Re: Cisco Vulnerability Testing Results

2003-07-22 Thread Neil J. McRae
You don't know quite how rife that rumour is over here at the moment. Peter, How so unlike you to take an anti-establishment view! Neil

Cisco vulnerability and dangerous filtering techniques

2003-07-22 Thread Adam Maloney
I had a passing thought over the weekend regarding Thursday's cisco vulnerability and the recent Microsoft holes. The next worm taking advantage of the latest Windows' vulnerabilities is more or less inevitable. Someone somewhere has to be writing it. So why not include the cisco exploit in

Re: Cisco vulnerability and dangerous filtering techniques

2003-07-22 Thread Niels Bakker
* [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Adam Maloney) [Tue 22 Jul 2003, 15:33 CEST]: The next worm taking advantage of the latest Windows' vulnerabilities is more or less inevitable. Someone somewhere has to be writing it. So why not include the cisco exploit in the worm payload? Why would a worm disable a

Re: Cisco vulnerability and dangerous filtering techniques

2003-07-22 Thread Stephen J. Wilcox
Hi Adam, I thought the same, and the solution is to apply the filters to all interfaces not just the borders. One thing about the worm idea is that if it hits routers it should burn itself out fairly quickly as it cuts off its own access. Another thing is it is necessary to send out probes

Re: Cisco vulnerability and dangerous filtering techniques

2003-07-22 Thread Valdis . Kletnieks
On Tue, 22 Jul 2003 15:40:02 +0200, Niels Bakker [EMAIL PROTECTED] said: * [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Adam Maloney) [Tue 22 Jul 2003, 15:33 CEST]: The next worm taking advantage of the latest Windows' vulnerabilities is more or less inevitable. Someone somewhere has to be writing it. So why not

RE: Cisco vulnerability and dangerous filtering techniques

2003-07-22 Thread McBurnett, Jim
EXACTLY!! Company A fired the wrong person. DDoS internally. Company B has a Business partner that has VPN access, that get's infected. Company C has a home user that uses VPN on a cable modem. he gets infected Virus writers will see this and use it... What better DDoS method is

Potential downside to using (very) old domain as spam trap.

2003-07-22 Thread David A. Ulevitch
Hi, I've recently been delegated a domain of a dead ISP which hasn't existed in *any* form for about 5+ years. As a test, we setup an MX for it to see what kind of mail it would get since we noted a lot of DNS lookups for it. After going through a few hundred emails it started to look like

Re: Potential downside to using (very) old domain as spam trap.

2003-07-22 Thread Paul Vixie
I've seen people put spamtraps on web pages and at the bottom of emails to use as blacklist fodder but not a whole domain. ... Is this done? Advisable? Experiences? cix.net, which has been dead for a few years, gets about 50 messages a day on its MX. the majority is spam, but there's always

Re: Cisco vulnerability and dangerous filtering techniques

2003-07-22 Thread jgraun
That is a bit paranoid, but it could happen. I have not seen anybody do anything that intelligent in the past couple of years. Not to say that there arent people out there that couldn't do that but I think many have thought of using one exploit to expose another, DDoS is the closest I have

Re: Cisco vulnerability and dangerous filtering techniques

2003-07-22 Thread Valdis . Kletnieks
On Tue, 22 Jul 2003 10:08:42 EDT, you said: I see this as a make or break If someone does not upgrade, well think of this as a roll-coaster. Remember the sign? This ride is not advised for people with bad backs, pregnant ladies.. Someplace I have a sign: Your clue must be at

Re: Cisco vulnerability and dangerous filtering techniques

2003-07-22 Thread Valdis . Kletnieks
On Tue, 22 Jul 2003 14:58:22 -, [EMAIL PROTECTED] said: That is a bit paranoid, but it could happen. I have not seen anybody do anything that intelligent in the past couple of years. Not to say that there arent people out there that couldn't do that but I think many have thought of using

RE: Cisco vulnerability and dangerous filtering techniques

2003-07-22 Thread Austad, Jay
I was thinking about this the other day. The most efficient way to make this work would be to spread using some vulnerability (like the Microsoft DCOM vulnerability released last week), and then at a predetermined time, start DoS'ing routers in the IP space of major providers, and then work your

Re: Potential downside to using (very) old domain as spam trap.

2003-07-22 Thread Chris Lewis
Paul Vixie wrote: therefore before you use whole-domain spamtrapping, i recommend looking VERY carefully at the flows so that you can be sure that i isn't adjacent to o on the qwerty keyboard, or some other such problem. Agreed. But I'll mention a situation where it's very valuable and show

Re: Cisco vulnerability and dangerous filtering techniques

2003-07-22 Thread Chris Lewis
Austad, Jay wrote: I was thinking about this the other day. The most efficient way to make this work would be to spread using some vulnerability (like the Microsoft DCOM vulnerability released last week), and then at a predetermined time, start DoS'ing routers in the IP space of major providers,

Re: Cisco Vulnerability Testing Results

2003-07-22 Thread Peter Galbavy
Neil J. McRae wrote: How so unlike you to take an anti-establishment view! Not anti-establishment. I am far from an anarchist. I am anti-idiot. Peter

