On Friday 08 December 2006 12:50, you wrote:
CNN recently reported that 90% of all email on the internet is spam.
http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/europe/11/27/uk.spam.reut/index.html
I posted my rant a while back to save bandwidth;
http://www.circleid.com/posts/misleading_spam_data/
Hi,
as a comsequence of a virus diffused in my customer-base, I often receive
big bursts of traffic on my DNS servers.
Unluckly, a lot of clients start to bomb my DNSs at a certain hour, so I
have a distributed tentative of denial of service.
I can't blacklist them on my DNSs, because the
I know this is kind of a crazy idea but how about making cleaning up all
these infected machines the priority as a solution instead of defending your
dns from your infected clients. They not only affect you, they affect the
rest of us so why should we give you a solution to your problem when you
Hello, I have been directed to this list by IANA when I asked the
following question:
I am researching ways of device/machine discovery on the
network. This
is similar to the Discovery phase of UPnP devices, which uses the SSDP
protocol.
I have researched far enough to
On Friday 08 December 2006 14:40, you wrote:
For this reason, I would like that a DNS could response maximum to 10
queries per second given by every single Ip address.
That may trap an email server or two.
Did you consider checking what they are looking up, and lying to them about
the
On Fri, 8 Dec 2006, Geo. wrote:
I know this is kind of a crazy idea but how about making cleaning up all
these infected machines the priority as a solution instead of defending your
dns from your infected clients. They not only affect you, they affect the
rest of us so why should we give you
On Fri, 8 Dec 2006, Luke wrote:
Hi,
as a comsequence of a virus diffused in my customer-base, I often receive
big bursts of traffic on my DNS servers.
Unluckly, a lot of clients start to bomb my DNSs at a certain hour, so I
have a distributed tentative of denial of service.
I can't
Actually, reading your reply (which is the same as my own, pretty much), I
figure the guy asked a question and he has a real problem. Assuming he
doesn't want to clean them up is not nice of us.
Infected machines (bots) will cause a lot more than just DNS issues. Issues
like this have a way
Geo. wrote:
I know this is kind of a crazy idea but how about making cleaning up
all these infected machines the priority as a solution instead of
defending your dns from your infected clients. They not only affect
you, they affect the rest of us so why should we give you a solution
to your
On 8-Dec-2006, at 11:52, Geo. wrote:
Actually, reading your reply (which is the same as my own, pretty
much), I
figure the guy asked a question and he has a real problem.
Assuming he
doesn't want to clean them up is not nice of us.
Infected machines (bots) will cause a lot more than
This is an automated weekly mailing describing the state of the Internet
Routing Table as seen from APNIC's router in Japan.
Daily listings are sent to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For historical data, please see http://thyme.apnic.net.
If you have any comments please contact Philip Smith [EMAIL
I have a bots infested network, they really task my services! How can I
make my services ignore them so that the clients start calling me and
spending my tech support budget?
Or:
I have bots on my network and as part of a multi-pronged approach to
cleaning my network while keeping the
On Fri, 8 Dec 2006, Petri Helenius wrote:
Geo. wrote:
I know this is kind of a crazy idea but how about making cleaning up
all these infected machines the priority as a solution instead of
defending your dns from your infected clients. They not only affect
you, they affect the rest
On 12/8/06, Petri Helenius [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Has anyone figured out a remote but lawful way to repair zombie machines?
sure, null route the customer until they clean their hosts up
--- [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
From: Petri Helenius [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Geo. wrote:
I know this is kind of a crazy idea but how about making cleaning up
all these infected machines the priority as a solution instead of
defending your dns from your infected clients. They not only affect
On Fri, 2006-12-08 at 19:56 +0200, Petri Helenius wrote:
Has anyone figured out a remote but lawful way to repair zombie machines?
Very interesting question. I personally believe that OS EULAs and ISP
ToS guidelines provide for an ISP or an OS mfg (i.e. Microsoft) to force
updates and fixes
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
Sorry for the top-post, but wanted to retain context here.
