The last patches from this have now been applied so closing this ticket.
Thanks!
Matt
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time has passed... nobody looked at this, sorry.
fixed earlier by disabling those protocol versions :)
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On 6/3/16, 13:23 , "openssl-dev on behalf of Dan Kegel via RT"
wrote:
>1.02 then. (0.9.8 is fine. I'm ok with 1.0.0/1.0.1 remaining broken.)
I compiled your death program, and confirm that it does abort on 1.0.2h.
So presumably no
1.02 then. (0.9.8 is fine. I'm ok with 1.0.0/1.0.1 remaining broken.)
On Fri, Jun 3, 2016 at 10:08 AM, Rich Salz via RT wrote:
> Sorry, but 0.9.8 and 1.0.0 are end of life and getting no updates and 1.0.1 is
> only getting security fixes at this time.
>
> --
> Ticket here:
Sorry, but 0.9.8 and 1.0.0 are end of life and getting no updates and 1.0.1 is
only getting security fixes at this time.
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The commit
From: "Dr. Stephen Henson"
Date: Fri, 1 Apr 2011 15:46:03 +
Subject: [PATCH] Add additional OPENSSL_init() handling add dummy call to
(hopefully) ensure OPENSSL_init() is always linked into an application.
Commit 7d6df9e in master. Thanks!
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Manual page for “openssl cms” says:
If the -decrypt option is used without a recipient certificate then an
attempt is made
to locate the recipient by trying each potential recipient in turn using
the supplied
private key.
To thwart the MMA attack
Thank you! Found the tests that generated this and made sure the temporary
files get removed.
Please get a fresh checkout of the master branch and check again.
Closing this ticket.
Cheers,
Richard
On Thu Jun 02 15:50:32 2016, stef...@sdaoden.eu wrote:
> Yep:
>
> -rw--- 1 steffen steffen
On 03/06/16 12:19, Matt Caswell wrote:
On 03/06/16 10:52, Alfred E. Heggestad wrote:
Hi Matt,
thanks for the suggested API and code. Please find below a suggested
patch that implements this new callback.
the patch is based on 1.0.2-dev from GIT:
url:
Merge RT4241 here as these are best handled together.
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On 03/06/16 10:52, Alfred E. Heggestad wrote:
> Hi Matt,
>
> thanks for the suggested API and code. Please find below a suggested
> patch that implements this new callback.
>
>
> the patch is based on 1.0.2-dev from GIT:
>
> url: git://git.openssl.org/openssl.git
> branch:
On 02/06/16 16:03, Matt Caswell wrote:
On 02/06/16 14:33, Alfred E. Heggestad wrote:
On 01/06/16 13:58, Matt Caswell wrote:
On 01/06/16 11:15, Alfred E. Heggestad wrote:
hi,
we are using DTLS from OpenSSL to implement DTLS-SRTP in our
product (Wire.com) .. The code and implementation
Hi,
> I'm aware it doesn't affect anything because the caller shouldn't process
> more than 2^32 * 64 bytes per key/nonce setup anyway.
>
> I was just wondering because it differs from the s390 asm implementation
> (and whether there is a particular reason to do so).
Implementation is
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