If I have
RootCA - IntermediateCA - ServerCert
current OpenSSL will only support trusting RootCA, not trusting
IntermediateCA or ServerCert.
I see in
http://old.nabble.com/Verify-intermediate-certificate-td33129488.html
that there's an experimental new flag X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST that
will
cached certificates and, for a file,
reload the file?
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f getting those various consumers, some of
which may be externally-sourced software, to accept such a request.)
>
>
> *From:*openssl-users [mailto:openssl-users-boun...@openssl.org] *On
> Behalf Of *Jordan Brown
> *Sent:* Wednesday, May 18, 2016 10:44 AM
> *To:* openssl-users@openss
s interested in doing the
development work, or because there's some reason why it would be a bad idea?
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On 5/1/2017 8:53 AM, James Condren wrote:
>
> Thanks for the prompt response. Just a little background: I am
> trying to install OpenSSL on a Windows PC so I can view a server cert.
>
It might be simpler to install cygwin and an already-built OpenSSL.
http://cygwin.com/
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to
straightforwardly add the new certificates to the trust list and have
them work, but seem to find that certificate verification doesn't handle
the case. (Mozilla NSS does seem to handle it.)
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On 9/20/2017 10:28 AM, Walter H. via openssl-users wrote:
> On 20.09.2017 18:33, Jordan Brown wrote:
>>
>> Q: Does OpenSSL's trust-list verification support trusting multiple
>> certificates with the same subject name and overlapping validity periods?
>>
> do these
On 9/20/2017 2:25 PM, Viktor Dukhovni wrote:
>> On Sep 20, 2017, at 12:33 PM, Jordan Brown <open...@jordan.maileater.net>
>> wrote:
>>
>> Q: Does OpenSSL's trust-list verification support trusting multiple
>> certificates with the same subject n
ient should be able to say
"give me a secure connection to host:port" and have sensible and secure
things happen with a single call. Maybe two, one to create a handle and
the other to actually set up the connection (to allow for intervening
calls that customize the connection).
--
settings without needing the application source. Maybe have
the "create handle" function take an application name as an argument, so
that individual applications could be managed separately.
Looking at it another way: browsers manage to do it...
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--
op
g that I know about the actual algorithms will
probably make that picture worse, not better. As you say, those
decisions need to be made by people who *do* understand these things...
which excludes 99% of developers.
Thanks for the thoughtful discussion. I really appreciate it.
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you miss a step, what you get
is a silently insecure connection rather than a failure.
Do you really like having OpenSSL featured in papers like this?
The most dangerous code in the world: validating SSL certificates in
non-browser software
<http://crypto.stanford.edu/%7Edabo/pubs/abstracts
should callers have to understand cipher suites at any deep
level? Why should they need to know any more than "there are multiple
algorithms, and new algorithms are introduced occasionally, and old
algorithms are defeated occasionally, but you may need old algorithms
for interoperability, so you
TLS-layer implementation would be primarily in the
TLS implementation, whereas an additional layer would necessarily impose
complexity on the application, over and above the complexity of the flow
control implementation itself.
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To unsubscr
eep the connection healthy.
Maybe in TLS 1.4.
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tion, but I do know shell syntax. Those
>> three variants are identical when
>> presented to the shell.
> True for standard Linux/UNIX shells; not necessarily true on other platforms.
Yes. I tried to stay simple :-)
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o the shell.
Quotes are only necessary - and only make a difference - if the string
has characters in it that are special to the shell. Letters and periods
are not special to the shell.
In all three cases, the program will see three arguments:
-header
Host
oscp.example.com
--
urn 1;
and it looks like you can plug in your own function using
SSL_set_security_callback. I do not understand, however, how the 80
relates to a 1024-bit limit.
Here's the documentation:
https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.0/ssl/SSL_set_security_callback.html
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--
client connection request, not an IP address.
