my sister called me last night to tell me that she was unable
to receive
mail from southwest airlines, and that her e-ticket was in
limbo for some
flight somewhere. i checked and sure enough southwest
airlines has sent
me three or messages per day that i don't want, for most days
out
None of this would be an issue, if abuse desks were:
1. Responsive
2. Responsible
3. Empowered
4. Accountable
Today, they are none of the above.
A lot of people on this list are opposed to increasing
government regulation of the Internet industry.
But how would you feel about a law
When a provider hosts a phishing site for _weeks on end_ and does
_nothing_ despite being notified repeatedly, sometimes a blacklist is
the
only cluebat strong enough to get through the provider's thick skull.
If they are notified that they are an
accessory to a crime and do not take any
meanwhile your sister has the hassle of getting southwest to send that
fax, or changing her travel plans. i'm sure glad you're not running my
isp.
if i were running your isp, paying customers would get to choose.
--- Iljitsch van Beijnum [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Einstein taught as that even the simple act of
observation influences
our surroundings. Wouldn't it make sense to try to
leverage this
influence such that the future is shaped more to our
liking, however
small the change may be?
So you think it's futile to try to get software vendors to improve their
products. I suppose I can go along with that to a certain degree. But how
can you expect end-users to work around the brokenness in the software they
use? This seems both unfair and futile.
at my aforementioned sister's
On Tue, 29 Jun 2004 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
If they are notified that they are an
accessory to a crime and do not take any
action, then doesn't this make the provider
liable to criminal charges?
You would think it would. But who bothers to prosecute? No one.
Did you really inform the
On 29-jun-04, at 22:53, David Barak wrote:
Einstein taught as that even the simple act of
observation influences our surroundings. Wouldn't it make sense to
try to
leverage this influence such that the future is shaped more to our
liking, however small the change may be?
nitpick: it wasn't
--- Iljitsch van Beijnum [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
The principle has been analogized to describe
larger
systems and items, and is a useful but not always
completely accurate metaphor. It is entirely
possible
to observe some things without affecting them.
Is it? If I want to look at
warning. this is about humans rather than about IOS configs. hit D now.
Also, an easy fix like this may lower the pressure on the parties
who are really responsible for allowing this to happen: the makers
of insecure software / insecure operational procedures (banks!) and
gullible
On Sun, 27 Jun 2004, Scott Call wrote:
On the the things the article mentioned is that ISP/NSPs are shutting off
access to the web site in russia where the malware is being downloaded
from.
Now we've done this in the past when a known target of a DDOS was upcoming
or a known website
On Jun 28, 2004, at 1:56 PM, Stephen J. Wilcox wrote:
Personally - bad.
Another personal response (edited from my response to the LINX paper):
Fighting phishing web sites is a necessary and important task. Of
course, part of why it is necessary is because end users are ignorant,
untrained,
Simon Lockhart wrote:
It's wholy unfair to the innocent parties affected by the blacklisting.
i.e. the collateral damage.
You´ll get burned anyway in a bad neighborhood because of the bandwidth
consumed by the crap.
Say a phising site is hosted by geocities. Should geocities IP addresses
be
[In the message entitled Re: BGP list of phishing sites? on Jun 28, 18:43, Simon
Lockhart writes:]
On Mon Jun 28, 2004 at 04:47:21PM +, Paul Vixie wrote:
if it's easier for you to BGP-blackhole these bad sources and the only
reason you don't is because you think it would be unfair
On Mon, 28 Jun 2004, Patrick W Gilmore wrote:
Unfortunately, I worry that this cure is worse than the disease.
Filtering IP addresses are not the right way to attack these sites -
the move too quickly and there is too much danger of collateral damage.
I think part of the point of this
On Jun 28, 2004, at 2:43 PM, Dan Hollis wrote:
On Mon, 28 Jun 2004, Patrick W Gilmore wrote:
Unfortunately, I worry that this cure is worse than the disease.
Filtering IP addresses are not the right way to attack these sites -
the move too quickly and there is too much danger of collateral
On Mon, 28 Jun 2004, Dan Hollis wrote:
When a provider hosts a phishing site for _weeks on end_ and does
_nothing_ despite being notified repeatedly, sometimes a blacklist is the
only cluebat strong enough to get through the provider's thick skull.
there are other reasons aside from
--On 28 June 2004 18:43 +0100 Simon Lockhart [EMAIL PROTECTED]
wrote:
It's wholy unfair to the innocent parties affected by the blacklisting.
i.e. the collateral damage.
