Re: TCP/BGP vulnerability - easier than you think

2004-04-22 Thread E.B. Dreger
EBD Date: Wed, 21 Apr 2004 10:56:26 + (GMT) EBD From: E.B. Dreger EBD This is more appropriate for cisco-nsp, where it's already EBD been covered, but the TTL 255 hack was introduced in EBD 12.0(22)S and 12.3(7)T if memory serves me. Pretty sparse Memory did not serve me. s/12.0(22)S/12.0

Re: IP economics morphed into (TCP/RST)

2004-04-22 Thread E.B. Dreger
IvB Date: Thu, 22 Apr 2004 18:03:33 +0200 IvB From: Iljitsch van Beijnum IvB Who says BGP sessions must run over IP(v4)? NetBEUI, anyone? No bickering over RFC1918 on WAN links... ;-) Eddy -- EverQuick Internet - http://www.everquick.net/ A division of Brotsman Dreger, Inc. -

Re: Winstar says there is no TCP/BGP vulnerability

2004-04-22 Thread E.B. Dreger
RT Date: Tue, 20 Apr 2004 23:11:28 -0500 (CDT) RT From: Rob Thomas RT We manage well over 150 peering sessions with MD5 passwords RT in place. This includes bogon peering, route-server peering, CYMRU bogon (et al.) route servers are an example of where MD5 or IPSec definitely is a good idea.

Re: TCP RST attack (the cause of all that MD5-o-rama)

2004-04-21 Thread E.B. Dreger
PG Date: Wed, 21 Apr 2004 07:45:36 +0100 PG From: Peter Galbavy PG E.B. Dreger wrote: PG I don't think we're even that far along. If I'm reading FreeBSD PG 4.9 and NetBSD 1.6.2 source correctly, PG PG /usr/src/sys/netinet/in_pcb.c PG PG Should have stretched as far as OpenBSD then. Same

Re: Winstar says there is no TCP/BGP vulnerability

2004-04-21 Thread E.B. Dreger
DH Date: Wed, 21 Apr 2004 02:01:56 -0700 (PDT) DH From: Dan Hollis DH Wouldnt anti-spoofing filters largely eliminate the need for DH all this panic about MD5? But that doesn't push the short-term cost onto other networks. Eddy -- EverQuick Internet - http://www.everquick.net/ A division of

Re: TCP/BGP vulnerability - easier than you think

2004-04-21 Thread E.B. Dreger
ASR Date: Wed, 21 Apr 2004 06:44:14 -0400 ASR From: Adam Rothschild ASR [T]he TTL hack sounds great on paper, but isn't exactly easy ASR to implement when you consider that vendor J and others ASR can't filter based upon TTL... yet. This is more appropriate for cisco-nsp, where it's already

Re: Winstar says there is no TCP/BGP vulnerability

2004-04-21 Thread E.B. Dreger
PS Date: Wed, 21 Apr 2004 14:23:38 +0300 (EEST) PS From: Pekka Savola PS But that doesn't push the short-term cost onto other networks. PS PS Not sure what you're saying. You don't need to deploy PS anti-spoofing filters everywhere. It needs to be done by I was being sarcastic wrt networks

Re: TCP/BGP vulnerability - easier than you think

2004-04-21 Thread E.B. Dreger
IvB Date: Wed, 21 Apr 2004 15:09:15 +0200 IvB From: Iljitsch van Beijnum IvB [T]he filters I listed in my earlier message simply filter IvB RSTs to/from the BGP port without looking at the address IvB fields [...] the BGP hold timer takes care of business here IvB anyway [...] Interesting

Re: TCP/BGP vulnerability - easier than you think

2004-04-21 Thread E.B. Dreger
JK Date: Wed, 21 Apr 2004 20:51:23 -0500 JK From: John Kristoff JK I would say the risk is due to implementation. If the JK vendor's gear vomits quicker due to a resource consumption JK issue in handling MD5, is this really a problem with MD5? Theoretically MD5 and IPSec sound great.

Re: TCP RST attack (the cause of all that MD5-o-rama)

2004-04-20 Thread E.B. Dreger
PWG Date: Tue, 20 Apr 2004 19:24:37 -0400 PWG From: Patrick W. Gilmore PWG Speaking of good randomization, does anyone have a good PWG algorithm to randomize ephemeral ports? Obviously pick PWG random number, see if port is open, if it is, repeat is not PWG a good idea, especially on a busy

Responsibility: user or OS? (Re: Microsoft XP SP2)

2004-04-19 Thread E.B. Dreger
JS Date: Mon, 19 Apr 2004 10:39:10 -0700 JS From: Jeff Shultz JS Also, do you realize how much the 'average technical school JS graduate type' makes just from acquaintances who complain JS that their computers are slow, by simply removing whatever JS flavor of the month backdoor spam proxy

Re: Lazy network operators

2004-04-15 Thread E.B. Dreger
JA Date: Wed, 14 Apr 2004 10:07:30 -0400 JA From: Joe Abley JA There's a slight wrinkle with that for people who want to JA submit mail over SSL. JA JA Several graphical, consumer-grade mail clients let you select JA a port for outgoing mail (SMTP) and also have a checkbox JA for use a secure