(Pretty much, you don't ever want to use IP addresses in specifying TLS
connections.)
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/blog/blog/2015/05/20/logjam-freak-upcoming-changes/
To protect OpenSSL-based clients, we’re increasing the minimum
accepted DH key size to 768 bits immediately in the next release,
and to 1024 bits soon after.
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To uns
On 12/29/2017 6:00 AM, Marty G wrote:
> For the same reason one doesn't wear a halloween costume to a
> technical meeting, Comic Sans is looked down upon when used outside
> comics and day-care centers. It is considered a snub to use it in
> non-trivial settings.
>
> Much as lifting up your
could supply defaults.
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can be trusted.
Any certificate updates have to be protected by the previous
certificate. If you've let the certificate lapse then you need some
kind of out-of-band verification.
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it can't find that much contiguous virtual
address space, and mmap won't be able to find it either.
If you're a 32-bit process, then malloc'ing or mmap'ing a 2GB object
will be difficult at best.
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er out "unimportant" leaks when you're trying to find out
whether you've introduced any "important" leaks.
Maybe the test suite only caused the program to leak one buffer, but
that doesn't tell you whether a real workload (or a malicious workload)
will leak gigabytes.
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ure that it isn't a result of their change.
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hat got unloaded because they were dependencies of other
shared objects that are intended to be used on a "load, call, unload" basis.
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, though doing so would introduce the possibility of
>truncation.
I'm curious: how did this ever work for HTTPS, where for a POST request
you have to see the end of the request body before you can (in general)
send the response?
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On 8/13/2018 11:25 AM, Viktor Dukhovni wrote:
>> On Aug 13, 2018, at 2:13 PM, Jordan Brown
>> wrote:
>>
>> I'm curious: how did this ever work for HTTPS, where for a POST request you
>> have to see the end of the request body before you can (in
zero. Errno is zero. It failed, but
nobody will tell me why.
Am I missing something here, or is this a client library bug?
(I have not tracked down exactly how the s_client tool ends up with a
message. It seems to use a more intricate mechanism than SSL_connect.)
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Jordan Brown, Oracle Solari
Any thoughts here?
On 8/31/2018 6:14 PM, Jordan Brown wrote:
>
> We're trying to nail down error reporting for TLS version mismatches,
> and we're seeing a couple of puzzling behaviors.
>
> First, and most puzzling... assume these two command lines:
>
> $ openssl s_se
And of course I remember just after hitting Send: Thanks!
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you might infer from my signature below, I work for Oracle in
the Solaris group. My immediate organization is primarily concerned
with our Solaris-based storage products. (That's not quite
accurate, but you don't want to know about our org chart.)
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Jordan Brown, Oracle Solaris
--
On 3/29/2018 1:08 AM, Richard Levitte wrote:
> In message <1ce93d56-6fa4-1bae-d440-5ab843900...@jordan.maileater.net> on
> Wed, 28 Mar 2018 17:10:40 -0700, Jordan Brown <open...@jordan.maileater.net>
> said:
>
> openssl> Matt: Indeed, looks very promising. Now if on
t, there's stuff in 1.0.x that will help and stuff in 1.1.x that
will likely do exactly what I need. That answers my question, thanks!
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use to read the PEM data (and thus what C type it
represents). It would lump all private key formats into one type, since
PEM_read_PrivateKey would work on all of them and return an EVP_PKEY.
Does such a function already exist? Any thoughts?
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t; as PDP-11 or an IBM mainframe.
PDP-11 used ASCII. So did all of the PDP series, though some used a
six-bit (no lowercase) variant for some purposes.
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On 1/4/2019 1:04 PM, Michael Wojcik wrote:
> Behavior is unfortunate if open fails, e.g. because the NFILES limit is
> reached, or because /dev/null is inaccessible (e.g. due to a
> poorly-configured chroot). You'd be better off with (fd >= 0 && fd < 3).
Yes. Oops.
