Stephen Satchell wrote:
SWIPs are required for reallocations of /29 and larger if the
allocation owner does not operate a RWhoIs server.
Of course, SWIP is a ARIN thing, and you work for BRITISH
TELECOMMUNICATIONS PLC. As a US network operator, I was well aware of
the requirements for
SWIP is a process used by organizations to submit information about
downstream customer's address space reassignments to ARIN for
inclusion
in the WHOIS database. Its goal is to ensure the effective
and efficient
maintenance of records for IP address space.
Lovely language but it
Maybe ARIN staff should start re-writing policies and
implementing out punishments. Guarantee you if operators were
penalized for not following rules, for allowing filth to leave
their networks, I bet you many maladies on the net would be
cut substantially.
Sorry, that's not their job.
On Wed, 11 Apr 2007 07:07:19 EDT, J. Oquendo said:
these so called rules? Many network operators are required to
do a lot of things, one of these things should be the
mitigation of malicious traffic from LEAVING their network.
And I want a pony.
We don't even do a (near) universal job of
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
* PGP Signed by an unverified key: 04/11/07 at 11:21:15
On Wed, 11 Apr 2007 07:07:19 EDT, J. Oquendo said:
these so called rules? Many network operators are required to
do a lot of things, one of these things should be the
mitigation of malicious traffic from
On Apr 11, 2007, at 11:28 AM, J. Oquendo wrote:
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
* PGP Signed by an unverified key: 04/11/07 at 11:21:15
On Wed, 11 Apr 2007 07:07:19 EDT, J. Oquendo said:
these so called rules? Many network operators are required to
do a lot of things, one of these things should
Warren Kumari wrote:
So, I have always wondered -- how do you customers really react when
they can no longer reach www.example.com, a site hosted a few IPs away
from www.badevilphisher.net? And do you really think that you blocking
them is going to make example.com contact their provider to
: if someone cannot get out somewhere, they're obviously
: going to get in touch with me as to why. Once this is
: done, it is explained
: I've always contacted someone
: after about 3 attempts at getting someone to assess
: their network
I know from experience this doesn't scale into
On Apr 11, 2007, at 2:53 PM, Scott Weeks wrote:
: if someone cannot get out somewhere, they're obviously
: going to get in touch with me as to why. Once this is
: done, it is explained
: I've always contacted someone
: after about 3 attempts at getting someone to assess
: their network
On Apr 11, 2007, at 10:32 AM, Warren Kumari wrote:
Perhaps you could write a nice, simple, friendly guide explaining
how you ensure that your network is never the source of malicious
traffic?
Identify your ownership, and ensure contact information is accurate
and well attended.
On Tue, Apr 10, 2007 at 07:44:59AM -0500, Frank Bulk wrote:
Comcast is known to emit lots of abuse -- are you blocking all their
networks today?
All? No. But I shouldn't find it necessary to block ANY, and wouldn't,
if Comcast wasn't so appallingly negligent.
( I'm blocking huge swaths of
On Wed, Apr 11, 2007 at 03:44:01PM -0400, Warren Kumari wrote:
The same thing happens with things like abuse -- it is easy to deal
with abuse on a small scale. It is somewhat harder on a medium scale
and harder still on a large scale -- the progression from small to
medium to large is
As for documentation on this... There is PLENTY of it. Why should
I write another document no one would follow.
Because you might be a better writer than those other folks. You might
be able to present the right balance of technical detail and policy
goals to be understood by a larger number
I know from experience this doesn't scale into the hundreds of
thousands of customers and can only imagine the big ass eyeball
network's scalability issues...
Hear hear...
Scaling process and procedures is often as hard or harder than
scaling technical things...
It's true. But
--- [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Wed, Apr 11, 2007 at 03:44:01PM -0400, Warren Kumari wrote:
The same thing happens with things like abuse -- it is easy to deal
with abuse on a small scale. It is somewhat harder on a medium scale
and harder still on a large scale -- the progression from
It truly is a wonder that Comcast doesn't apply DOCSIS config file filters
on their consumer accounts, leaving just the IPs of their email servers
open. Yes, it would take an education campaign on their part for all the
consumers that do use alternate SMTP servers, but imagine how much work it
16 matches
Mail list logo
