Re: the O(N^2) problem

2008-04-14 Thread Edward B. DREGER
Stardate Mon, 14 Apr 2008, Suresh Ramasubramanian's log: SR From: Suresh Ramasubramanian SR Looks like what various people in the industry call a reputation SR system I started responding; Suresh's reply came as I was doing so, and put it very succinctly. Reputation system, but inter-network.

Re: the O(N^2) problem

2008-04-14 Thread Suresh Ramasubramanian
On Mon, Apr 14, 2008 at 11:27 AM, Edward B. DREGER [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: For such a system to scale, it would need to avoid OSPF-style convergence. Similarly, I would not want to query, for the sake of example, 15k different trust peers each time I needed to validate a new

Re: the O(N^2) problem

2008-04-14 Thread Steven M. Bellovin
The risk in a reputation system is collusion.

Re: the O(N^2) problem

2008-04-14 Thread Suresh Ramasubramanian
On Mon, Apr 14, 2008 at 11:50 AM, Steven M. Bellovin [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: The risk in a reputation system is collusion. Multiple reputation systems, each with their own reputation .. Sed quis custodiet ipsos custodes and all that .. A lot of the reputation (aka positive reputation) shall

Re: the O(N^2) problem

2008-04-14 Thread Edward B. DREGER
I received an off-list request: Could you clarify what precisely you are trying to secure? I fear that perhaps I am still too vague. When one accepts an email[*], one wishes for some sort of _a priori_ information regarding message trustworthiness. DKIM can vouch for message authenticity, but

Re: the O(N^2) problem

2008-04-14 Thread Joe Greco
The risk in a reputation system is collusion. /One/ risk in a reputation system is collusion. Reputation is a method to try to divine legitimacy of mail based on factors other than whether or not a recipient authorized a sender to send mail. To a large extent, the majority of the focus on

Re: the O(N^2) problem

2008-04-14 Thread Rich Kulawiec
On Mon, Apr 14, 2008 at 01:41:50PM +, Edward B. DREGER wrote: When one accepts an email[*], one wishes for some sort of _a priori_ information regarding message trustworthiness. DKIM can vouch for message authenticity, but not trust. At the moment, this problem can't be solved on an

Re: the O(N^2) problem

2008-04-14 Thread Tony Finch
On Mon, 14 Apr 2008, Edward B. DREGER wrote: When it comes to establishing trust: * The current SMTP model is O(N^2); In practice it's O(N): small-to-medium-sized email systems rely on external reputation providers (blacklists or anti-spam service providers) rather than creating their own

[admin] RE: the O(N^2) problem

2008-04-14 Thread Martin Hannigan
Folks, Same request as the Yahoo! Mail thread, can we go ahead and wrap this up? Excellent points, intelligent positions, but definitely not operational. This one might be great for ASRG, which has been a little more active lately. Best Regards, Marty -- Martin Hannigan

Re: the O(N^2) problem

2008-04-13 Thread David Andersen
Another alternative is something we've been working on that we call Perspectives: http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~dwendlan/perspectives/ Warning: This is a work in progress. The Mozilla plugin is a little flaky and the paper is still being revised for the final revision for USENIX. The SSH

Re: the O(N^2) problem

2008-04-13 Thread Owen DeLong
On Apr 13, 2008, at 5:36 PM, Edward B. DREGER wrote: Bottom line first: We need OOB metadata (trust/distrust) information exchange that scales better than the current O(N^2) nonsense, yet is not PKI. Not sure why PKI should be excluded, but, so far, this is too abstract to know what the

Re: the O(N^2) problem

2008-04-13 Thread Suresh Ramasubramanian
On Mon, Apr 14, 2008 at 10:34 AM, Owen DeLong [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Now I'm lost again. You've mixed so many different metaphors from interdomain routing to distance-vector computaton to store-and-forward that I simply don't understand what you are proposing or how one could begin to