On Tue, 26 Nov 2002, Irwin Lazar wrote:
Thought this might be worth passing on:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/2514651.stm
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/2514651.stm
Its difficult to tell what the authors have discovered since the paper
won't be published for four months. From
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL_udi=B6V1H-461XHCP
-1_user=10_coverDate=02%2F28%2F2003_rdoc=4_fmt=summary_orig=brows
e_srch=%23toc%235675%232003%2399978%23346577!_cdi=5675_sort=d_
docanchor=wchp=dGLbVzb-lSzBA_acct=C50221_version=1_urlVersion=
Dear Colleagues,
The RIPE NCC received the IPv4 address range 82.0.0.0/8 from the
IANA in November 2002. We will begin allocating from this range
in the near future.
You may wish to adjust any filters you have in place accordingly.
More information on the IP space administered by the RIPE NCC
Doesn't that argue for a more mesh-like architecture?
Thought this might be worth passing on:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/2514651.stm
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/2514651.stm
There is a recent book out called Linked: The New Science of Networks
which details the
Title: Re: Risk of Internet collapse
grows
I think this is old news. There was a cover story back in
1996 time frame on Mae_east. We have to ask how likely is
this with many of the top backbones doing private peering over local
loops, how much damage would occur if an exchange point where
hit?
On Wed, 27 Nov 2002, David Diaz wrote:
I think this is old news. There was a cover story back in 1996 time
frame on Mae_east. We have to ask how likely is this with many of
the top backbones doing private peering over local loops, how much
damage would occur if an exchange point where
On Wed, 27 Nov 2002 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Wed, 27 Nov 2002, David Diaz wrote:
I think this is old news. There was a cover story back in 1996 time
frame on Mae_east. We have to ask how likely is this with many of
the top backbones doing private peering over local loops, how
On Wed, 27 Nov 2002, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Wed, 27 Nov 2002, David Diaz wrote:
I think this is old news. There was a cover story back in 1996 time
frame on Mae_east. We have to ask how likely is this with many of
the top backbones doing
Yah, the abstract indicates what most of us already know. Good coverage
and redundancy options in urban areas; less so for rural areas. Why
should this shock anyone? Imminent death of the 'net is *not predicted ;-)
Eliot
DRD Date: Wed, 27 Nov 2002 07:46:26 -0500 (EST)
DRD From: David R. Dick
DRD Doesn't that argue for a more mesh-like architecture?
From a resiliency standpoint, yes. Economics, and to a certain
indirect sense capacity concerns, favor aggregation over route
diversity. N! is not your friend.
Exactly my thought. I didnt mention it for fear of rambling. But
there are areas of limited redundancy, and those are larger targets.
I used to receive interesting messages from rebels in S. America
because at the time we were working with some of the larger companies
down there by hosting
Anyone have any idea what really happened :
http://www.boston.com/dailyglobe2/330/science/Got_paper_+.shtml
snip
It was too late. Somewhere in the web of copper wires and glass fibers that
connects the hospital's two campuses and satellite offices, the data was stuck
in an endless loop.
Hmm, well until the comment about STP it sounded like the guy did something
stupid on a program/database on a mainframe..
I cant see how STP could do this or require that level of DR. Perhaps its just
the scapegoat for the Doc's mistake which he didnt want to admit!
STeve
On Wed, 27 Nov 2002,
On Wednesday, Nov 27, 2002, at 10:25 Canada/Eastern, Stephen J. Wilcox
wrote:
Hmm, well until the comment about STP it sounded like the guy did
something
stupid on a program/database on a mainframe..
I cant see how STP could do this or require that level of DR. Perhaps
its just
the scapegoat
Sure, which is why
Within a few hours, Cisco Systems, the hospital's network provider, was loading
thousands of pounds of network equipment onto an airplane in California, bound
seems somewhat excessive! :)
and
The crisis began on a Wednesday afternoon, Nov. 13, and lasted nearly four
days
Anyone have any idea what really happened :
http://www.boston.com/dailyglobe2/330/science/Got_paper_+.shtml
I know someone who worked on it, but I've avoided asking what
really happened so I don't freak out the day the ambulence drives
me up to their emergency room :) The other day, I did
The full paper is available at:
http://whopper.sbs.ohio-state.edu/grads/tgrubesi/survive.pdf
password: grubesic
It was posted on the www.cybergeography.org website with the password,
plus I'm sure Tony would like the feedback.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
CALL FOR PRESENTATIONS
NANOG 27
GENERAL SESSION
TUTORIALS
Cisco wins...
