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http://www.boingboing.net/2010/07/31/wikileaks-volunteer.html
Are those a new activity of the President Obama administration against
Internet anonymity and against the Tor-network?
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On Sun, 01 Aug 2010 20:50:57 +
James Brown jbrownfi...@gmail.com wrote:
http://www.boingboing.net/2010/07/31/wikileaks-volunteer.html
Are those a new activity of the President Obama administration against
Internet anonymity and against the Tor-network?
It's unclear. The simplest
On Fri, Jul 30, 2010 at 12:32:43PM -0700, Seth David Schoen wrote:
The simplest threat scenario for Tor users would be when an
attacker in a position to observe a particular user's traffic,
but not any exit node traffic, hypothesizes that the user is
likely to visit a particular site and
Steven J. Murdoch writes:
Yes, this has been a known risk with all currently deployed
low-latency anonymity systems. One recent paper which looked at the
problem was discussed here:
Thanks for these references.
--
Seth Schoen
Senior Staff Technologist sch...@eff.org
On Sun, Aug 1, 2010 at 8:02 PM, Gregory Maxwell gmaxw...@gmail.com wrote:
...
The overhead of padding schemes that I've seen, either end to end
type, or hop-based for free routed networks as presented above, are
simply too large to be practical.
perhaps DLP with SFQ and datagram transport.
On Sun, 1 Aug 2010 23:02:53 -0400
Gregory Maxwell gmaxw...@gmail.com wrote:
On Sun, Aug 1, 2010 at 9:07 PM, Steven J. Murdoch
tortalk+steven.murd...@cl.cam.ac.uk wrote:
[snip]
To fix this attack, systems can add dummy traffic (padding), delay
packets, and/or drop packets. Tor adds a bit of
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