Question re: privacy regulation (USA)

2007-04-07 Thread Martin Hannigan
Dear Colleagues: Anyone have a pointer to a list of regulations, or know off the top of your head, related to data privacy at US ISP's? CALEA? CANSPAM? DMCA? et. al. Please reply off list and I will summarize responses back to the list at a later date. Best Regards, Martin

RE: GoDaddy's abuse procedures [was: ICANNs role [was: Re: On-going ...]]

2007-04-07 Thread Frank Bulk
While you have your friend's ear, ask him why they maintain a spam policy of blocking complete /24's when: a) the space has been divided into multiple sub-blocks and assigned to different companies, all well-documented and queryable in ARIN b) there have been repeated pleas to whitelist a certain

Abuse procedures... Reality Checks

2007-04-07 Thread J. Oquendo
On Sat, 07 Apr 2007, Frank Bulk wrote: While you have your friend's ear, ask him why they maintain a spam policy of blocking complete /24's when: a) the space has been divided into multiple sub-blocks and assigned to different companies, all well-documented and queryable in ARIN b) there

RE: Abuse procedures... Reality Checks

2007-04-07 Thread Frank Bulk
Joe: I understand your frustration and appreciate your efforts to contact the sources of abuse, but why indiscriminately block a larger range of IPs than what is necessary? Here's the /24 in question: Combined Systems Technologies NET-CST (NET-207-177-31-0-1) 207.177.31.0 -

Re: Abuse procedures... Reality Checks

2007-04-07 Thread J. Oquendo
On Sat, 07 Apr 2007, Frank Bulk wrote: Joe: I understand your frustration and appreciate your efforts to contact the sources of abuse, but why indiscriminately block a larger range of IPs than what is necessary? Far too many times I've tried to contact those who have the DIRECT

Re: Blocking mail from bad places

2007-04-07 Thread Thomas Leavitt
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 Here's what one of the messages my system produces: Apr 7 12:02:26 tongs postfix/smtpd[15229]: NOQUEUE: reject: RCPT from mail.middreut.com[208.61.243.195]: 454 Service unavailable; Client host [208.61.243.195] blocked using dnsbl.cagreens.org;

RE: On-going Internet Emergency and Domain Names

2007-04-07 Thread Frank Bulk
One of the reasons that registrars are slow to take down sites that are paid with a credit card is because there is little financial incentive to do sothey've lost money it already, why have a department whose priority is speed if you can hire a person to do it at their own pace and minimize

RE: On-going Internet Emergency and Domain Names

2007-04-07 Thread Jim Popovitch
On Sat, 2007-04-07 at 14:43 -0500, Frank Bulk wrote: One of the reasons that registrars are slow to take down sites that are paid with a credit card is because there is little financial incentive to do so. Also there is the customer numbers affect, most often seen with public companies or

Re: Abuse procedures... Reality Checks

2007-04-07 Thread Rich Kulawiec
On Sat, Apr 07, 2007 at 02:31:25PM -0500, Frank Bulk wrote: I understand your frustration and appreciate your efforts to contact the sources of abuse, but why indiscriminately block a larger range of IPs than what is necessary? 1. There's nothing indiscriminate about it. I often block

RE: GoDaddy's abuse procedures [was: ICANNs role [was: Re: On-going ...]]

2007-04-07 Thread Chris L. Morrow
On Sat, 7 Apr 2007, Frank Bulk wrote: While you have your friend's ear, ask him why they maintain a spam policy of blocking complete /24's when: a) the space has been divided into multiple sub-blocks and assigned to different companies, all well-documented and queryable in ARIN b) there

Re: Abuse procedures... Reality Checks

2007-04-07 Thread Peter Dambier
J. Oquendo wrote: ... So to answer your question about fairness... It's not fair by any means, but it is effective. I see it as follows... Well, that's the reason why I have a gmail account and all my customers have. I can send even from my dynamic ip-address and still they let me in. They

RE: Abuse procedures... Reality Checks

2007-04-07 Thread Frank Bulk
On Sat, Apr 07, 2007 at 02:31:25PM -0500, Frank Bulk wrote: I understand your frustration and appreciate your efforts to contact the sources of abuse, but why indiscriminately block a larger range of IPs than what is necessary? 1. There's nothing indiscriminate about it. I often