As a result of the crash, Beth Israel Deaconess plans to spend $3 million to
replace its entire network - creating an entire parallel set of wires and
switches, double the capacity the medical center thought it needed.
Huff, Mark.vcf
Description: Binary data
Cisco wins...
As a result of the crash, Beth Israel Deaconess plans to spend $3 million to
replace its entire network - creating an entire parallel set of wires and
switches, double the capacity the medical center thought it needed.
The question is for how long that parallel network would
At 11:10 AM -0500 11/27/02, Eric Gauthier wrote:
I don't know which scares me more: that the hospital messed up spanning-tree
so badly (which means they likely had it turned off) that it imploded
their entire network. Or that it took them 4 days to figure it out.
If it's anything like a
Oh wow I worked for a company who integrated some fairly large network based
imaging systems in there and things were broken then too.
Their techs kept cutting fibers and disconnecting nodes and it took days for
them to figure out why.
- Original Message -
From: Huff, Mark [EMAIL
Many people have asked to to update my complexity pages
with a bit of theoretical background to to support some
of the material there (in particular, percolation
theory). So, as promised, I've updated
http://www.maoz.com/~dmm/complexity_and_the_internet
We
have a /23 (199.5.156/23) and seem to be having a problem with our ISP (Network
Access Solutions - NAS) .
We
do not do our own route advertising - they do it for us and route the block to
our connection.
The
problem is that the second part of the block (199.5.157.0 -
On Wed, 27 Nov 2002 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
It depends which exchange point is hit. There are a couple of buildings
in London which if hit would have a disasterous affect on UK and European
peering.
Why hit buildings when removing relatively small number of people will
render Internet
If they werent there before, it means someone added
them, likely the person in charge of bgp rtr config for that as #
Brian
- Original Message -
From:
Palmer,
John
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Wednesday, November 27, 2002 1:06
PM
Subject: Broken Netmask?
I thought we agreed, no politics
or, =functional= public disruption strategies!
:D
.Richard.
==
A historic moment, the very first head of homeland security,
makes a patriotic speech at a GOP convention:
Genuity filed for bankruptcy today as part of a deal to sell nearly all
of its assets to Level 3.
http://biz.yahoo.com/djus/021127/1744000711_1.html
--Steve Bellovin, http://www.research.att.com/~smb (me)
http://www.wilyhacker.com (Firewalls book)
On Wed, 27 Nov 2002 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
The full paper is available at:
http://whopper.sbs.ohio-state.edu/grads/tgrubesi/survive.pdf
password: grubesic
It was posted on the www.cybergeography.org website with the password,
plus I'm sure Tony would like the feedback.
Was this paper
I guess that means that L3 is giving up its pure-play protestations...
Black(3) Rocket anyone?? ;)
DJ
-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]On Behalf Of
Steve Bellovin
Sent: Wednesday, November 27, 2002 6:25 PM
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject:
Sean:
the marketing maps in Boardwatch are meaningful.
ROFLMAO!! - I needed a good laugh (I'm the NOC babysitter for this round
of Holidays.. looking at a boring 4 days. )
On the semi-productive almost on-topic side:
Are there any GOOD maps out there? I don't have a
Minimal social engineering plus a weak network security infrastructure
is a disaster waiting to happen for any major medical facility.
You forgot to mention probable political infighting. And maybe
inexperienced leadership. My favorite snippet from the article is:
Dr. John Halamka,
Just a data point here, most hospital networks and it departments are headed
by Doctor's. They have to sign off on everything from equipment selection,
platform changes everything. Some have a clew but admittedly its no more
than a self taught clew of the very basics from having 3 servers at
This is an FYI only...
The first meeting of the South Asia Network Operators Group (SANOG) will
take place alongside ITConference2003 (http://www.itconference.org.np/) in
Kathmandu, Nepal on 23rd-27th January 2003.
Its aimed at ISPs and Network Operators in the South Asia region, basically
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