I am looking for ideas to stop the spam created by compromised Windows
PC's. This is not about the various worms and viruses replicating but
these boxes acting as open relays or open proxies.
There are valid reasons not to run antivirus software, coupled with
clueless users, this
Tony,
--On 17 February 2004 17:27 -0800 Tony Hain [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Clearly I misinterpreted your comments; sorry for reading other parts of
the thread into your intent. The bottom line is the lack of a -scalable-
trust infrastructure. You are arguing here that the technically inclined
I apologize for the potentially obvious question, but I've been through
sf, google, etc and can't find anything.
I have a customer that is currently getting several hundred thousand
packets per second sent to them on 80/udp. /etc/services lists 80/udp as
IANA assigned for http but I've never
Everybody thinks if its not us, we don't have problem so we dont want
to spend anything to fix it - bu its not true, you already are paying
for it due to increased cost of operation. The cost of fixing your own
network even 50% of other ISPs did it, would in the end be smaller.
The cost of
* No authentication scheme
Bang on!
People do, however, use it because there
currently is no realistic widely deployed alternative available. Those
that are currently available (e.g. SPF) are not widely deployed, and
in any case are far from perfect. Whilst we have no hammer, people will
Thanks for anyone who answered.
Guess, we sorted it out now.
Sven
On Sun, Feb 15, 2004 at 07:31:46PM +, E.B. Dreger wrote:
...
SH As this is a small network internally everything is routed
SH via static routes.
Except for the smallest of networks, I try to avoid static
routes.
Hello
I just wanted to find out what the standard arrangements are when
one buys transit traffic. I've been left in charge of this now,
without haven't been doing this before :-(
So what normally you buy x amount of bandwidth over a physical line
e.g. 45Mb/s over FastEthernet or so. They
Looks like a problem with the first CW router in the path (hop 10) or
somewhere on it's path back to you, not reproducible this morning.
No congestion between ATDN and CW on that link last night. As for
contacts, it's appropriate you call your RR technical support.
However, ATDN issues can be
Howdy,
If someone from Cogeco.net (AS7992) is onboard, please
contact me off-list.
Thanks,
- Christopher
==
On Wed, 18 Feb 2004 10:08:25 +1300, Don Gould [EMAIL PROTECTED] said:
The RFC for mail was very well designed. If people simply stuck to the
orginal RFC (~800 something) and managed more of their own small systems
then this spam thing just wouldn't be the problem that it has become...
would
Folks,
TH If you insist on restricting the service to a small set of 'approved'
TH applications, people will simply encapsulate what they really want to do in
TH the approved service and you will lose visibility.
A small elaboration:
You will make life intolerable for the average user -- ie,
Dave Crocker wrote:
Folks,
TH If you insist on restricting the service to a small set of 'approved'
TH applications, people will simply encapsulate what they really want to
do in
TH the approved service and you will lose visibility.
A small elaboration:
You will make life
Will an employee of the Equinix corporation please contact me off-list?
This is regarding equipment delivery issues at 350 E. Cermak.
I think that the registration oriented authentication mechanisms (spf,
rmx, lmap, etc.) can be useful only when the authenticator is the
hosting network provider, rather than a message author.
I think widespread use of SPF will gut the major sources of spam.
The problem with spam proxies
Yes, this seems to be a common thing these days. You send udp/LAGE udp
packets and fragments to port 80 to saturate bandwidth and you combine
that with compromised hosts successively opening and closing TCP
connections to port 80 (Not a syn flood, actual connections that look
to the router in
Wayne E. Bouchard wrote:
Yes, this seems to be a common thing these days. You send udp/LAGE udp
packets and fragments to port 80 to saturate bandwidth and you combine
that with compromised hosts successively opening and closing TCP
connections to port 80 (Not a syn flood, actual connections
Guðbjörn,
I think that the registration oriented authentication mechanisms (spf,
rmx, lmap, etc.) can be useful only when the authenticator is the
hosting network provider, rather than a message author.
GSH I think widespread use of SPF will gut the major sources of spam.
Well, it will gut
Greetings,
Could someone from First American get in touch with me off list? There
seems to be a malfunctioning mail server in the firstam.com domain..
Thanks,
Jonathan
I think that the registration oriented authentication mechanisms
(spf,
rmx, lmap, etc.) can be useful only when the authenticator is the
hosting network provider, rather than a message author.
GSH I think widespread use of SPF will gut the major sources of spam.
Well, it will gut a
Wayne E. Bouchard [2/19/2004 6:16 AM] :
Easy enough to fend off except for the TCP 80 bit. For most of these
attacks, I've taken to just filtering the entire LACNIC and APNIC
address delegations at the host level for the durration of the
incident since, in the general case, my customers (the
How well does Anycast work with Windows 2000 or XP servers? Is the
Microsoft OSPF implementation good enough to use or do people port another
routing implementation?
Yeah, I know about Unix/Linux. All the large scale anycast deployments
I know about are on unix, but I was wondering if anyone
On Wed, 18 Feb 2004 13:06:05 -0500, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Any real solution is going to have to deal with the fact that properly
administered systems are in the distinct minority.
You shut the mal-administered systems of from the internet until they
are no lnger a threat to the internet,
On Tue, 17 Feb 2004, Alex Bligh wrote:
they in turn chose to trust. Take BGP (by which I mean eBGP) as the case in
point: [...] The trust relationship is
important, [...]. BGP allows me (in commonly deployed form) to run
a relatively
secure protocol between peers, and deploy (almost)
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