-
On 1/17/2019 5:33 PM, Jordan Brown wrote:
> Am I missing something?
Seems I was. Thanks, all.
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$ openssl ciphers AES:-SHA384
*TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384*:TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256:[...]
That doesn't seem right. Am I missing something?
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e crypto subsystem as a black
box - but completely survivable.
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te safe" today... but what about tomorrow?
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user's identity. Then you look at their subject
name to derive the user ID (probably from its CN). If you want to be
really paranoid - if you believe that Verisign can vouch for John and
Comodo can vouch for Sam, but not vice versa, factor the issuer name
into the process.
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s don't work in your environment. You can also
build an environment that doesn't include system libraries, and there
are reasons to do so, but few programs will work in it.
Looking at Solaris, about 15% of the programs in /usr/bin and 5% of the
libraries in /usr/lib have a reference to /dev/null.
--
3);
close(fd);
(That's strictly not quite right, since it leaves 0 open writable and 1
and 2 open readable, but that's pretty harmless.)
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ver... it seems like you're reinventing ssh. Your replacement for
ssh will likely require a custom client, which will be a pain in the
neck for your users. Maybe you should start with an existing ssh
library and hack it until it behaves the way you need.
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Jordan Brown, Oracle ZFS Storage Ap
les to determine the list of allowable ciphers, but
then found that we needed much more complex rules than were desirable.
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an
the client supports, it has no way to say "no". If the positions are
reversed, the server counter-offers a version that the client then
rejects as too old.
Thanks again.
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Thanks!
Now I need to wrap my head around what that all means.
It sounds like the protocol doesn't really have a version-independent
way for the version negotiation to cleanly fail. That's unfortunate.
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cation cannot predict which
libraries might need it or what those reasons might be. OpenSSL must be
designed to be used by multiple non-coordinated components running in
the same process, including by dynamically loaded and unloaded shared
objects.
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> *
> I believe that instead of loading the entire file all at once I am
> reading the 44MB file in chunks and computing the hash using the piece
> of code below: (fph is the file pointer)
> *while ((bytes_read = fread (message_data, 1, BUFFER_SIZE, fph)) != 0)*
> * EVP_DigestUpdate(mdctx, message_data, bytes_read);*
> *
> *
> Where I am going wrong? How can I free the buff/cache after
> computation of message digest? Please suggest ways to tackle this.
>
>
> Thanks and Regards,
> Prithiraj
>
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Jordan Brown, Oracle ZFS Storage Appliance, Oracle Solaris
On 8/14/2019 2:11 PM, Robert Moskowitz wrote:
> [...]
> commonName="/CN=IPv6::2001:24:28:24/64"
> [...]
> req: Hit end of string before finding the equals.
> problems making Certificate Request
Some systems present distinguished names using slashes as separators. I
assume that that's what
don't find anything more generic.
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Jordan Brown, Oracle ZFS Storage Appliance, Oracle Solaris
g to involve
OpenSSL, so restrictions on OpenSSL per se aren't very interesting.
The way to restrict PKI operations (in a simple configuration) is
through file and directory permissions on the data involved.
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Jordan Brown, Oracle ZFS Storage Appliance, Oracle Solaris
On 11/6/2019 11:42 PM, Frederick Gotham wrote:
> Jordan Brown wrote:
>
>> Note that __pthread_once_slow is in the stack twice, called from
>> OPENSSL_init_crypto and CRYPTO_THREAD_run_once.
>>
>> "once" functions ensure that they call their
EAD_run_once.
"once" functions ensure that they call their function argument exactly
once, even if they are called multiple times in parallel while their
function is running. They do that by locking a mutex around the
execution of the function. The second call attempted to lock the mute
On 10/14/2019 10:59 PM, Anton Schmidt wrote:
> I've found OpenSSL library source
> code https://github.com/openssl/openssl but not the sources for
> command line utility. Are the sources available?