Re: Lazy network operators

2004-04-15 Thread E.B. Dreger
JD Date: Wed, 14 Apr 2004 12:16:46 -0700 JD From: JC Dill JD We need to stop whining that it's hard or expensive do to JD the right thing and close loopholes that are abused by JD spammers. It's much harder Aand more expensive long term to JD NOT do the right thing. Leave it for future

Re: Lazy network operators

2004-04-13 Thread E.B. Dreger
EAH Date: Mon, 12 Apr 2004 12:20:01 -0500 EAH From: Eric A. Hall EAH today. If there was a standard that worked for this, we would EAH certainly follow it. EAH EAH Standardized scripts would also be abused. #include pki-and-trusted-peers-debate.h Eddy -- EverQuick Internet -

Re: Lazy network operators

2004-04-13 Thread E.B. Dreger
PV Date: 13 Apr 2004 06:04:04 + PV From: Paul Vixie PV [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Steven Champeon) writes: PV PV SC As of today, fully 60% of my incoming mail is spam; 30% PV SC are bounces from accept-then-bounce servers; and we're PV SC quickly approaching 99% spam for several of the domains PV

VZW + Outlook2003 + SMTPS? MTU? Proxy?

2004-03-22 Thread E.B. Dreger
Greetings, Has anyone encountered Mar 17 14:24:01 mail postfix/smtpd[32452]: SSL_accept error from unknown[166.154.120.211]: -1 Mar 17 14:24:01 mail postfix/smtpd[32452]: warning: Write failed in network_biopair_interop with errno=32: num_write=-1,

Re: Enterprise Multihoming

2004-03-11 Thread E.B. Dreger
PH Date: Thu, 11 Mar 2004 18:21:03 +0200 PH From: Petri Helenius PH Depending on your requirements, the option of having somebody PH redistribute all their BGP routes into ISIS or OSPF might not PH worth looking forward to. Couldn't quite parse this, but it sounds scary. Eddy -- EverQuick

Re: Enterprise Multihoming

2004-03-11 Thread E.B. Dreger
JN Date: Thu, 11 Mar 2004 10:10:17 -0700 JN From: John Neiberger JN My current opinion is that since we can't accept much JN downtime in the case of a single provider failure, it's JN probably not wise to put all of our eggs in Sprint's basket JN even if all circuits are geographically diverse.

Re: Enterprise Multihoming

2004-03-11 Thread E.B. Dreger
PH Date: Thu, 11 Mar 2004 20:31:52 +0200 PH From: Petri Helenius PH I´m refering to the most popular way of causing an IGP PH meltdown. Obviously there are other ways, like software PH defects to make your IGP go mad. But when your upstream´s IGP PH does that, you want to have provider B to

Re: Counter DoS

2004-03-11 Thread E.B. Dreger
VA Date: Thu, 11 Mar 2004 08:12:04 -0500 VA From: Vinny Abello VA Plus imagine an attack originates behind one of these devices VA for some reason attacking another device. It'll just create a VA massive loop. :) That would be interesting. I wonder if it pays attention to the evil bit? ;)

Re: Source address validation (was Re: UUNet Offer New Protection Against DDoS)

2004-03-07 Thread E.B. Dreger
SD Date: Sat, 6 Mar 2004 22:04:58 -0500 (EST) SD From: Sean Donelan SD Would you rather ISPs spend money to SD 1. Deploying S-BGP? SD 2. Deploying uRPF? SD 3. Respond to incident reports? Let's look at the big picture instead of a taking a shallow mutex approach. If SAV were

Re: Source address validation (was Re: UUNet Offer New Protection Against DDoS)

2004-03-07 Thread E.B. Dreger
SD Date: Sun, 7 Mar 2004 02:13:38 -0500 (EST) SD From: Sean Donelan SD Has the number of DDOS attacks increased or decreased in the SD last few years has uRPF has become more widely deployed? Number of life guards on duty increases in the summer. So does drowning. Therefore, having life

layered security for the modern Internet

2004-03-07 Thread E.B. Dreger
Looking at last week's NANOG posts: SAV... 30% of spam from h4x0r3d boxen... bagle... It seems the original definition and ideology of layered security are outdated. Layered security now means: * Do nothing at a given layer if the problem can be solved, or partially solved, at another layer;

RE: layered security for the modern Internet

2004-03-07 Thread E.B. Dreger
CJW Date: Sun, 7 Mar 2004 12:56:35 -0700 CJW From: Christopher J. Wolff CJW My favorite idiom is; You're either part of the problem or CJW part of the solution. Thanks for your contribution. CJW What's your solution? There's no one single answer. That's the whole point. The closest thing

Re: Source address validation (was Re: UUNet Offer New Protection Against DDoS)

