On Tue, May 27, 2014 at 05:23:45AM +, mancha wrote:
On Mon, May 26, 2014 at 09:01:53PM +, mancha wrote:
On Mon, May 26, 2014 at 08:49:03PM +, Viktor Dukhovni wrote:
On Mon, May 26, 2014 at 08:20:43PM +, mancha wrote:
For our purposes, the operative question is
On Tue, May 27, 2014 at 08:23:29AM +0200, Otto Moerbeek wrote:
On Tue, May 27, 2014 at 05:23:45AM +, mancha wrote:
On Mon, May 26, 2014 at 09:01:53PM +, mancha wrote:
On Mon, May 26, 2014 at 08:49:03PM +, Viktor Dukhovni wrote:
On Mon, May 26, 2014 at 08:20:43PM +,
On 5/26/14 2:01 PM, mancha wrote:
On Mon, May 26, 2014 at 08:49:03PM +, Viktor Dukhovni wrote:
On Mon, May 26, 2014 at 08:20:43PM +, mancha wrote:
For our purposes, the operative question is whether the distribution
bias created can be leveraged in any way to attack factoring (RSA)
or
On 25 May 2014, at 23:29, Kurt Roeckx k...@roeckx.be wrote:
On Sun, May 25, 2014 at 10:20:03PM +0200, Michael Tuexen wrote:
I'm just a bit hesitating to invest more time given that
the patch wasn't accepted the last four years... If there is interest,
I would be happy to update it to include
Not quite correct, the prime rands shouldn't come from a DRBG, they should come from an NRBG (NIST terminology).
There's a considerable difference between the performance of an entropy source and a DRBG.
The output of a DRBG not being non-deterministic being the important point.
/dev/random V
On Tue, 2014-05-27 at 09:18 +0200, Michael Tuexen wrote:
Please do update it.
I guess that patch should be against the master branch, right?
(the current patch doesn't apply there...)
That what I was thinking about. Wouldn't it be less work to apply my
patch to master and then apply patch
Am Dienstag, 27. Mai 2014, 17:45:48 schrieb Peter Waltenberg:
Hi Peter,
Not quite correct, the prime rands shouldn't come from a DRBG, they
should come from an NRBG (NIST terminology). There's a considerable
difference between the performance of an entropy source and a DRBG.
Not sure where you
On 27 May 2014 08:45, Peter Waltenberg pwal...@au1.ibm.com wrote:
...
I did change the RNG sources for some of the OpenSSL code in our hacked
version to help with the performance problems using the wrong source causes,
for example RSA blinding data can safely come from a DRBG
On 27 May 2014, at 10:01, Krzysztof Kwiatkowski krzys...@leeds.pl wrote:
On Tue, 2014-05-27 at 09:18 +0200, Michael Tuexen wrote:
Please do update it.
I guess that patch should be against the master branch, right?
(the current patch doesn't apply there...)
That what I was thinking about.
On 2014-05-27 11:13, Michael Tuexen wrote:
On 27 May 2014, at 10:01, Krzysztof Kwiatkowski krzys...@leeds.pl
wrote:
On Tue, 2014-05-27 at 09:18 +0200, Michael Tuexen wrote:
Please do update it.
I guess that patch should be against the master branch, right?
(the current patch doesn't apply
It may have been unreliable, our version isn't. We hook the RNG callbacks and direct them into our own code. That makes some sense of why OpenSSL hasn't fixed those problems, but that probably should be done now you have decent DRBG's.
As for the prime generation, I'll try to dig up a reference,
On 27 May 2014 09:16, Joseph Birr-Pixton jpix...@gmail.com wrote:
On 27 May 2014 08:45, Peter Waltenberg pwal...@au1.ibm.com wrote:
...
I did change the RNG sources for some of the OpenSSL code in our hacked
version to help with the performance problems using the wrong source causes,
for
Hello Stephen,
Yes, it was a problem in our patch. So this ticket (and I think, 2598)
should be closed.
Thank you very much!
On Sun, May 25, 2014 at 5:26 PM, Dmitry Belyavsky beld...@gmail.com wrote:
Hello Stephen,
On Sun, May 25, 2014 at 5:19 PM, Dr. Stephen Henson
Dmitry has confirmed that this is not a defect, so closing this ticket.
Matt
__
OpenSSL Project http://www.openssl.org
Development Mailing List openssl-dev@openssl.org
Dmitry has confirmed that this is not a defect, so closing this ticket.
Matt
__
OpenSSL Project http://www.openssl.org
Development Mailing List openssl-dev@openssl.org
On 27 May 2014 15:40, Dmitry Belyavsky beld...@gmail.com wrote:
Hello Stephen,
Yes, it was a problem in our patch. So this ticket (and I think, 2598)
should be closed.
What about 2745?
Matt
__
OpenSSL Project
Hello,
I think it is not to be closed, the leak occurs.
On Tue, May 27, 2014 at 7:23 PM, Matt Caswell m...@openssl.org wrote:
On 27 May 2014 15:40, Dmitry Belyavsky beld...@gmail.com wrote:
Hello Stephen,
Yes, it was a problem in our patch. So this ticket (and I think, 2598)
should be
Nice idea.
It inspired my son, Felix, and I to think about a related idea:
generate random numbers which are inherently coprime to small primes.
Felix went on to implement the idea, and include benchmarks and tests.
Not finished - while implementing, we noticed that the existing prime
number
Note that the indexes for 7, 11, 13, and 19 repeat with period 45, so they
could be a single lookup table instead several tables with mod operations:
sumBytes = {
{ 1, 4, 2, 1, 4, 2, 1, 4, 2 ... },
{ 1, 3, 9, 5, 4, 1, 3, 9, 5, 4, ... },
{ 1, 9, 3, 1, 9, 3, ... },
{ 1, 9, 5, 7, 6,
Am 27.05.2014 12:04, schrieb Ben Laurie:
On 26 May 2014 21:15, Annie a.you...@informatik.hu-berlin.de wrote:
Am 26.05.2014 21:23, schrieb Ben Laurie:
On 26 May 2014 19:52, Viktor Dukhovni openssl-us...@dukhovni.org wrote:
On Mon, May 26, 2014 at 07:24:54PM +0100, Ben Laurie wrote:
Finally,
On Tue, May 27, 2014, Ben Laurie wrote:
Nice idea.
It inspired my son, Felix, and I to think about a related idea:
generate random numbers which are inherently coprime to small primes.
Felix went on to implement the idea, and include benchmarks and tests.
Not finished - while
I've converted all the divisibility rules for all the primes less than 25
into binary. All the sums can be calculated at once.
Nice work!
/r$
--
Principal Security Engineer
Akamai Technologies, Cambridge, MA
IM: rs...@jabber.me; Twitter: RichSalz
Also, I should note that this approach is not portable. You need to
operate in the same base as BIGNUM does, or account for endianness is
the byte-level operations.
On 26 May 2014 02:31, Russell Harkins russ...@russellharkins.info wrote:
Hi SSL Team,
I was looking for ways to make calculating
Patch applied:
http://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=commit;h=028bac0670c167f154438742eb4d0fbed73df209
Many thanks for your contribution.
Matt
__
OpenSSL Project http://www.openssl.org
On Tue, May 27, 2014 at 09:04:20PM +0100, Ben Laurie wrote:
It inspired my son, Felix, and I to think about a related idea:
generate random numbers which are inherently coprime to small primes.
Felix went on to implement the idea, and include benchmarks and tests.
When you say small, you mean
On Tue, May 27, 2014 at 08:23:29AM +0200, Otto Moerbeek wrote:
On Tue, May 27, 2014 at 05:23:45AM +, mancha wrote:
On Mon, May 26, 2014 at 09:01:53PM +, mancha wrote:
On Mon, May 26, 2014 at 08:49:03PM +, Viktor Dukhovni wrote:
On Mon, May 26, 2014 at 08:20:43PM +,
I haven't read through the references but am grateful for them. Indeed, I
haven't actually followed this mail-thread in detail but I was struck by a
strange sense of déjà-vu. There was a similar discussion over 10 years ago;
http://marc.info/?t=10705874291r=1w=2
:-) Talk about feeling old...
Hi,
I am writing an in house application where my main web server is apache
web server hosting the main web portal which is being accessed by HTTPS.
On one of the webpage I am establishing the connection to the socketio based
server using HTTPS again but on different port. Hostnames are same
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