I believe they are in the "apps" directory of that repository.
--
Jorda
t means that the library has to check for and handle
all of those "should be impossible" error cases.
Here's a paper on the subject:
http://www.open-std.org/jtc1/sc22/wg14/www/docs/n1967.htm
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Jordan Brown, Oracle ZFS Storage Appliance, Oracle Solaris
e for somebody trying to maintain compatibility is that
when you remove some algorithm X, there's always a risk that something
in the stack - be it software or user configuration - explicitly depends
on X and so will fail on upgrade.
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Jordan Brown, Oracle ZFS Storage Appliance, Oracle Solaris
hen wipe the
in-memory cache.
Yes, aspects of this are system-specific, but that's true of many
things. There could easily be an internal API that captures a
current-stage object, and another that answers "is this still the
same". The default implementation could always say "yes&
works, because there's no negative caching, but *removing* one
doesn't work.
[*] Which tells you that although my purist sense says that it would
be nice to have and would improve correctness, customers aren't
lined up waiting for it.
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can free
the old structure. As I think about it more, there might be a challenge
fitting such a mechanism into the existing functions.
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Jordan Brown, Oracle ZFS Storage Appliance, Oracle Solaris
t might well be sufficient. Rereading the file would probably be
low-cost compared to the network connection.
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Jordan Brown, Oracle ZFS Storage Appliance, Oracle Solaris
int
to the same page that the kernel is using for its disk buffer.)
Of course any particular implementation could do things a bit
differently, but that's my perception of how it's usually done.
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Jordan Brown, Oracle ZFS Storage Appliance, Oracle Solaris
I don't know exactly what environments the OpenSSL build targets, but a
writable /tmp is a POSIX requirement.
https://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/basedefs/V1_chap10.html
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On 7/3/2020 10:46 AM, Karl Denninger wrote:
> On 7/3/2020 13:45, Jordan Brown wrote:
>> On 7/3/2020 6:03 AM, Marc Roos wrote:
>>> Also hypocrite of Akamai, looking at the composition of the executive team.
>> I think it's pretty clear that Rich was speaking as himself, no
On 7/3/2020 6:03 AM, Marc Roos wrote:
> Also hypocrite of Akamai, looking at the composition of the executive team.
I think it's pretty clear that Rich was speaking as himself, not as a
representative of Akamai.
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On 6/15/2020 12:37 AM, Viktor Dukhovni wrote:
> OpenSSL SHOULD NOT include parameter names in public headers.
It would be sort of, maybe, OK to use names with an appropriate prefix.
That wouldn't be perfect, but it would be better.
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Jordan Brown, Oracle ZFS Storage Appliance, Oracle Solaris
ntroduced by the application's header file rather than a library header
file, or the application could be compiled with -Dfreefunc=xxx.
Supplying names for the arguments in function prototypes makes them
easier to read, but risks namespace problems.
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Jordan Brown, Oracle ZFS Storage Applianc
t want to be safe cannot use *any*
names that aren't reserved to them.
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() on each verification is considered too expensive, maybe there
could be a timeout, that if the file hasn't been checked in the last ten
minutes then check it.
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Jordan Brown, Oracle ZFS Storage Appliance, Oracle Solaris
ves need a similar set of functions.
The existing API isn't bad, once you figure out how to use it. It's
been several years since I wrote a CSR generator and so I don't remember
how I figured it out, but I think I might have had to look at req.c
rather than finding documentation.
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Jordan Brown, O
API calls, since that's the more
general case.
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Jordan Brown, Oracle ZFS Storage Appliance, Oracle Solaris
th, check the fingerprint, or copy
the certificate out of band.
In some senses they are *better* than a CA-based cert, because once
established they are not vulnerable to CA compromise.
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Jordan Brown, Oracle ZFS Storage Appliance, Oracle Solaris
ersion worked, so as to understand the
software and work out how it should work with the new library.
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