2004-03-07 Thread E.B. Dreger
SD Date: Sun, 7 Mar 2004 16:17:50 -0500 (EST) SD From: Sean Donelan SD SAV doesn't tell you where the packets came from. At best SD SAV tells you where the packets didn't come from. If SAV were universal, source addresses could not be spoofed. If source addresses could not be spoofed... SD

Re: Source address validation (was Re: UUNet Offer New Protection

2004-03-07 Thread E.B. Dreger
SD Date: Sun, 7 Mar 2004 17:47:09 -0500 (EST) SD From: Sean Donelan SD In practice, GWF's ... send reports about packets which have SD our IP addresses, but didn't originate here. The last thing Probably because someone else failed to implement SAV. If $origin_net prevented spoofing your IP

Re: Source address validation (was Re: UUNet Offer New Protection Against DDoS)

2004-03-07 Thread E.B. Dreger
CLM Date: Mon, 8 Mar 2004 01:32:51 + (GMT) CLM From: Christopher L. Morrow CLM in a perfect world yes[...] CLM Until this is a default behaviour and you can't screw it up CLM (ala directed-broadcast) this will be something we all have CLM to deal with. Yes. But the only way we'll get

Re: Source address validation (was Re: UUNet Offer New Protection Against DDoS)

2004-03-07 Thread E.B. Dreger
SD Date: Sun, 7 Mar 2004 21:24:44 -0500 (EST) SD From: Sean Donelan SD This confirms my statement. You save nothing by deploying SD SAV on your network. There may be some indeterminate benefit Unless, of course, the traffic originated from your network and it simplifies your backtrace.

Re: Analogies=dead threads (was RE:Open, anonymous services and dealing with abuse)

2004-02-17 Thread E.B. Dreger
RA Date: Tue, 17 Feb 2004 20:38:12 + RA From: Rainer Atkins RA Is it just me, or is it a clear indication that a thread is RA ending its useful life is when people start debating the RA merits of the analogies that have been posed rather than the RA original subject matter of the thread? I

Re: BGP - weight

2004-02-15 Thread E.B. Dreger
SH Date: Sun, 15 Feb 2004 16:50:02 + SH From: Sven Huster [ editted and reformatted for clarity ] SH The core sends to R1, which believes the best path is via R2 SH and sends it back to the core as that's the only way to reach SH R2. Then the core again sends it to R1 and all the same SH

Re: BGP - weight

2004-02-14 Thread E.B. Dreger
SH Date: Sat, 14 Feb 2004 12:23:06 + SH From: Sven Huster SH We had some recent issues were it looks like the core got SH out of sync with the border (looks more like a sw issue SH than just convergence delay) and packets bounced back and SH forth between them. Yikes. I'd try to see what

Re: BGP - weight

2004-02-14 Thread E.B. Dreger
SH Date: Sat, 14 Feb 2004 18:00:51 + SH From: Sven Huster SH The thing that happend was that the core believed that the SH best path out is via R1, which R1 thought it was via R2. So a SH little loop there. So core sends to R1, which sends to R2... where does R2 send the packets? Back to

Re: Dumb users spread viruses

2004-02-08 Thread E.B. Dreger
SD Date: Sun, 8 Feb 2004 15:41:53 -0500 (EST) SD From: Sean Donelan SD http://www.silicon.com/software/security/0,39024655,39118228,00.htm Not surprising. In our experience, I'm not concerned about security, because I don't have anything really important on the computer is all too common of an

Re: Monumentous task of making a list of all DDoS Zombies.

2004-02-08 Thread E.B. Dreger
SD Date: Sun, 8 Feb 2004 02:01:29 -0500 (EST) SD From: Sean Donelan SD Instead of Doubleclick tracking users with Cookies, they SD would be able to track the unique computers from the MAC SD address in the reverse DNS record over time. A MAC address is six octets. Append time past Epoch when

Re: Monumentous task of making a list of all DDoS Zombies.

2004-02-08 Thread E.B. Dreger
SD Date: Sun, 8 Feb 2004 17:43:34 -0500 (EST) SD From: Sean Donelan SD Again, why does an ISP need to spend the money and as you SD point out the extra hassle, to do this? ISPs already have SD all the information they need to trace a subscriber from the SD IP address and timestamp. I'm not

Re: Dumb users spread viruses

2004-02-08 Thread E.B. Dreger
PV Date: 08 Feb 2004 22:46:17 + PV From: Paul Vixie PV There is nothing wrong with a user who thinks they should not PV have to know how to protect their computer from virus PV infections. If we (the community who provides them service PV and software) can't make it safe-by-default, then

Re: Impending (mydoom) DOS attack

2004-02-01 Thread E.B. Dreger
PG Date: Sat, 31 Jan 2004 17:04:32 +1100 (EST) PG From: Phillip Grasso PG I've implemented a means of distributing the www.sco.com/32 PG or any other DDoS destination network block around my own PG AS and blocking it by routing to null on the edge routers. Consider also: Martini tunnels IIRC,

