Re: understanding openssl entropy

2012-02-18 Thread David Jacobson
Here is how /dev/urandom works on the systems I've looked at. (More specifically, I'm looking at Ubuntu, but I've also looked at Solaris.) /dev/urandom has some pool of information (commonly called entropy). At shutdown, the system reads a 4K byte block from /dev/urandom and stores it in

add new encryption algorithm to racoon

2012-02-18 Thread aram_baghomian
Hi, I developed an encryption algorithm for freeBsd crypto module. I want to add this algorithm to racoon ipsec-tools for freebsd that it can recognize it In it's config file and use it for encryption connections. I use the 'des' algorithm as a sample and

Re: add new encryption algorithm to racoon

2012-02-18 Thread Jason Gerfen
On Sat, Feb 18, 2012 at 4:50 AM, aram_baghom...@hushmail.com wrote: Hi, I developed an encryption algorithm for freeBsd crypto module. I want to add this algorithm to racoon ipsec-tools for freebsd that it can recognize it In it's config file and use it for encryption connections. I use

RE: understanding openssl entropy

2012-02-18 Thread Edward Ned Harvey
From: David Jacobson [mailto:dmjacob...@sbcglobal.net] Sent: Friday, February 17, 2012 3:33 PM Here is how /dev/urandom works on the systems I've looked at.  (More specifically, I'm looking at Ubuntu, but I've also looked at Solaris.) /dev/urandom has some pool of information (commonly

Re: understanding openssl entropy

2012-02-18 Thread Stanislav Meduna
On 18.02.2012 17:02, Edward Ned Harvey wrote: So these studies went out and scoured the internet, collecting public keys from every service they could find, which amounts to something like 1-2 million servers, and they scanned them all for identical keys and/or shared factors. They found

Re: understanding openssl entropy

2012-02-18 Thread Kurt Roeckx
On Sat, Feb 18, 2012 at 05:28:41PM +0100, Stanislav Meduna wrote: On 18.02.2012 17:02, Edward Ned Harvey wrote: So these studies went out and scoured the internet, collecting public keys from every service they could find, which amounts to something like 1-2 million servers, and they

Re: FIPS fingerprint in .data not .rodata

2012-02-18 Thread Kevin Fowler
On Fri, Feb 17, 2012 at 10:25 PM, Dr. Stephen Henson st...@openssl.orgwrote: On Fri, Feb 17, 2012, Kevin Fowler wrote: Thanks Harvey, This seems to have worked as far as getting the .rodata section used. This is what I see now: 001b5740 g O .rodata0010

RE: understanding openssl entropy

2012-02-18 Thread Edward Ned Harvey
From: owner-openssl-...@openssl.org [mailto:owner-openssl- d...@openssl.org] On Behalf Of Stanislav Meduna On 18.02.2012 17:02, Edward Ned Harvey wrote: So these studies went out and scoured the internet, collecting public keys from every service they could find, which amounts to

Re: FIPS fingerprint in .data not .rodata

2012-02-18 Thread Andy Polyakov
The key thing I realized is that the incore script that comes with the FIPS Object Module v2.0 tarball handles both native AND cross-compile scenarios. Even though FIPS 2.0 util/incore is capable of handling arbitrary ELF binary (native or not), it's not used in non-cross-compile/native

Re: understanding openssl entropy

2012-02-18 Thread Stanislav Meduna
On 18.02.2012 22:47, Edward Ned Harvey wrote: Any link to the studies? - I was not able to find anything relevant. Is this related to the 2008 Debian OpenSSL snafu? Not the debian thing. http://arstechnica.com/business/news/2012/02/crypto-shocker-four-of-every-10