Re: Abuse procedures... Reality Checks

2007-04-07 Thread Chris Owen
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 On Apr 7, 2007, at 4:20 PM, Frank Bulk wrote: Sure, block that /29, but why block the /24, /20, or even /8? Perhaps your (understandable) frustration is preventing you from agreeing with me on this specific case. Because what you usually see

Re: Abuse procedures... Reality Checks

2007-04-07 Thread Fergie
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 - -- Rich Kulawiec [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: 1. There's nothing indiscriminate about it. I often block /24's and larger because I'm holding the *network* operators responsible for what comes out of their operation. If they can't hold the outbound

Re: Abuse procedures... Reality Checks

2007-04-07 Thread william(at)elan.net
On Sat, 7 Apr 2007, Fergie wrote: -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 - -- Rich Kulawiec [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: 1. There's nothing indiscriminate about it. I often block /24's and larger because I'm holding the *network* operators responsible for what comes out of their

RE: Abuse procedures... Reality Checks

2007-04-07 Thread Frank Bulk
If they're properly SWIPed why punish the ISP for networks they don't even operate, that obviously belong to their business customers? And if the granular blocking is effectively shutting down the abuse from that sub-allocated block, didn't the network operator succeed in protecting themselves?

RE: Abuse procedures... Reality Checks

2007-04-07 Thread william(at)elan.net
On Sat, 7 Apr 2007, Frank Bulk wrote: If they're properly SWIPed why punish the ISP for networks they don't even operate, that obviously belong to their business customers? All ISPs have AUPs that prohibit spam (or at least I hope all of you do) though are enforced at some places better

Re: Blocking mail from bad places

2007-04-07 Thread Valdis . Kletnieks
On Sat, 07 Apr 2007 11:40:50 PDT, Thomas Leavitt said: ... and why aren't bounce messages standardized in content and formatting?!? Jiminy creepers, why can't people run software that implements standards from the last frikking *millenium*??!? 1891 SMTP Service Extension for Delivery Status

Re: Abuse procedures... Reality Checks

2007-04-07 Thread Fergie
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 - -- william(at)elan.net [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On Sat, 7 Apr 2007, Fergie wrote: I would have to respectfully disagree with you. When network operators do due diligence and SWIP their sub-allocations, they (the sub-allocations) should be

Re: Abuse procedures... Reality Checks

2007-04-07 Thread Stephen Satchell
Frank Bulk wrote: [[Attribution deleted by Frank Bulk]] Neither I nor J. Oquendo nor anyone else are required to spend our time, our money, and our resources figuring out which parts of X's network can be trusted and which can't. It's not that hard, the ARIN records are easy to look up.

Re: Abuse procedures... Reality Checks

2007-04-07 Thread Fergie
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 - -- Stephen Satchell [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: It's *very* hard to do it with an automated system, as such automated look-ups are against the Terms of Service for every single RIR out there. Exactly why is this hard to do? I would think that

Re: Abuse procedures... Reality Checks

2007-04-07 Thread Chris Owen
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 On Apr 7, 2007, at 11:00 PM, Fergie wrote: I would think that it's actually very easy to do when sub-allocations are SWIP'ed. Not that I'm really defending this policy, but sub-allocations are very often not SWIPed. I'd say 75% or more of the

Re: Abuse procedures... Reality Checks

2007-04-07 Thread Fergie
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 - -- Chris Owen [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On Apr 7, 2007, at 11:00 PM, Fergie wrote: I would think that it's actually very easy to do when sub-allocations are SWIP'ed. Not that I'm really defending this policy, but sub-allocations are very

Re: Abuse procedures... Reality Checks

2007-04-07 Thread Chris Owen
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 On Apr 7, 2007, at 11:41 PM, Fergie wrote: Please read what I wrote: I would think that it's actually very easy to do when sub-allocations are SWIP'ed. I cannot, and will not, presuppose that in cases when they are not SWIP'ed that some kind of