Re: MS is vulnerable

2004-02-01 Thread E.B. Dreger
Date: Thu, 29 Jan 2004 09:26:05 -0500 (EST) From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] This is because your mom doesn't want to have to hire a technical consultant to manage her IT infrastructure when all she wants to do is get email pictures of her grandkids. Problem: 1. Even so-called easy systems are

Re: Outbound Route Optimization

2004-02-01 Thread E.B. Dreger
RAS Date: Mon, 26 Jan 2004 15:35:28 -0500 RAS From: Richard A Steenbergen RAS On Mon, Jan 26, 2004 at 10:58:49AM -0800, Sean Finn wrote: RAS RAS(Quiz for the list readers: RAS What percentage of the Internet routing table does RAS your network actually use?) Perhaps around 25% for

Re: SMTP problems from *.ipt.aol.com

2004-01-18 Thread E.B. Dreger
SR Date: Sat, 17 Jan 2004 08:24:06 +0530 SR From: Suresh Ramasubramanian SR AOL has, since the past several months (over a year I think) SR set up their dynamic IP pool *.ipt.aol.com to hijack port 25 I recall seeing this in November 2002, and believe it had already been in place for a few

Re: sniffer/promisc detector

2004-01-18 Thread E.B. Dreger
DJ Date: Sat, 17 Jan 2004 14:57:19 -0500 DJ From: Deepak Jain DJ I know most people don't take the time to hard code their DJ MACs onto their switch ports, but it really only takes a few DJ seconds per switch with a little cutting pasting -- as DJ customer switches a network port, they just

Re: PC Routers (was Re: /24s run amuck)

2004-01-15 Thread E.B. Dreger
Date: Wed, 14 Jan 2004 23:16:22 -0500 (EST) From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] You may find it interesting that both Linux and FreeBSD now have interrupt coalescing, and www.hipac.org is building a compiled ruleset. grep usec_delay /sys/most/any/nic/driver/*.c Eddy -- Brotsman Dreger, Inc. -

RE: Bandwidth Control Question

2003-12-19 Thread E.B. Dreger
R Date: Fri, 19 Dec 2003 11:05:55 -0800 R From: Roy (CC list trimmed) R Media converters are much cheaper than specialized FX cards R like these. A 10Mbps converters are just $99 each and 100Mbps R is $150. Definitely more attractive than the work needed to prevent ground loops when using

Re: Server mirroring

2003-11-27 Thread E.B. Dreger
P Date: Thu, 27 Nov 2003 16:35:21 -0500 P From: Priyantha P As a part of business continuity plan we are going to have all our servers P replicated in a different place to which a fiber connection is available. P (Currently its running at 100Mb) Servers are running mostly RH Linux 7.2 to P 8.x

Re: Web hijacking by router - a new method of advertisement by Belkin

2003-11-07 Thread E.B. Dreger
DS Date: Sat, 08 Nov 2003 00:16:11 -0500 DS From: Dave Stewart DS Imagine that... they listened to the community. I hate to imagine a Verisign/Belkin hybrid router. (Would that mean that a random, HTTP request to valid FQHN would work once every eight hours? Firmware release only after ICANN

Re: Hijacked IP space.

2003-11-03 Thread E.B. Dreger
HN Date: Tue, 4 Nov 2003 07:25:12 +0200 (IST) HN From: Hank Nussbacher HN They view themselves as leasing out IP address space. HN Although they never reclaim IP address space that has long HN since never been announced. Perhaps if netblocks _were_ reclaimed, 1. Fewer hijackings would happen

Re: Harassment (was Re: ELAN.NET ...)

2003-11-02 Thread E.B. Dreger
There has been more operational and useful discussion on #nanog today than on NANOG-L. Something is wrong with this picture. Eddy -- Brotsman Dreger, Inc. - EverQuick Internet Division Bandwidth, consulting, e-commerce, hosting, and network building Phone: +1 785 865 5885 Lawrence and

Re: Yankee Group declares core routing obsolete (was Re: Anybody using GBICs?)

2003-10-31 Thread E.B. Dreger
Date: Fri, 31 Oct 2003 09:53:09 + From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Todays Internet is much bigger, more diverse, and engineered by people who have a lot higher skill level based on hard-won experience. Why do businesses keep supporting these cheerleader analyst groups who want to treat

Re: [arin-announce] IPv4 Address Space (fwd)

2003-10-30 Thread E.B. Dreger
Date: Tue, 28 Oct 2003 21:51:01 -0500 From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] The real problem is that we have an environment where the malware can figure out how to disable the firewall but the user can't. And part of why the current Internet has so much peer-to-peer traffic on it. ;-) Eddy --

Re: [arin-announce] IPv4 Address Space (fwd)

2003-10-30 Thread E.B. Dreger
JB Date: Wed, 29 Oct 2003 15:27:27 -0600 JB From: Jack Bates JB I think the point that was being made was that NAT allows the JB filtering of the box to be more idiot proof. Firewall rules JB tend to be complex, which is why mistakes *do* get made and JB systems still get compromised. NAT

Re: 'Net security gets root-level boost

2003-10-30 Thread E.B. Dreger
BW Date: Tue, 28 Oct 2003 10:41:56 -0500 BW From: Barney Wolff BW On Tue, Oct 28, 2003 at 09:58:20AM +0200, Hank Nussbacher wrote: BW BW http://www.nwfusion.com/news/2003/1027ddos.html BW BW Love this quote from Verisign: BW BW We tested Anycast for about a year...to monitor its behavior, BW

Re: Yankee Group declares core routing obsolete (was Re: Anybody using GBICs?)