RE: Cisco Vulnerability Testing Results

2003-07-22 Thread Bob German
Anti-idiot is not political. It's religion. At least for me it is. Bob German -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Peter Galbavy Sent: Tuesday, July 22, 2003 12:34 PM To: Neil J. McRae Cc: Richard Irving; [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re:

Re: Cisco vulnerability and dangerous filtering techniques

2003-07-22 Thread Jason Frisvold
On Tue, 2003-07-22 at 09:54, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I'm going to go out on a limb and say that at least 30% of Ciscos are installed in places that would, if hit with this, have NO CLUE why their router needs to be power cycled every 30 mins. Not only the clueless, but how about those of

Re: Cisco vulnerability and dangerous filtering techniques

2003-07-22 Thread Allan Liska
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 On 22 Jul 2003, Jason Frisvold wrote: Not only the clueless, but how about those of us who deploy older routers sometime in the future with legitimate uses? What happens when we forget that this bug exists? Now we have to go through the

Re: Cisco vulnerability and dangerous filtering techniques

2003-07-22 Thread Jason Frisvold
In our case we use some older routers as managment devices... Not critical to the core unless there is some larger outage... Those devices are old enough that they can't handle a newer rev of code... ACL's are the only answer there.. Luckily they have very little traffic even under heavy use,

RADb ?

2003-07-22 Thread mike harrison
Does anyone really use the RADb ? Worth the $250 per year? Just wondering if it worth renewing..

The status of consumer rate-limiting?

2003-07-22 Thread Owings, Curtis L [GMG]
Im interested in an informal poll of consumer ISPs regarding application rate-limiting. For all you folks out there managing broadband networks to residential end-users: Are you controlling peer-to-peer traffic in some way (i.e. rate-limiting, blocking, etc)? Do you have plans to

Re: The status of consumer rate-limiting?

2003-07-22 Thread Niels Bakker
* [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Owings, Curtis L [GMG]) [Tue 22 Jul 2003, 20:10 CEST]: I'm interested in an informal poll of consumer ISP's regarding application rate-limiting. For all you folks out there managing broadband networks to residential end-users: We're asking everybody to turn off HTML when

Re: RADb ?

2003-07-22 Thread Kevin Oberman
Date: Tue, 22 Jul 2003 14:25:18 -0400 (EDT) From: mike harrison [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sender: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Does anyone really use the RADb ? Worth the $250 per year? Just wondering if it worth renewing.. Registry is worth it, but you might want to think about a free DB (if you

Re: The status of consumer rate-limiting?

2003-07-22 Thread Dan Hollis
On Tue, 22 Jul 2003, Niels Bakker wrote: * [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Owings, Curtis L [GMG]) [Tue 22 Jul 2003, 20:10 CEST]: I'm interested in an informal poll of consumer ISP's regarding application rate-limiting. For all you folks out there managing broadband networks to residential end-users:

Re: The status of consumer rate-limiting?

2003-07-22 Thread Dr. Jeffrey Race
On Tue, 22 Jul 2003 20:13:35 +0200, Niels Bakker wrote: We're asking everybody to turn off HTML when they post to mailing lists. Here's some boilerplate I wrote for this purpose: http://www.camblab.com/nugget/turnoff.txt

RE: RADb ?

2003-07-22 Thread Ejay Hire
One other option that is worth mentioning.. If you are an Arin member (i.e. you have an ASN) then you can use Arin's Route registry services. These services are currently free to members. -Ejay -Original Message- From: Kevin Oberman [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Tuesday, July 22,

RE: RADb ?

2003-07-22 Thread mike harrison
On Tue, 22 Jul 2003, Ejay Hire wrote: One other option that is worth mentioning.. If you are an Arin member (i.e. you have an ASN) then you can use Arin's Route registry services. These services are currently free to members. Thank You! a common sense answer I had not had hit me over the

The status of consumer rate limiting?

2003-07-22 Thread Owings, Curtis L [GMG]
Repost in plain text... just a little too clicky on the send button folks. I'm interested in an informal poll of consumer ISP's regarding application rate-limiting. For all you folks out there managing broadband networks to residential end-users: Are you controlling peer-to-peer traffic in

Re: RADb ?

2003-07-22 Thread Adam Rothschild
On 2003-07-22-15:01:06, Ejay Hire [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: One other option that is worth mentioning.. If you are an Arin member (i.e. you have an ASN) then you can use Arin's Route registry services. These services are currently free to members. Also worthy of mention is Steve Rubin's most

RE: RADb ?

