of philosophy are pseudo-propositions. At worst they nonsensical like the propositions of traditional metaphysics. At best, they turn out to be propositions of logical analysis which are still a species of pseudopropositions. Hence, that's why for Wittgenstein there cannot be theses or theories in philosophy. CB http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/theses/index.htm Jim Farmelant http://independent.academia.edu/JimFarmelant www.foxymath.com Learn or Review Basic Math Obama Urges Homeowners to Refinance If you owe under $729k you probably qualify for Obama's Refi Program http://thirdpartyoffers.juno.com/TGL3141/4d1cbf0f10232a1dafcst01vuc ___ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis
Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] Guy Robinson on Thomas Kuhn
It amazes me that this rubbish is considered the cornerstone of 20th century philosophy. From formalism to the censorship of thought. Ultrasophisticated juvenalia. I can see what Rosa--is Rosa really a she or really a Rosa or Lichtenstein?--sees in this. It prevents the self-reflection of a Brittrot sectarian. On 12/30/2010 12:18 PM, Jim Farmelant wrote: On Thu, 30 Dec 2010 09:40:33 -0500 c bcb31...@gmail.com writes: Rosa, Marxist philosophy without theses ? Without theory ? I think that claim has to be understood within the context of Wittgensteinian philosophy. For Wittgenstein the only genuine propositions are those about the external world since those are the only kinds of statements that can be confirmed or disconfirmed. Therefore, statements in mathematics and logic did not qualify as genuine propositions in Wittgenstein's view since they can be analyzed as being either tautologies if true, or contradictions if false. As Wittenstein put it in the Tractatus: - 6.1 The propositions of logic are tautologies. 6.2 Mathematics is a logical method. The propositions of mathematics are equations, and therefore pseudo-propositions. 6.3 Logical research means the investigation of all regularity. And outside logic all is accident. 6.4 All propositions are of equal value. 6.5 For an answer which cannot be expressed the question too cannot be expressed. The riddle does not exist. If a question can be put at all, then it can also be answered. Later on, Wittgenstein writes: The propositions of logic therefore say nothing. (They are the analytical propositions.) 6.12 The fact that the propositions of logic are tautologies shows the formal -- logical -- properties of language, of the world. That its constituent parts connected together in this way give a tautology characterizes the logic of its constituent parts. In order that propositions connected together in a definite way may give a tautology they must have definite properties of structure. That they give a tautology when so connected shows therefore that they possess these properties of structure. 6.13 Logic is not a theory but a reflexion of the world. Logic is transcendental. Later on also: 6.113 It is the characteristic mark of logical propositions that one can perceive in the symbol alone that they are true; and this fact contains in itself the whole philosophy of logic. And so also it is one of the most important facts that the truth or falsehood of non-logical propositions can not be recognized from the propositions alone. And eventually: 6.53 The right method of philosophy would be this: To say nothing except what can be said, i.e. the propositions of natural science, i.e. something that has nothing to do with philosophy: and then always, when someone else wished to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had given no meaning to certain signs in his propositions. This method would be unsatisfying to the other -- he would not have the feeling that we were teaching him philosophy -- but it would be the only strictly correct method. 6.54 My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally recognizes them as senseless, when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up on it.) He must surmount these propositions; then he sees the world rightly. 7 Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent. -- For Wittgenstein, propositions of philosophy are pseudo-propositions. At worst they nonsensical like the propositions of traditional metaphysics. At best, they turn out to be propositions of logical analysis which are still a species of pseudopropositions. Hence, that's why for Wittgenstein there cannot be theses or theories in philosophy. CB http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/theses/index.htm ___ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis
