One point is that if this is a delivery for someone
subject to the FIPS-only procurementrequirement
imposed on various US Government related entities,
then whatever OS theyuse, MUST (by that requirement)
have already passed this for its password handling.
This is *technically* true, in the
From: Steve Marquess marqu...@openssl.com
Date: 04/14/15 09:31
and note that of the 101 platforms (OEs) appearing there, most of
those operating systems are neither CC certified nor have any other FIPS
140-2 validated crypto. Keep in mind that at Level 1 the validation
applies to the
On 04/13/2015 01:30 PM, Jakob Bohm wrote:
..
With the very unique exception of the OpenSSL FIPS Object Module, there
are no FIPS 140-2 validated cryptographic modules that can be obtained
in source form and compiled by the end user. The fact that Red Hat (or
whomever) has taken open source
On 04/14/2015 09:42 AM, jonetsu wrote:
From: Steve Marquess marqu...@openssl.com Date: 04/14/15 09:31
and note that of the 101 platforms (OEs) appearing there, most
of those operating systems are neither CC certified nor have any
other FIPS 140-2 validated crypto. Keep in mind that at
.
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have an
idea of the order of magnitude in performance loss this could be for IPSec,
to use crypto from OpenSSL instead of the kernel ?
Regards.
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If I may, I'd like to ask about including the Linux kernel in the validation.
As the old joke goes, if you have to ask, you can't afford it.
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On 13/04/2015 18:48, Steve Marquess wrote:
On 04/13/2015 12:14 PM, Jakob Bohm wrote:
On 13/04/2015 17:48, Salz, Rich wrote:
In other words, is the only
practical and viable option regarding this to re-implement crypt()
using EVP
methods ? - thanks.
Yes. That would be so much easier than
On 04/13/2015 12:14 PM, Jakob Bohm wrote:
On 13/04/2015 17:48, Salz, Rich wrote:
In other words, is the only
practical and viable option regarding this to re-implement crypt()
using EVP
methods ? - thanks.
Yes. That would be so much easier than anything you can imagine.
Yes, the only
On 13/04/2015 17:48, Salz, Rich wrote:
In other words, is the only
practical and viable option regarding this to re-implement crypt() using EVP
methods ? - thanks.
Yes. That would be so much easier than anything you can imagine.
Yes, the only thing easier would be if someone (maybe Red Hat)
.
Regards.
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In other words, is the only
practical and viable option regarding this to re-implement crypt() using EVP
methods ? - thanks.
Yes. That would be so much easier than anything you can imagine.
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