2003-10-30 Thread E.B. Dreger
RAS Date: Thu, 30 Oct 2003 13:08:01 -0500 RAS From: Richard A Steenbergen RAS http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=storycid=75e=18u=/nf/22581 RAS RAS Plainly stated, routers no longer have a home in the core of the network. RAS You might have found a router there five years ago, but most

Re: Yankee Group declares core routing obsolete (was Re: Anybody using GBICs?)

2003-10-30 Thread E.B. Dreger
SR Date: Thu, 30 Oct 2003 13:18:28 -0500 SR From: Suresh Ramasubramanian SR What brand of switch is this guy selling? And what is he SR smoking? Sure would be interesting to find out :) Maybe the Yankee Group is a subsidiary of Ncatal Ventures. Eddy -- Brotsman Dreger, Inc. - EverQuick

Re: Yankee Group declares core routing obsolete (was Re: Anybody using GBICs?)

2003-10-30 Thread E.B. Dreger
DG Date: Thu, 30 Oct 2003 13:52:54 -0500 DG From: Daniel Golding DG Lets all be thankful they are now using ASICs, though! All DG that software based routing was making me nervous - five DG years ago :) Routing or forwarding? Eddy -- Brotsman Dreger, Inc. - EverQuick Internet Division

Re: ISPs' willingness to take action

2003-10-27 Thread E.B. Dreger
MS Date: Mon, 27 Oct 2003 20:06:25 +1000 MS From: Matthew Sullivan MS PS: Some of the worst are in the SORBS database because they MS couldn't even work out how to secure them against simple MS relay. What's an open relay? Exact quote from a local MCSE-happy consultancy. I expect there are

Re: IAB concerns against permanent deployment of edge-based filtering

2003-10-18 Thread E.B. Dreger
Date: Sat, 18 Oct 2003 11:14:42 -0700 (PDT) From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] perhaps. but last I checked, it was the Internet Architecture Board not the Internet Operations Board. So form an architectural purity perspective, sure, don't filter (and by extention, pull out

Re: Tomatoes for Verisign at NANOG 29

2003-10-17 Thread E.B. Dreger
KS Date: Fri, 17 Oct 2003 13:02:31 -0700 (PDT) KS From: Kenny Sallee KS to their own Site Finder site, I'm sure they can KS redirect to other large corporations, who would KS probably pay for that kind of service. Buy this VeriGator? *cringe* Eddy -- Brotsman Dreger, Inc. - EverQuick

Re: Verisign to sell Network Solutions

2003-10-16 Thread E.B. Dreger
CW Date: Thu, 16 Oct 2003 11:19:25 -0400 CW From: Chris Woodfield CW So...correct me if I'm wrong here...does this mean that the CW registry services operations and the GTLD maintenance CW operations for .com/.net will be owned by different CW companies? I wonder just how different they are,

Re: Site Finder

2003-10-16 Thread E.B. Dreger
KH Date: Thu, 16 Oct 2003 15:23:41 -0400 KH From: Kee Hinckley KH Verisign is trying to move this argument into a question of what best KH serves the end-user. They are doing this because the public KH understands that, and because they know they can't win the question KH of what best serves

Re: kooky BGP tricks

2003-10-08 Thread E.B. Dreger
DG Date: Wed, 08 Oct 2003 09:31:45 +0200 DG From: Daniel Golding DG 1) In a way, its fraudulent If not mutually agreed in advance between 65000 and 65100, yes. This is analogous to announcing more specifics from another provider's space. DG 2) Some folks do BGP traffic engineering tricks

kooky BGP tricks

2003-10-07 Thread E.B. Dreger
Greetings all, Time for the kooky routing idea of the year post... Scenario: AS65000 is a bandwidth provider. One of their downstreams wishes to peer with AS65100, or to multihome with AS65100 as a second upstream. The obvious and 100% correct answer is for $downstream to register their

Re: Kiss-o'-death packets?

2003-10-06 Thread E.B. Dreger
PG Date: Mon, 6 Oct 2003 11:45:11 +0100 PG From: Peter Galbavy PG Yes but... there is a strong likelyhood that less paranoid PG protocol implementors (not necessarily designers, just those PG coding stuff from spec) could simplify their lives and not PG check all the right conditions required

Re: Kiss-o'-death packets?

2003-10-06 Thread E.B. Dreger
PG Date: Mon, 6 Oct 2003 19:40:04 +0100 PG From: Peter Galbavy PG No, please do not twist my words; I referrred to poor PG implementations of good ideas. Nowhere did I say that the PG protocol is bad as a result of poor implementations. You warned of the hazards of poor implementation. Fine.