Say a phising site is hosted by geocities. Should geocities IP addresses
be added to the blacklist?
What if it made it onto
It's wholy unfair to the innocent parties affected by the blacklisting.
i.e. the collateral damage.
maybe so. but it'll happen anyway, because victims often have no recourse
that won't inflict collateral damage. the aggregate microscopic damage of
this kind is becoming measurable and
jokingly named it the Uniplexed Information and
Computing System (UNICS) as a pun on MULTICS.
-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On
Behalf Of Stephen J. Wilcox
Sent: Monday, June 28, 2004 11:56 AM
To: Scott Call
Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: BGP list
PWG Date: Mon, 28 Jun 2004 15:04:59 -0400
PWG From: Patrick W Gilmore
PWG If the blacklist is only for sites which are weeks, or even
PWG a couple days old, that probably would remove most of the
PWG objections. (I _think_ - I have not considered all the
PWG ramifications, but it sounds like a
Information and
Computing System (UNICS) as a pun on MULTICS.
-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On
Behalf Of Stephen J. Wilcox
Sent: Monday, June 28, 2004 11:56 AM
To: Scott Call
Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: BGP list of phishing sites
: Stephen J. Wilcox [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Monday, June 28, 2004 2:58 PM
To: Smith, Donald
Cc: Scott Call; [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: RE: BGP list of phishing sites?
Hi Donald,
the bogon feed is not supposed to be causing any form of
disruption, the
purpose of a phishing bgp feed
On Mon Jun 28, 2004 at 03:12:12PM -0600, Smith, Donald wrote:
So would ISP's block an phishing site if it was proven
to be a phishing site and reported by their customers?
Would you block access to a kiddie porn site? Do you block access to warez
sites? Both are illegal. I'm not convinced
On 28-jun-04, at 18:47, Paul Vixie wrote:
the root cause of network abuse is humans and human behaviour, not
hardware or software or corporations or corporate behaviour. if most
people weren't sheep-like, they would pay some attention to the results
of their actions and inactions.
It's easy to
On Jun 28, 2004, at 6:24 PM, Iljitsch van Beijnum wrote:
On 28-jun-04, at 18:47, Paul Vixie wrote:
the root cause of network abuse is humans and human behaviour, not
hardware or software or corporations or corporate behaviour. if most
people weren't sheep-like, they would pay some attention to
the root cause of network abuse is humans and human behaviour, not
hardware or software or corporations or corporate behaviour. if most
people weren't sheep-like, they would pay some attention to the results
of their actions and inactions.
It's easy to blame the user, and usually they
Happy Sunday nanogers...
I was doing some follow up reading on the js.scob.trojan, the latest
hole big enough to drive a truck through exploit for Internet Explorer.
On the the things the article mentioned is that ISP/NSPs are shutting off
access to the web site in russia where the malware is
On Sun, 27 Jun 2004, Scott Call wrote:
Happy Sunday nanogers...
I was doing some follow up reading on the js.scob.trojan, the latest
hole big enough to drive a truck through exploit for Internet Explorer.
On the the things the article mentioned is that ISP/NSPs are shutting off
access
On 27-jun-04, at 20:17, Scott Call wrote:
On the the things the article mentioned is that ISP/NSPs are shutting
off access to the web site in russia where the malware is being
downloaded from.
Now we've done this in the past when a known target of a DDOS was
upcoming or a known website hosted
http://www.news.com.au/common/story_page/0,4057,9975753%255E1702,00.html
-Henry
--- Scott Call [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Happy Sunday nanogers...
I was doing some follow up reading on the
js.scob.trojan, the latest
hole big enough to drive a truck through exploit
for Internet Explorer.
So what I was curious about is would there be interest in a BGP feed
(like the DNSBLs used to be) to null route known malicious sites like
that?
i dunno much about this new-fangled DNSBL thing you speak of, but the
original MAPS RBL is still alive and well and available by BGP. the fine
32 matches
Mail list logo
