Please contact med off list.
tia
-- amar
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A general question to the list about RoadRunner security...
I've been receiving a DNS flood from either a malicious, or badly
configured IP in Taiwan since last Thursday. I've contacted the ISP
responsible, but if the owner of 140.116.23.19 would
I am sending it to their security/postmaster (Todd Herr) guru now.
-Dennis
-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On
Behalf Of Chris Horry
Sent: Tuesday, June 20, 2006 9:20 AM
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: RoadRunner security
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On Jun 20, 2006, at 6:01 AM, Amar wrote:
Please contact med off list.
Yes, several. Sent my akamai address offlist.
Hi -
At a content forum and NANOG in June 2006 I led some discussions
involving predictions for what the Internet might look like in 2010.
What makes this so interesting is that so many perspectives
highlighted so many potential futures that others had not considered.
When you then discuss the
I'm looking into the FCC ruling to require CALEA support for certain
classes of VoIP providers, as upheld by the DC circuit court a couple of
weeks ago [1]. The portion of VoIP that is covered by this order is pretty
narrow (ie, you provide telephony-like voip services for $$ [read the
specs for
I'm willing to reply on-list, but obviously any business or legal
contacts have to be off-list. For those, I can point you to the
product manager for the technology, but it would frankly be better
for one to go through one's account team, for scaling reasons.
Yes, the vendors are aware
### On Tue, 20 Jun 2006 09:13:16 -0700, William B. Norton
### [EMAIL PROTECTED] casually decided to expound upon nanog@merit.edu
### the following thoughts about Internet 2010 - Predictions for 2010 from
### a Content Forum and NANOG 37 in San Jose:
WBN Content Provider Predictions for 2010
WBN
On 6/20/2006 1:33 PM, Fred Baker wrote:
Yes, the vendors are aware of this. Our legal people track it pretty
closely, and we have been dealing with the issues in Europe,
Australia, and a number of other places for quite a while. We talk
directly with legislators, regulators, and
The draft allows you to have a set of keys in your keychain and
the implementation tries all of them before declaring the segment
as invalid.
No time synchronization required. No BGP message required.
The added cost for CPU-bound systems is that they have to try
(potentially) multiple keys
On 20-jun-2006, at 21:12, Bora Akyol wrote:
The draft allows you to have a set of keys in your keychain and
the implementation tries all of them before declaring the segment
as invalid.
No time synchronization required. No BGP message required.
What if we agree to change the key on our
IBM and Georgia Institute of Technology are experimenting with silicon-
germanium, it is said here:
http://tinyurl.com/g26bu
I find this interesting having just attended NANOG 37 where some
manufacturers of network devices told us in a panel that network
heat problems weren't going away
The added cost for CPU-bound systems is that they have to try
(potentially) multiple keys before getting the **right** key
once
What if we agree to change the key on our BGP session, I add the new
key on my side and start sending packets using the new key, while you
don't have the new key in your configuration yet?
again: try reading the draft
On 20-jun-2006, at 21:23, Randy Bush wrote:
What if we agree to change the key on our BGP session, I add the new
key on my side and start sending packets using the new key, while you
don't have the new key in your configuration yet?
again: try reading the draft
I've read the draft and it
On 6/20/2006 2:57 PM, Hoffpauir, Dusty wrote:
The FCC/FBI have left it up the industry to define a standard, they are
not defining it themselves.
Right. But they do have veto power, and they do not appear to have given
approval yet. Meanwhile the deadline continues to close. This is an
NANOG
Subscribers,
I'm not sure if
you've ever attempted to contact the MSN (Microsoft Network) NOCC, which would
be AS 8075, or 207.68.160.0/19, but their ARIN WHOIS listed
phone numbers are all going to a central receptionist -
+1-425-882-8080,who won't help at all, and won't put you me
On Tue, 20 Jun 2006 21:16:05 +0200, Iljitsch van Beijnum said:
What if we agree to change the key on our BGP session, I add the new
key on my side and start sending packets using the new key, while you
don't have the new key in your configuration yet?
How is that *any* different than you
On 6/20/2006 at 12:33 PM, Iljitsch van Beijnum [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On 20-jun-2006, at 21:23, Randy Bush wrote:
What if we agree to change the key on our BGP session, I add the new
key on my side and start sending packets using the new key, while you
don't have the new key in your
IBM and Georgia Institute of Technology are experimenting
with silicon-
germanium, it is said here:
http://tinyurl.com/g26bu
I find this interesting having just attended NANOG 37 where some
manufacturers of network devices told us in a panel that network
heat problems weren't
USTelecom has put on a free webinar about this, with guests from VeriSign.