Re: VeriSign Capitulates

2003-10-03 Thread E.B. Dreger
JM Date: Fri, 3 Oct 2003 16:16:29 -0400 JM From: Jared Mauch JM I wonder if they will still present at Nanog? JM JM http://www.nanog.org/mtg-0310/dns.html Perhaps they could give away limited-edition Snubby Mail Rejector t-shirts; bonus points if the shirts include expect script or is

Re: Removal of wildcard A records from .com and .net zones

2003-10-03 Thread E.B. Dreger
ML Date: Fri, 3 Oct 2003 17:50:02 -0400 ML From: Matt Larson [EMAIL PROTECTED] ML VeriSign was directed by ICANN to suspend the Site Finder service by ML 0100 UTC on Sunday, October 5. We requested an extension from ICANN ML to give more notice to the community but were denied. We will be

Re: Annoying dynamic DNS updates

2003-09-29 Thread E.B. Dreger
WCS Date: Mon, 29 Sep 2003 00:05:36 -0500 WCS From: Stewart, William C (Bill), RTSLS [ moderately snipped ] WCS Some cable user's machine running default-configured MS apps WCS is sending Paul dynamic DNS queries that it shouldn't, WCS Well, default-configured Microsoft applications have an

Re: ICMP Blocking Woes

2003-09-29 Thread E.B. Dreger
SMB Date: Mon, 29 Sep 2003 16:10:59 -0400 SMB From: Steven M. Bellovin SMB No, they use icmp. Or at least that's what the XP box SMB sitting next to me does... AFAIK, it's been that way since Win95. I recall a certain vendor's dodgy ISDN router * * * on Windows traceroute, but working fine

Re: anycast (Re: .ORG problems this evening)

2003-09-22 Thread E.B. Dreger
DGA Date: Mon, 22 Sep 2003 18:32:19 -0400 DGA From: David G. Andersen DGA The whole problem with only listing two anycast servers is that DGA you leave yourself vulnerable to other kinds of faults. Your DGA upstream ISP fat-fingers ip route 64.94.110.11 null0 and DGA accidentally blitzes the

Re: VeriSign SMTP reject server updated

2003-09-21 Thread E.B. Dreger
SJW Date: Sun, 21 Sep 2003 15:17:34 + (GMT) SJW From: Stephen J. Wilcox SJW That was my understanding but on checking with Paul he said SJW that NXDOMAIN means dont do further checks so dont look for SJW A... Return NOERROR for one type of RR, but NXDOMAIN for another? Is that valid?!

Re: Verisign vs ICANN

2003-09-20 Thread E.B. Dreger
KH Date: Sat, 20 Sep 2003 17:03:04 -0400 KH From: Kee Hinckley KH The whois database is not a replacement for a DNS query. Especially considering how Verisign whois info often lags waaay behind what is correct. Outdated NS info, anyone? Eddy -- Brotsman Dreger, Inc. - EverQuick Internet

Re: .ORG problems this evening

2003-09-18 Thread E.B. Dreger
TV Date: Thu, 18 Sep 2003 10:05:15 -0400 (EDT) TV From: Todd Vierling TV DNS site A goes down, but its BGP advertisements are still in TV effect. Or are they? Eddy -- Brotsman Dreger, Inc. - EverQuick Internet Division Bandwidth, consulting, e-commerce, hosting, and network building Phone:

Re: .ORG problems this evening

2003-09-18 Thread E.B. Dreger
TV Date: Thu, 18 Sep 2003 11:39:17 -0400 (EDT) TV From: Todd Vierling TV And guess what: neither of the two addresses supplied by TV UltraDNS worked last night for some sites, because their TV anycast configuration is not allowing DNS redundancy. It is TV depending on every site somehow

Re: Worst design decisions?

2003-09-18 Thread E.B. Dreger
PEF Date: Thu, 18 Sep 2003 11:02:08 -0500 PEF From: Peter E. Fry PEF Is that the best example you can come up with? Ever use any PEF Bay equipment...? You have reminded me of Bay's config GUI. I shall have nightmares tonight. Eddy -- Brotsman Dreger, Inc. - EverQuick Internet Division

Re: .ORG problems this evening

2003-09-18 Thread E.B. Dreger
TV Date: Thu, 18 Sep 2003 13:01:18 -0400 (EDT) TV From: Todd Vierling TV BGP doesn't know when a DNS server dies. Therein lies the TV findamental problem of using anycast as an application TV redundancy scheme. But it can and should. Again, seeing if the process is running is easy; verifying

Re: .ORG problems this evening

2003-09-18 Thread E.B. Dreger
TV Date: Thu, 18 Sep 2003 12:52:29 -0400 (EDT) TV From: Todd Vierling TV I couldn't know for sure from some sites, but traceroutes TV sure got there. That would imply that (at their end) the TV advertisements were still up. Which would be an implementation flaw, not something inherently wrong

anycast (Re: .ORG problems this evening)