Also, sorry for the specific product mention, but much of is
mentioned below is something that we are doing with ICSS/BASE:
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
This report has been generated at Fri Nov 10 21:40:01 2006 AEST.
Okay, am I the only one who misses this being posted to the list? Yes, I
know that I can go to the site for the report, but it just suddenly
vanished (at least to me), without warning. Was I the only
Aaron Glenn wrote:
On 12/8/06, Petri Helenius [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Has anyone figured out a remote but lawful way to repair zombie
machines?
sure, null route the customer until they clean their hosts up
My question was specifically directed towards zombies that are not local
to
On Fri, 8 Dec 2006, Simon Waters wrote:
I suspect complex rate limiting may be nearly as expensive as providing DNS
answers with Bind9.
Indeed. It is generally accepted that it is easier to simply scale
your service to provide adequate headroom than implement per-client
traffic policies.
On Fri, 8 Dec 2006, Gadi Evron wrote:
Luke:
It is possible the DNS queries made are for non existent domains, fake
replies, perhaps even making them something in 1918 space, and they MAY
stop being not nice netizens.
Configuring your nameservers to randomly give bad answers isn't
considered
Okay, am I the only one who misses this being posted to the list?
Winters: Lieutenant Sobel does not hate Easy Company, Private Randleman. He
just hates you. (from HBO Series: Band of Brothers #1)
According to my kept messages of Nanog List, they were coming every 7 days.
I have them back
On Fri, 8 Dec 2006 09:54:03 -0600
Dave Raskin [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Hello, I have been directed to this list by IANA when I asked the
following question:
An even better set of lists might be:
https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/mboned
You could also look at Cloudshield. I was following the EveryDNS issue this
weekend and this item among the regular VON press release blast jumped out
at me:
http://www.cloudshield.com/news_events/2006_Releases/EveryDNS%20FINAL.pdf
Regards,
Frank
_
From: Frank Bulk
Sent: Friday,
On Dec 8, 2006, at 6:40 AM, Luke wrote:
Hi,
as a consequence of a virus diffused in my customer-base, I often
receive big bursts of traffic on my DNS servers. Unluckly, a lot of
clients start to bomb my DNSs at a certain hour, so I have a
distributed tentative of denial of service. I
According to my archives, the last CIDR report was badly broken:
Recent Table History
Date PrefixesCIDR Agg
03-11-06199409 129843
04-11-06199323 129829
05-11-06199330 129854
06-11-06199273 129854
BGP Update Report
Interval: 25-Nov-06 -to- 08-Dec-06 (14 days)
Observation Point: BGP Peering with AS4637
TOP 20 Unstable Origin AS
Rank ASNUpds % Upds/PfxAS-Name
1 - AS17974 20956 1.7% 66.3 -- TELKOMNET-AS2-AP PT
TELEKOMUNIKASI INDONESIA
2 - AS7018
This report has been generated at Sat Dec 9 14:46:53 2006 AEST.
The report analyses the BGP Routing Table of an AS4637 (Reach) router
and generates a report on aggregation potential within the table.
Check http://www.cidr-report.org/as4637 for a current version of this report.
Recent Table
BGP Update Report
Interval: 24-Nov-06 -to- 07-Dec-06 (14 days)
Observation Point: BGP Peering with AS4637
TOP 20 Unstable Origin AS
Rank ASNUpds % Upds/PfxAS-Name
1 - AS17974 21233 1.7% 67.0 -- TELKOMNET-AS2-AP PT
TELEKOMUNIKASI INDONESIA
2 - AS7018
This report has been generated at Fri Dec 8 21:49:56 2006 AEST.
The report analyses the BGP Routing Table of an AS4637 (Reach) router
and generates a report on aggregation potential within the table.
Check http://www.cidr-report.org/as4637 for a current version of this report.
Recent Table
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