RE: Abuse procedures... Reality Checks

2007-04-07 Thread Frank Bulk
Stephen: Are you saying that if there's nefarious IP out there let's automatically blacklist the /24 of that IP? J. Oquendo was describing his own methods and they sounded quite manual, manual enough that he's getting down to a /8 as necessary to blacklist a non-responsive operator. My point

RE: Abuse procedures... Reality Checks

2007-04-07 Thread Frank Bulk
That sounds like a very reasonable perspective and generally the route I follow both as a operator and as someone who works with others. Frank -Original Message- From: william(at)elan.net [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Saturday, April 07, 2007 6:23 PM To: Frank Bulk Cc:

RE: Abuse procedures... Reality Checks

2007-04-07 Thread Robert Bonomi
From: Frank Bulk [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: RE: Abuse procedures... Reality Checks Date: Sat, 7 Apr 2007 16:20:59 -0500 If they can't hold the outbound abuse down to a minimum, then I guess I'll have to make up for their negligence on my end. Sure, block that /29, but why block the

Re: Abuse procedures... Reality Checks

2007-04-07 Thread Dave Pooser
BLUNT QUESTIONS: *WHO* pays me to figure out 'which parts' of a provider's network are riddled with problems and 'which parts' are _not_? I don't know the answer in your case, but in my case the answer is my employer. More specifically, my employer pays me to block junk and let good traffic*

RE: Abuse procedures... Reality Checks

2007-04-07 Thread Frank Bulk
Robert: You still haven't answered the question: how wide do you block? You got an IP address that you know is offensive. Is your default policy to blacklist just that one, do the /24, go to ARIN and find out the size of that block and do the whole thing, or identify the AS and block traffic

Re: Abuse procedures... Reality Checks

2007-04-07 Thread Fergie
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 - -- Chris Owen [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On Apr 7, 2007, at 11:41 PM, Fergie wrote: Please read what I wrote: I would think that it's actually very easy to do when sub-allocations are SWIP'ed. I cannot, and will not, presuppose that in cases

Re: Abuse procedures... Reality Checks

2007-04-07 Thread Chris Owen
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 On Apr 8, 2007, at 2:51 AM, Fergie wrote: Again, a simple recursive WHOIS will show you sub-allocations if they are properly SWIP'ed. Define properly. The Cox addresses in my example are SWIPed. Are they properly SWIPed? How could you tell

Re: Abuse procedures... Reality Checks

2007-04-07 Thread John Levine
Sure, block that /29, but why block the /24, /20, or even /8? Since nobody will route less than a /24, you can be pretty sure that regardless of the SWIPs, everyone in a /24 is served by the same ISP. I run a tiny network with about 400 mail users, but even so, my semiautomated systems are

Re: Abuse procedures... Reality Checks

2007-04-07 Thread Fergie
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 - -- Chris Owen [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On Apr 8, 2007, at 2:51 AM, Fergie wrote: Again, a simple recursive WHOIS will show you sub-allocations if they are properly SWIP'ed. Define properly. The Cox addresses in my example are SWIPed. Are

Re: Abuse procedures... Reality Checks

2007-04-07 Thread Matthew Black
On Sat, 7 Apr 2007 20:41:19 -0500 (CDT) Robert Bonomi [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: BLUNT QUESTIONS: *WHO* pays me to figure out 'which parts' of a provider's network are riddled with problems and 'which parts' are _not_? *WHO* pays me to do the research to find out where the end-user

RE: Abuse procedures... Reality Checks

2007-04-07 Thread Frank Bulk
I guess our upstream provider is a nobody because they have lots of small sub-allocated blocks less than a /24 that they route to different member ISPs. =) What is the point of blocking a /24 on the basis of a /32 if the ISP manages dozens of other /24 or larger blocks? If you're going to do

Re: Abuse procedures... Reality Checks

2007-04-07 Thread Mikael Abrahamsson
On Sat, 7 Apr 2007, Chris Owen wrote: And how do you know the difference? The Cox IP address is SWIPed. Its even sub-allocated. The allocation is just a /19. Exactly, so why not just block whatever the suballocation is? Would mean that companies that properly SWIP their IP-blocks and put