2003-09-18 Thread E.B. Dreger
Date: Thu, 18 Sep 2003 13:47:01 -0400 From: Keptin Komrade Dr. BobWrench III esq. And, I might add, in the case of a highly complex anycast application, you will need to check not only for correctness, but for timeliness. In a realtime system, something that is late is considered

Re: .ORG problems this evening

2003-09-18 Thread E.B. Dreger
Date: Thu, 18 Sep 2003 10:29:06 -0700 (PDT) From: bmanning Ick. you really believe that BGP can or should be augmented to understand application liveness? BGP reaching past the And why not? BGP deals in reachability information. Perhaps it conventionally represents interface and link

Re: anycast (Re: .ORG problems this evening)

2003-09-18 Thread E.B. Dreger
EBD Date: Thu, 18 Sep 2003 18:01:07 + (GMT) EBD From: E.B. Dreger EBD That's why one uses a daemon with main loop including EBD something like: EBD EBDsuccess = 0 ; EBDfor ( i = checklist ; i-callback != NULL ; i++ ) EBDsuccess = i-callback(foo) ; EBDif ( success

Re: .ORG problems this evening

2003-09-18 Thread E.B. Dreger
TV Date: Thu, 18 Sep 2003 14:22:19 -0400 (EDT) TV From: Todd Vierling TV Sucks to be anyone trying to use the service whose routers TV pick those nodes as the only ones available. That's the TV fault of the implementor, not the client. Yes. TV The major issue here is that no *gTLD*,

Re: .ORG problems this evening

2003-09-18 Thread E.B. Dreger
Date: Thu, 18 Sep 2003 11:36:37 -0700 (PDT) From: bmanning Bill, I know you know better, so let's try more facts and less FUD. Mmmmkay? Your above paragraph is a red herring that is analogous to saying all multihomed services must be run on the router itself. yes, it does

Re: [Re: Change to .com/.net behavior]

2003-09-17 Thread E.B. Dreger
JS Date: Mon, 15 Sep 2003 21:50:42 -0400 JS From: Joshua Sahala JS i'm not sure if it could be cached, but i still see verisign JS pretending to 0wn the net... No, it's not cached. Try dig +norec @a.gtld-servers.net '*.net.' any to confirm. Eddy -- Brotsman Dreger, Inc. -

Re: Where will Verisign stop?

2003-09-17 Thread E.B. Dreger
http://www.internetnews.com/bus-news/article.php/3_85721 Deja vu. If I didn't know any better, I'd think that article were written in the past few days. What's going to happen in another 4.5 years? Shall we have a contest who can write the most accurate article before the next incident

Re: ICANN - Formal Complaint re Verisign

2003-09-17 Thread E.B. Dreger
PH Date: Thu, 18 Sep 2003 00:50:18 +0300 PH From: Petri Helenius PH If I remember correctly, Verisign person stated in an PH interview that they estimate that it will be worth up to PH $100M annually. I'm willing to suffer that sort of burden to, uh, help make the Internet a better place.

Re: News of ISC Developing BIND Patch

2003-09-17 Thread E.B. Dreger
Date: Wed, 17 Sep 2003 18:39:27 -0400 (EDT) From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Any solution which requires uniqueness also requires a singular ultimate authority. Or cooperation between multiple authorities. Of course, how realistic is that? Eddy -- Brotsman Dreger, Inc. - EverQuick Internet

Re: VeriSign responds to complaints via press release

2003-09-17 Thread E.B. Dreger
H Date: Wed, 17 Sep 2003 20:01:37 -0400 H From: Haesu H omg. So VeriSign is requiring all network operations, or the H whole internet to pretty much redo their network per their H Recommendations to allow sitefinder? I definitely want a piece of that $100M. ;-) It's interesting that

Re: .ORG problems this evening

2003-09-17 Thread E.B. Dreger
TV Date: Thu, 18 Sep 2003 00:50:28 -0400 (EDT) TV From: Todd Vierling TV tld[12].ultradns.net, the NS for .ORG, was completely TV unreachable for about an hour or two this evening, timing out TV on all DNS queries. Anyone else see similar? (The hosts are I don't recall having troubles this

Re: .ORG problems this evening

2003-09-17 Thread E.B. Dreger
CLM Date: Thu, 18 Sep 2003 05:28:05 + (GMT) CLM From: Christopher L. Morrow CLM Just because they hosts are on the same subnet and are CLM apparently behind the same end device for you doesn't make CLM them non-geographically diverse if they are really anycast CLM pods, does it? It really

Where will Verisign stop?

