Tony,
--On 17 February 2004 17:27 -0800 Tony Hain [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Clearly I misinterpreted your comments; sorry for reading other parts of
the thread into your intent. The bottom line is the lack of a -scalable-
trust infrastructure. You are arguing here that the technically inclined
* No authentication scheme
Bang on!
People do, however, use it because there
currently is no realistic widely deployed alternative available. Those
that are currently available (e.g. SPF) are not widely deployed, and
in any case are far from perfect. Whilst we have no hammer, people will
On Wed, 18 Feb 2004 10:08:25 +1300, Don Gould [EMAIL PROTECTED] said:
The RFC for mail was very well designed. If people simply stuck to the
orginal RFC (~800 something) and managed more of their own small systems
then this spam thing just wouldn't be the problem that it has become...
would
Folks,
TH If you insist on restricting the service to a small set of 'approved'
TH applications, people will simply encapsulate what they really want to do in
TH the approved service and you will lose visibility.
A small elaboration:
You will make life intolerable for the average user -- ie,
Dave Crocker wrote:
Folks,
TH If you insist on restricting the service to a small set of 'approved'
TH applications, people will simply encapsulate what they really want to
do in
TH the approved service and you will lose visibility.
A small elaboration:
You will make life
I think that the registration oriented authentication mechanisms (spf,
rmx, lmap, etc.) can be useful only when the authenticator is the
hosting network provider, rather than a message author.
I think widespread use of SPF will gut the major sources of spam.
The problem with spam proxies
Guðbjörn,
I think that the registration oriented authentication mechanisms (spf,
rmx, lmap, etc.) can be useful only when the authenticator is the
hosting network provider, rather than a message author.
GSH I think widespread use of SPF will gut the major sources of spam.
Well, it will gut
I think that the registration oriented authentication mechanisms
(spf,
rmx, lmap, etc.) can be useful only when the authenticator is the
hosting network provider, rather than a message author.
GSH I think widespread use of SPF will gut the major sources of spam.
Well, it will gut a
On Wed, 18 Feb 2004 13:06:05 -0500, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Any real solution is going to have to deal with the fact that properly
administered systems are in the distinct minority.
You shut the mal-administered systems of from the internet until they
are no lnger a threat to the internet,
On Tue, 17 Feb 2004, Alex Bligh wrote:
they in turn chose to trust. Take BGP (by which I mean eBGP) as the case in
point: [...] The trust relationship is
important, [...]. BGP allows me (in commonly deployed form) to run
a relatively
secure protocol between peers, and deploy (almost)
Most of the responses to the anti-spam thread, and the comments to Itojun's
IAB presentation in Miami about filtering, show that this community has been
thoroughly infiltrated and is now as CLUELESS as the PSTN providers, and
just as power hungry. The current ISPs have the opportunity to turn the
In message [EMAIL PROTECTED], Tony Hain writes:
The Internet has value because it allows arbitrary interactions where new
applications can be developed and fostered. The centrally controlled model
would have prevented IM, web, sip applications, etc. from ever being
deployed. If there are any
In message [EMAIL PROTECTED], Tony Hain writes:
The Internet has value because it allows arbitrary interactions where new
applications can be developed and fostered. The centrally controlled model
would have prevented IM, web, sip applications, etc. from ever being
deployed. If there are
The Internet has value because it allows arbitrary interactions where new
applications can be developed and fostered. The centrally controlled model
would have prevented IM, web, sip applications, etc. from ever being
deployed. If there are any operators out there who still understand the
In message [EMAIL PROTECTED], Tony Hain
writes:
The Internet has value because it allows arbitrary
interactions where new
applications can be developed and fostered. The centrally
controlled model
would have prevented IM, web, sip applications, etc. from ever being
deployed. If there are
--On 17 February 2004 12:17 -0800 Tony Hain [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
[with apologies for rearrangement]
The Internet has value because it allows arbitrary interactions where new
applications can be developed and fostered. The centrally controlled model
would have prevented IM, web, sip
: Alex Bligh
Subject: Re: Clueless service restrictions (was RE: Anti-spam System Idea)
The real problem here is that there are TWO problems which interact.
It is a specific case of the following general problem:
* A desire for any to any end to end connectivity using the
protocol concerned
--On 17 February 2004 16:10 -0600 Chen, Weijing
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Sound like an any to any end to end signaling/control mechanism with
authentication capabilities. Smell fishy (packet version of dial tone?)
Since when had dialtone got end-to-end signalling/control? My POTS line
doesn't
, Weijing; [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: Alex Bligh
Subject: RE: Clueless service restrictions (was RE: Anti-spam System Idea)
--On 17 February 2004 16:10 -0600 Chen, Weijing
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Sound like an any to any end to end signaling/control mechanism with
authentication capabilities
Steven M. Bellovin wrote:
In message [EMAIL PROTECTED], Tony Hain writes:
The Internet has value because it allows arbitrary interactions where new
applications can be developed and fostered. The centrally controlled model
would have prevented IM, web, sip applications, etc. from ever being
Randy Bush [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
and, if you want to see a particularly broken example, buy internet
service from t-mobile gprs in the states, port 22 blocked, no smtp
relay, ... walled garden mentality from the get go.
Strangely enough, the only complaints I've heard about t-mob GPRS
On Tue, 17 Feb 2004 21:48:18 +
Alex Bligh [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
a) Some forms of filtering, which do occasionally prevent the customer
from using their target application, are in general good, as the
operational (see, on topic) impact of *not* applying tends to be
worse than
In the immortal words of Robert E. Seastrom ([EMAIL PROTECTED]):
Randy Bush [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
and, if you want to see a particularly broken example, buy internet
service from t-mobile gprs in the states, port 22 blocked, no smtp
relay, ... walled garden mentality from the get
and, if you want to see a particularly broken example, buy internet
service from t-mobile gprs in the states, port 22 blocked, no smtp
relay, ... walled garden mentality from the get go.
The ssh client for the Danger Sidekick is extremely popular, and I
don't think it would be if the
Steve,
--On 17 February 2004 17:28 -0500 Steven M. Bellovin
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
In almost all circumstances, authentication is useful for one of two
things: authorization or retribution. But who says you need
authorization to send email? Authorized by whom? On what criteria?
Authorized
On 17 Feb 2004, Robert E. Seastrom wrote:
Randy Bush [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
and, if you want to see a particularly broken example, buy internet
service from t-mobile gprs in the states, port 22 blocked, no smtp relay,
... walled garden mentality from the get go.
Strangely enough,
Alex Bligh wrote:
Steve,
--On 17 February 2004 17:28 -0500 Steven M. Bellovin
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
In almost all circumstances, authentication is useful for one of two
things: authorization or retribution. But who says you need
authorization to send email? Authorized by whom?
--On 17 February 2004 16:19 -0800 Tony Hain [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Where they specifically form a club and agree to preclude the basement
multi-homed site from participating through prefix length filters. This
is exactly like the thread comments about preventing consumers from
running
17, 2004 4:48 PM
To: Tony Hain; 'Steven M. Bellovin'
Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; Alex Bligh
Subject: RE: Clueless service restrictions (was RE: Anti-spam System Idea)
--On 17 February 2004 16:19 -0800 Tony Hain [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Where they specifically form a club and agree
On Tue, 17 Feb 2004, Stephen J. Wilcox wrote:
On 17 Feb 2004, Robert E. Seastrom wrote:
Randy Bush [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
and, if you want to see a particularly broken example, buy internet
service from t-mobile gprs in the states, port 22 blocked, no smtp relay,
...
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