2003-07-22 Thread Andy Dills
On Tue, 22 Jul 2003, mike harrison wrote: On Tue, 22 Jul 2003, Ejay Hire wrote: One other option that is worth mentioning.. If you are an Arin member (i.e. you have an ASN) then you can use Arin's Route registry services. These services are currently free to members. Thank You! a

RE: Cisco vulnerability and dangerous filtering techniques

2003-07-22 Thread alex
I was thinking about this the other day. The most efficient way to make this work would be to spread using some vulnerability (like the Microsoft DCOM vulnerability released last week), and then at a predetermined time, start DoS'ing routers in the IP space of major providers, and then work

RE: Cisco vulnerability and dangerous filtering techniques

2003-07-22 Thread Austad, Jay
It could poll different looking glasses... -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Tuesday, July 22, 2003 4:01 PM To: Austad, Jay Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: RE: Cisco vulnerability and dangerous filtering techniques I was thinking

Re: Cisco vulnerability and dangerous filtering techniques

2003-07-22 Thread Steve
Just a handful of traceroutes would give it enough information to start at a major backbone and work back towards itself. -SW It could poll different looking glasses... -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Tuesday, July 22, 2003 4:01 PM

RE: Cisco vulnerability and dangerous filtering techniques

2003-07-22 Thread alex
Pray tell, the virus will also get BGP feeds to determine where the edges are? It could poll different looking glasses... And I could be the Pope... How many thousands of polls do you think a looking glass can handle simultaneously? I am all for the doomsday scenarios, but lets make

Re: Cisco vulnerability and dangerous filtering techniques

2003-07-22 Thread alex
Just a handful of traceroutes would give it enough information to start at a major backbone and work back towards itself. I guess all folks with Ph.D. at Akamai really are paid for nothing if a virus could calculate that with a few traceroutes. Alex

Re: Cisco vulnerability and dangerous filtering techniques

2003-07-22 Thread Valdis . Kletnieks
On Tue, 22 Jul 2003 17:50:17 EDT, [EMAIL PROTECTED] said: How many thousands of polls do you think a looking glass can handle simultaneously? I am all for the doomsday scenarios, but lets make them a little bit less sci-fi, shall we? How about it would create valid looking OSPF packets with

Re: Cisco vulnerability and dangerous filtering techniques

2003-07-22 Thread Valdis . Kletnieks
On Tue, 22 Jul 2003 17:51:20 EDT, [EMAIL PROTECTED] said: I guess all folks with Ph.D. at Akamai really are paid for nothing if a virus could calculate that with a few traceroutes. It's actually pretty easy if you get 20K distributed zombies doing the traceroutes and then distributing the data

RE: Cisco vulnerability and dangerous filtering techniques

2003-07-22 Thread Austad, Jay
How many thousands of polls do you think a looking glass can handle simultaneously? I am all for the doomsday scenarios, but lets make them a little bit less sci-fi, shall we? How about it would create valid looking OSPF packets with garbage in them? or create valid looking STP packets

Re: The status of consumer rate limiting?

2003-07-22 Thread Fletcher E Kittredge
Are you controlling peer-to-peer traffic in some way (i.e. rate-limiting, blocking, etc)? no Do you have plans to control peer-to-peer traffic? no Are you imposing other total traffic download/upload limits? no Additional comment: we market based on no limits and so far have met our

Re: The status of consumer rate limiting?

2003-07-22 Thread Fletcher E Kittredge
Are you controlling peer-to-peer traffic in some way (i.e. rate-limiting, blocking, etc)? no Do you have plans to control peer-to-peer traffic?

Re: failure notice

2003-07-22 Thread Valdis . Kletnieks
On Wed, 23 Jul 2003 02:12:53 BST, Stephen J. Wilcox [EMAIL PROTECTED] said: A bit harsh bearing in mind this address is your legitimate reply address from the email.. ! On the other hand, it *would* explain any e-mail based reachability issues... ;) pgp0.pgp Description: PGP signature

Re: ATT Canada Problems ???

2003-07-22 Thread Mike Tancsa
Looks fine to me. Where is / was it croaking for you ? granite# telnet www.allstream.com 80 Trying 207.245.244.30... Connected to www.allstream.com. Escape character is '^]'. HEAD sdfsdfsdf !DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC -//IETF//DTD HTML 2.0//EN HTMLHEAD TITLE400 Bad Request/TITLE /HEADBODY H1Bad

Re: The status of consumer rate limiting?

2003-07-22 Thread Stephen J. Wilcox
Since some p2p programs now use well known port numbers allocated to other things eg port 80, is it even possible to block/rate limit them? And have folks attempts at blocking caused this move to use such port numbers which imho is not a good thing.. Steve On Tue, 22 Jul 2003, Fletcher E

failure notice

2003-07-22 Thread Stephen J. Wilcox
A bit harsh bearing in mind this address is your legitimate reply address from the email.. ! On Tue, 22 Jul 2003, John Palmer (NANOG Acct) wrote: Hi. This is the TMDA program at adns.net. I'm afraid I wasn't able to deliver your message to the following addresses. This is a permanent

ATT Canada Problems ???

2003-07-22 Thread John Palmer
Cannot get to sites on ATT Canada - Any news regarding the problem cause?

Re: Cisco vulnerability and dangerous filtering techniques

2003-07-22 Thread Richard A Steenbergen
On Tue, Jul 22, 2003 at 05:53:45PM -0400, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On Tue, 22 Jul 2003 17:51:20 EDT, [EMAIL PROTECTED] said: I guess all folks with Ph.D. at Akamai really are paid for nothing if a virus could calculate that with a few traceroutes. It's actually pretty easy if you get