2003-09-16 Thread E.B. Dreger
Someone mentioned earlier that Verisign could issue an official- looking cert for an invalid domain. They accidentally issued a cert to a Microsoft imposter. Although it presumably would be illegal (IANAL), what's to say a valid cert wouldn't accidentally be issued for a competitor at the same

Re: Not the best solution, but it takes VeriSign out of the loop

2003-09-16 Thread E.B. Dreger
MD Date: Tue, 16 Sep 2003 11:07:41 -0700 MD From: Mike Damm MD Who's up for creating a network of new gTLD servers? I'm sure I dunno. We'd be trusting those operating the gTLD network. ;-) MD it wouldn't be too hard to reconstruct 90% of the com/net MD zones from publicly available data MD

Re: simple way to fix Verisign DNS issues

2003-09-16 Thread E.B. Dreger
JB Date: Tue, 16 Sep 2003 12:05:04 -0600 JB From: John Brown JB Make sure you tag the route with NO-EXPORT :) Are you sure about this? ;-) Eddy -- Brotsman Dreger, Inc. - EverQuick Internet Division Bandwidth, consulting, e-commerce, hosting, and network building Phone: +1 785 865 5885

Re: Heads up -- potential problems in 3.7, too? [Fwd: OpenSSH Security Advisory: buffer.adv]

2003-09-16 Thread E.B. Dreger
JS Date: Tue, 16 Sep 2003 20:58:13 -0400 (EDT) JS From: James Smallacombe JS I hope you mean OpenSSH 3.7p1 ? No. He means 3.7.1p1 -- fire up your compiler(s) again. Eddy -- Brotsman Dreger, Inc. - EverQuick Internet Division Bandwidth, consulting, e-commerce, hosting, and network building

Re: Root Server Operators (Re: What *are* they smoking?)

2003-09-16 Thread E.B. Dreger
DL Date: Tue, 16 Sep 2003 21:20:08 -0400 (EDT) DL From: David Lesher DL Verisign Move to Mean More Spam DL DL Will that do for a hook? s,to,could, and I'll bite. Gotta keep it factual. Eddy -- Brotsman Dreger, Inc. - EverQuick Internet Division Bandwidth, consulting, e-commerce,

Re: Root Server Operators (Re: What *are* they smoking?)

2003-09-16 Thread E.B. Dreger
SD Date: Wed, 17 Sep 2003 00:48:09 -0400 (EDT) SD From: Sean Donelan SD So, Verisign just returns a NS pointer to another name server SD Verisign controls which then answers the queries with SD Verisign's helpful web site. Queries for random zones make a nice starting point. Eddy -- Brotsman

Patching BIND (Re: What *are* they smoking?)

2003-09-15 Thread E.B. Dreger
PWG Date: Mon, 15 Sep 2003 19:40:33 -0400 PWG From: Patrick W. Gilmore PWG Anyone wanna patch BIND such that replies of that IP addy PWG are replaced with NXDOMAIN? That solves the web site and PWG the spam problem, and all others, all at once. I'd actually go for keeping the A RR for

Re: Patching BIND (Re: What *are* they smoking?)

2003-09-15 Thread E.B. Dreger
EBD Date: Tue, 16 Sep 2003 05:32:50 + (GMT) EBD From: E.B. Dreger EBD I'd actually go for keeping the A RR for '*.net.' and EBD '*.com.' in an authoritative NS's cache. If any other A RR s,authoritative,resolver, Eddy -- Brotsman Dreger, Inc. - EverQuick Internet Division Bandwidth

Re: bgp route-map

2003-08-25 Thread E.B. Dreger
ML Date: Mon, 25 Aug 2003 15:30:01 -0400 ML From: Matt Levine ML Except that what you are proposing would allow your customer ML to announce 2 /16's just fine from within one of rob's bogon ML /8's, as the 2 /16's wouldn't be in your rib. Unless the route server processed all routes (several

Re: Complaint of the week: Ebay abuse mail (slightly OT)

2003-08-04 Thread E.B. Dreger
Date: Mon, 4 Aug 2003 18:50:36 -0400 (EDT) From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] And so we should do nothing? If a _few_ networks null-route abusers, said networks isolate themselves. If _all_ networks cut off abusers, who becomes the island? Fixing the Internet is difficult. What can't be tackled

Re: WANTED: ISPs with DDoS defense solutions

2003-08-03 Thread E.B. Dreger
CLM Date: Sat, 2 Aug 2003 02:45:29 + (GMT) CLM From: Christopher L. Morrow CLM EBD Who should be held accountable for vulnerable boxen? CLM CLM I believe the vendor should, but my opinion matters not :) I agree. It stinks when cutting code, knowing that _some_ competitor is slinging out

Re: WANTED: ISPs with DDoS defense solutions

2003-08-03 Thread E.B. Dreger
EBD Date: Sun, 3 Aug 2003 20:06:16 + (GMT) EBD From: E.B. Dreger EBD Sort of like deaggregating routes, helping track down and Ugh. s/helping/not helping/ Eddy -- Brotsman Dreger, Inc. - EverQuick Internet Division Bandwidth, consulting, e-commerce, hosting, and network building Phone

Re: North America not interested in IP V6

2003-08-01 Thread E.B. Dreger
DGA Date: Thu, 31 Jul 2003 13:10:20 -0400 DGA From: David G. Andersen DGA a) DHCP'ing everyone is just easier. Assign unchanging IP address based on MAC address. Done/done. Eddy -- Brotsman Dreger, Inc. - EverQuick Internet Division Bandwidth, consulting, e-commerce, hosting, and network

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