It might be on interest.
http://www.ustelecom.org/events.php?urh=home.events.web2006_0615
Frank
-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Eric
A. Hall
Sent: Tuesday, June
David W. Hankins wrote:
IBM and Georgia Institute of Technology are experimenting with silicon-
germanium, it is said here:
http://tinyurl.com/g26bu
I find this interesting having just attended NANOG 37 where some
manufacturers of network devices told us in a panel that network
heat
On Jun 20, 2006, at 12:18 PM, David W. Hankins wrote:
IBM and Georgia Institute of Technology are experimenting with
silicon-
germanium, it is said here:
http://tinyurl.com/g26bu
I find this interesting having just attended NANOG 37 where some
manufacturers of network devices told
I've got a customer who's recently assigned network block
(from ARIN) is being blocked from access to MSN.com, and they
would sure love to have their Hotmail working again. Anyone
know who to contact over there?
[EMAIL PROTECTED] They are pretty responsive.
-Dennis
On Jun 20, 2006, at 11:44 AM, Eric A. Hall wrote:
This is interesting approach. For one, it seems to cover a lot more
technology than CALEA requires. I suppose that is an artifact of
trying to
serve multiple countries' requiresments in a single architecture.
Actually, no.
IANAL
US laws
Once upon a time, Warren Kumari [EMAIL PROTECTED] said:
Nope, all this says is that with sufficient cooling you can go
faster. What we need is going faster with less cooling.
Read the article, not the headline. They got 350GHz at room
temperature (which is a lot more interesting than 500GHz
On Tue, Jun 20, 2006 at 12:59:54PM -0700, Tony Li wrote:
Sure doesn't sound like it. In fact, it sound like they're pushing to a
high frequency regardless of the power and thermal consequences.
I thought their 500 Ghz number was just for rediculous press teasing,
like the people who use lHe to
On Mon, Jun 19, 2006 at 04:25:09PM -0400, Todd Vierling wrote:
On 6/19/06, Lionel Elie Mamane [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
You don't do your financial transactions over HTTPS? If you do, by
the very design of SSL, the tor exit node cannot add any HTTP
header. That would be a man-in-the-middle
Sorry, I should have given a link to the actual archived copy:
http://w.on24.com/r.htm?e=24039s=1k=38C852E931DEFE2A92A709EDE5FCF209partn
erref=website
The master list of event can be found on this page:
http://www.ustelecom.org/webinars.php?urh=home.events.webinars
Frank
-Original
At 12:12 PM 6/20/2006 -0700, Bora Akyol wrote:
The draft allows you to have a set of keys in your keychain and
the implementation tries all of them before declaring the segment
as invalid.
DoS against routers is of course a major concern. Using
encryption has the potential of making DoS
Good comments, please see inline:
-Original Message-
From: Ross Callon [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Tuesday, June 20, 2006 2:06 PM
To: Bora Akyol; nanog@merit.edu
Subject: RE: key change for TCP-MD5
At 12:12 PM 6/20/2006 -0700, Bora Akyol wrote:
The draft allows you to
On Tue, Jun 20, 2006 at 05:06:27PM -0400, Ross Callon wrote:
DoS against routers is of course a major concern. Using
encryption has the potential of making DoS worse, in the
sense that the amount of processing that a bogus packet
can cause is increased by the amount of processing
needed to
The point that I was trying to make (admittedly REALLY badly) was
that this is not the 'next big thing' .
Did you read anything more than just that article?
IBMs press release is here:
http://www-03.ibm.com/technology/news/2006/0620_frozen_chip.html
and they have a video here:
The added cost for CPU-bound systems is that they have to try
(potentially) multiple keys before getting the **right** key
but in real life this can be easily mitigated by having a rating
system on the key based on the frequency of success.
This mitigates the effect of authenticating valid
On Jun 20, 2006, at 4:29 PM, Richard A Steenbergen wrote:
We already collectively wasted our time deploying MD5 passwords
over a big
scare that turned out to be nothing more than someone cracking open
the
manual and rediscovering how stuff worked all along
Bwahahahhahaha.
I work with
I'd still like someone to explain why we're wasting man hours, CPU time,
filling up our router logs, and potentially making DoS easier, for an
attack that doesn't exist.
because the non-existent attack(s) have occurred. and keys have
been compomised.
randy
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