Yes if you redirect DNS requests to Tor's DNSPort you should be safe
against DNS leaks.
Do I have to use AutomapHostsOnResolve 1 as well? Seems to be pointless
without defining AutomapHostsSuffixes.
I guess you are talking about a local setup without a middlebox
involved. If my assumption is
On 02/13/2011 03:20 PM, Tomasz Moskal wrote:
Do I have to use AutomapHostsOnResolve 1 as well? Seems to be pointless
without defining AutomapHostsSuffixes.
No it is not pointless because also if you do not use
AutomapHostsSuffixes in your config .exit and .onion are
AutomapHostsSuffixes per
From the Tor Project FAQ
https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq#ChooseEntryExit:
We recommend you do not use these — they are intended for testing and
may disappear in future versions. You get the best security that Tor can
provide when you leave the route selection to Tor; overriding the
entry /
On 02/13/2011 03:43 PM, Tomasz Moskal wrote:
Now, it's a little bit confusing for a novice, let me explain why.
People both on this mailing list and else where on the Internet are
often referring to excluding bad/evil exit nodes (I'm aware that it's
a bit ambiguous concept) and yet there is
On Sun, 2011-02-13 at 15:51 +0100, tagnaq wrote:
No you do not need to exclude them because your client will not use
nodes with the BadExit flag as an exit node anyway. The torstatus
website does not flag them, it just shows you that they have this flag
because the DirectoryAuthorities flagged
On 02/13/2011 04:19 PM, Tomasz Moskal wrote:
Now I'm even more confused! What is DirectoryAuthorities?
Could you point me somewhere I can
find more informations about matters relating to exit nodes?
https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#KeyManagement
(Coordination section)
General
On Sun, 2011-02-13 at 17:07 +0100, tagnaq wrote:
https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#KeyManagement
(Coordination section)
General Design Document:
https://www.torproject.org/docs/documentation.html.en#DesignDoc
https://svn.torproject.org/svn/projects/design-paper/tor-design.html
On 2/13/2011 10:19 AM, Tomasz Moskal wrote:
[snip]
How someone can recognise if an exit node *might* be doing something
suspicious - like sniffing traffic for passwords? As far as I can tell
(with my limited knowledge that is!) it's by checking which ports the
node in question is making
On Sun, Feb 13, 2011 at 11:39 AM, Tomasz Moskal
ramshackle.industr...@gmail.com wrote:
[snip]
Would you recommend using not Tor connection when one is forced to use
unencrypted protocols? I think I'm safer using Tor even with unencrypted
traffic that using regular connection but again I can be
On 02/13/2011 05:21 PM, Tomasz Moskal wrote:
OK, so to wrap it all up last (hopefully!) couple of questions...
iptables script/rules set:
#!/bin/sh
# the UID Tor runs as
TOR_UID=109
iptables -F
iptables -t nat -F
# Redirects DNS traffic to the local port 53
iptables -t nat -A
Could you describe your use case + thread model?
I'm terrible sorry for chaos I'm causing but right now I'm a very small
and confused person :-) Let me start from the beginning...
I'm using Privoxy + Tor combination. For Privoxy to properly handle
TCP/HTTP requests and send them over Tor
On Sun, 13 Feb 2011 18:50:19 +
Tomasz Moskal ramshackle.industr...@gmail.com wrote:
I wonder why your uid should be different everytime you reboot, but you
can also use the name of the user instead of the numerical value.
Well I can't tell you why but that how it is. To double check I
I've been fighting two different Tor users for a week. Each is
apparently having a good time trying to see how quickly they
can get results from Scroogle searches via Tor exit nodes.
The fastest I've seen is about two per second. Since Tor users
are only two percent of all Scroogle searches, I'm
On Sun, 2011-02-13 at 11:04 -0800, Robert Ransom wrote:
That's a process ID, not a user ID.
Arrrgh! My brain is slowly melting. I think what I will do now is to
give up on Tor and attempts to understand it. I will explore more how to
properly and effectively use Linux. Then I shall delve some
On Sun, Feb 13, 2011 at 2:09 PM, scroo...@lavabit.com wrote:
[snip]
I'm getting to the point where I'm tempted to offer my two
exit node lists (yesterday plus today, and previous six days
plus today) to the public. If I had more confidence in the
lists currently available to the public, I
Am 13.02.2011 00:54, schrieb Matthew:
Incidentally, in http://torstatus.blutmagie.de/ gpfTOR4 is listed as
being in the Czech Republic while gpfTOR5 and gpfTOR6 are in
Netherlands. Is this correct?
Yes, coorect.
In the last years we see much less trouble by using non-German ISPs for
our Tor
On 13/02/11 19:09, scroo...@lavabit.com wrote:
I've been fighting two different Tor users for a week. Each is
apparently having a good time trying to see how quickly they
can get results from Scroogle searches via Tor exit nodes.
The fastest I've seen is about two per second. Since Tor users
On 13/02/11 21:03, Karsten N. wrote:
Am 13.02.2011 00:54, schrieb Matthew:
Incidentally, in http://torstatus.blutmagie.de/ gpfTOR4 is listed as
being in the Czech Republic while gpfTOR5 and gpfTOR6 are in
Netherlands. Is this correct?
Yes, coorect.
In the last years we see much less
Gregory Maxwell wrote:
As far as performance goes, you can download a list of nodes which can
reach a particular address at
https://check.torproject.org/cgi-bin/TorBulkExitList.py?ip=1.2.3.4
but, these results have the same problem with omitted nodes that I
mentioned.
That's the
On Sun, 13 Feb 2011 14:09:56 -0500 (EST)
scroo...@lavabit.com wrote:
I've been fighting two different Tor users for a week. Each is
apparently having a good time trying to see how quickly they
can get results from Scroogle searches via Tor exit nodes.
I've talked to a few services that do one
A reminder that this migration occurs this week.
On Mon, 24 Jan 2011 15:05:03 -0500
Andrew Lewman and...@torproject.org wrote:
Hello or-talk subscribers,
On February 19, 2011, we are migrating or-talk from or-t...@seul.org
to tor-t...@lists.torproject.org. We will migrate your e-mail
On Sun, Feb 13, 2011 at 9:34 PM, Andrew Lewman and...@torproject.org wrote:
I've talked to a few services that do one of the following:
- Run a Tor exit enclave, which would only allow exit through Tor to
your webservers. There are a few services that run a tor client and
simply block
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