Re: Scaled Back Cybersecuruty

2003-01-15 Thread Sean Donelan
On Tue, 14 Jan 2003, Pete Kruckenberg wrote: All of the initiatives (only a couple) I've found related to Internet operator security collaboration all appear to be pre 2000. At the May 2001 NANOG, which specifically focused on networking security, there was no presentation or (significant)

Re: Scaled Back Cybersecuruty

2003-01-14 Thread Avi Freedman
In article [EMAIL PROTECTED] Pete Kruckenberg wrote: : One of the criticisms of the change relative to this group : is that the previous stronger wording for the network : operator industry was watered down. Instead of : expecting/demanding/mandating that the industry collaborate : on network

Re: Scaled Back Cybersecuruty

2003-01-14 Thread Avi Freedman
In article [EMAIL PROTECTED] Vijay the Budget Master wrote: : Avi Freedman [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: : Perhaps the Feds (and maybe states) could use their purchasing power : to effect change. Short of that, or regulation, the I don't see how : the serious issues we have with the 'net will get

Re: Scaled Back Cybersecuruty

2003-01-14 Thread Vijay Gill
Avi Freedman [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: Many networks of sizable import have no capex budget, though - or sometimes very little if no engineering resources. They all pay attention to sales - and especially to RFIs and RFQs from the Feds, though. I suspect this will be a self correcting

Re: Scaled Back Cybersecuruty

2003-01-14 Thread Christopher L. Morrow
On 14 Jan 2003, Paul Vixie wrote: This is alarming, considering the increase in attacks against infrastructure, and the sophistication of attacks over the last year. And we still use basically the same ineffective techniques to counteract and track attacks that became household

Re: Scaled Back Cybersecuruty

2003-01-14 Thread Andy Dills
On Tue, 14 Jan 2003, Christopher L. Morrow wrote: To start fixing this problem every ISP really needs some security folks dedicated to customer security issues... These folks need to have the ability to contact customers and shut off services until the problem has been rectified. I'd be

Re: Scaled Back Cybersecuruty

2003-01-14 Thread Johannes Ullrich
i've had absolutely no luck getting the source isp's to care about the problems i've seen at my home firewall in recent weeks. (see below if you wonder whether i'm implicating anyone here.) there's no other way to view the internet than as a worm-infested zombie. hehe... I know the

Re: Scaled Back Cybersecuruty

2003-01-14 Thread Pete Kruckenberg
On 14 Jan 2003, Vijay Gill wrote: Avi Freedman [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: Perhaps the Feds (and maybe states) could use their purchasing power to effect change. Short of that, or regulation, the I don't see how the serious issues we have with the 'net will get resolved. People do. I've

Re: Scaled Back Cybersecuruty

2003-01-14 Thread sgorman1
denominator. Purchasing requirements, subsidies, taxes, regulation??? Maybe a bunch of economic voodoo, but might be a different way of looking at the issue. - Original Message - From: Pete Kruckenberg [EMAIL PROTECTED] Date: Tuesday, January 14, 2003 8:16 pm Subject: Re: Scaled Back

Re: Scaled Back Cybersecuruty

2003-01-14 Thread Martin Hannigan
On Tue, 14 Jan 2003, Andy Dills wrote: On Tue, 14 Jan 2003, Christopher L. Morrow wrote: To start fixing this problem every ISP really needs some security folks dedicated to customer security issues... These folks need to have the ability to contact customers and shut off services

Re: Scaled Back Cybersecuruty

2003-01-14 Thread Avi Freedman
In article [EMAIL PROTECTED] Pete wrote: : I'm trying to envision an RFP that awards business to one or : a few network operators, but requires that they interoperate : effectively with other operators who don't win any of the : business. I've only got a state-level purchasing : perspective, but

Re: Scaled Back Cybersecuruty

2003-01-14 Thread Avi Freedman
In article [EMAIL PROTECTED] you wrote: : Seems to be a case of prisoners dilema. The security of any one network : is to some extent at the mercy of all other connected networks. The : overall security of the network is only as strong as it's weakest link. : In a highly competitive market

Re: Scaled Back Cybersecuruty

2003-01-14 Thread David Scott Olverson
In article [EMAIL PROTECTED] Pete wrote: : I'm trying to envision an RFP that awards business to one or : a few network operators, but requires that they interoperate : effectively with other operators who don't win any of the : business. I've only got a state-level purchasing :

Re: Scaled Back Cybersecuruty

2003-01-14 Thread Vijay Gill
Avi Freedman [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: - Routers must be configured by end of 2003 so that all packets to the control plane must be logically separated from user packets (or demonstrate the ability to take 200mb of attack traffic to the router CPU without having an effect) This at

Re: Scaled Back Cybersecuruty

2003-01-14 Thread sgorman1
willing to provide enough incentive to change the market place? If RFP's alone can't do it what else could be tried? - Original Message - From: Avi Freedman [EMAIL PROTECTED] Date: Tuesday, January 14, 2003 9:06 pm Subject: Re: Scaled Back Cybersecuruty In article [EMAIL PROTECTED] you

Re: Scaled Back Cybersecuruty

2003-01-14 Thread batz
On Tue, 14 Jan 2003 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: :That is the rub. Kind of like targeting treatment for AIDS to those :with the most sexual partners - it helps solves the problem but is it :worth rewarding irresponsible behaviour. I don't think its fair or sensible to evaluate the outcome of a

Re: Scaled Back Cybersecuruty

2003-01-14 Thread Avi Freedman
In article [EMAIL PROTECTED] John wrote: : The problem is that the government does not have large purchasing power : compared to the commercial side of the house. The government doesn't buy in : bulk, doesn't buy often and usually selects the lowest cost. Vendors design : equipment/services

RE: Scaled Back Cybersecuruty

2003-01-14 Thread Merlin Communications
In article [EMAIL PROTECTED] John wrote: SNIP : acknowledge them (this goes for government and industry). And sadly there : are some vendors who are so big or have such a large share of their market : space, that they just do what they want regardless. : John S. Maddaus I really

Re: Scaled Back Cybersecuruty

2003-01-14 Thread Avi Freedman
In article [EMAIL PROTECTED] Mr. Maddaus wrote: : This may be true on the services side of the business but the hw/sw : manufacturing side that provisions the service side has seen fit in years : past to ignore small issues. It is just too costly to develop and support : with limited RD

Re: Scaled Back Cybersecuruty

2003-01-08 Thread Pete Kruckenberg
On Tue, 7 Jan 2003 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: This may be of interst: AP: Bush Expected to Sign Scaled Back Internet Security Plan One of the criticisms of the change relative to this group is that the previous stronger wording for the network operator industry was watered down. Instead of

Re: Scaled Back Cybersecuruty

2003-01-08 Thread Paul Vixie
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Pete Kruckenberg) writes: Is there anything happening with collaborative security policy and remediation in the industry? Has any effort showed progress towards an effective ISAC or similar? Can networks realistically collaborate on security, or do the political and

Scaled Back Cybersecuruty

2003-01-07 Thread sgorman1
This may be of interst: AP: Bush Expected to Sign Scaled Back Internet Security Plan Washington, DC -- A new Bush administration plan aimed at improving the security of key U.S. computer networks will not be as ambitious as previously indicated, the Associated Press reported on Tuesday. The