On Fri, Oct 31, 2008 at 06:03:51AM CET, Roger Dingledine wrote:
There are still people in Germany who run high profile Tor relays and
who say they will not log.
Just for their (and your) information: the maximum possible penality
for non-compliance is 500,000 EUR plus the fees of the law
On Fri, 31 Oct 2008 10:14:21 +0100 Eugen Leitl [EMAIL PROTECTED]
wrote:
On Fri, Oct 31, 2008 at 09:21:09AM +0100, Lexi Pimenidis wrote:
Just for their (and your) information: the maximum possible penality
for non-compliance is 500,000 EUR plus the fees of the law suit.
If you're running a
On Fri, Oct 31, 2008 at 09:21:09AM +0100, Lexi Pimenidis wrote:
Just for their (and your) information: the maximum possible penality
for non-compliance is 500,000 EUR plus the fees of the law suit.
If you're running a middle-man only node on domestic broadband
the logging part is your
On Sat, 1 Nov 2008 00:23:20 +0100 Sven Anderson [EMAIL PROTECTED]
wrote:
Am 31.10.2008 um 06:03 schrieb Roger Dingledine:
I'm still surprised at all the people who think the choice is between
keeping their Tor relay without logs or adding logging. The choice is
to keep the relay running
On Mon, Oct 20, 2008 at 05:54:18PM +0200, Sven Anderson wrote:
And we do not want to see any Tor relays that log traffic
information. So
should Tor's role for now be to simply say the only risk from the
German
data retention law is if its vague wording convinces Tor operators
to install
Roger Dingledine schrieb:
On Sun, Oct 19, 2008 at 02:30:32AM +0200, Sven Anderson wrote:
All sources I know don't let any doubt that ISPs will _only_ keep
data, which they log anyways, that is which IP has been assigned
to which user at which time.
IMHO it is not true, that ISPs will only
Am 20.10.2008 um 15:29 schrieb Dominik Schaefer:
Roger Dingledine schrieb:
On Sun, Oct 19, 2008 at 02:30:32AM +0200, Sven Anderson wrote:
All sources I know don't let any doubt that ISPs will _only_ keep
data, which they log anyways, that is which IP has been assigned
to which user at
Am 20.10.2008 um 00:06 schrieb Roger Dingledine:
So it will be very interesting how this will continue, since it
is assumed by many, that the data retention law violates the German
constitution.
Quite so. Good thing all the German laws are so clear. :)
As long as the constitution has the
On Sat, 18 Oct 2008 19:30:53 -0400 7v5w7go9ub0o [EMAIL PROTECTED]
wrote:
Roger Dingledine wrote:
On Sat, Oct 18, 2008 at 06:43:34PM -0400, 7v5w7go9ub0o wrote:
Roger Dingledine wrote:
snip
Otherwise, all german nodes have to switch to middle man.
snip
To be clear, I didn't write the
On Sun, Oct 19, 2008 at 01:44:15AM -0500, Scott Bennett wrote:
If nothing else, defaulting to 443 would allow a greater number of
hotspot laptops access to TOR from HTTP/S-only networks.
Doing that, however, *would* make it rather difficult for the same
machine--or another machine
On Sat, Oct 18, 2008 at 08:36:00PM CEST, Sven Anderson wrote:
Hej,
In general I don't like to create the impression that the logging in
Tor nodes is so essential for the reliability of Tor. If the trust in
Tor would be based on the assumption, that the Tor nodes are not
compromised and
Karsten N. wrote:
I. part: A short overview about the data rentention law in Germany.
hi there,
@Karsten: that's the point of view how German police and German Ministry of the
Interior would like to see the new data retention law interpreted. It might not
be the smarted idea for us to blindly
Olaf Selke schrieb:
Karsten N. wrote:
I. part: A short overview about the data rentention law in Germany.
@Karsten: that's the point of view how German police and German Ministry of
the
Interior would like to see the new data retention law interpreted.
Yes, correct. It was may opinion,
Roger Dingledine schrieb:
A fine question. Hopefully as we learn more about what ISPs will
log,
The EU directive
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2006:105:0054:01:EN:HTML
originally defines what data has to be retained.
An interesting term in that document seems to
On Sun, 19 Oct 2008 09:35:13 +0200 Niels Grewe [EMAIL PROTECTED]
wrote:
On Sun, Oct 19, 2008 at 01:44:15AM -0500, Scott Bennett wrote:
If nothing else, defaulting to 443 would allow a greater number of
hotspot laptops access to TOR from HTTP/S-only networks.
Doing that, however,
* on the Sun, Oct 19, 2008 at 07:14:31AM -0500, Scott Bennett wrote:
Besides, opening ports 1024 usually requires root-privileges,
which could introduce serious security issues if an exploitable
flaw were found in Tor. You can still advertise port 443 as your
ORPort and listen on 9001, but
On Sun, Oct 19, 2008 at 01:45:22PM +0200, Dominik Schaefer wrote:
As already said, much more difficult is the part about anonymizing
services, which brings us right to the still missing 'technical
directive'.
That will define the specifics: who is exempted (e.g. WLAN hotspots in
hotels are
Am 19.10.2008 um 17:06 schrieb krishna e bera:
On Sun, Oct 19, 2008 at 01:45:22PM +0200, Dominik Schaefer wrote:
As already said, much more difficult is the part about anonymizing
services, which brings us right to the still missing 'technical
directive'.
That will define the specifics: who
krishna e bera schrieb:
However, suppose the technical implementation is something like requiring
ISPs
to allow wholesale teeing of the pipes as is now done at ATT in the USA,
at government/taxpayer expense.
Then we will not know whether some or all of the data is logged.
Well, that is not
Erilenz wrote:
* on the Sun, Oct 19, 2008 at 07:14:31AM -0500, Scott Bennett wrote:
Besides, opening ports 1024 usually requires root-privileges,
which could introduce serious security issues if an exploitable
flaw were found in Tor. You can still advertise port 443 as your
ORPort and listen
On Sun, Oct 19, 2008 at 02:30:32AM +0200, Sven Anderson wrote:
Am 18.10.2008 um 22:13 schrieb Roger Dingledine:
I say maybe because it's far from clear that all ISPs will be forced to
log TCP connection start and stop timestamps.
Wait, ISPs will _not_ log TCP connections (in general).
Hi,
I. part: A short overview about the data rentention law in Germany.
1: ISPs have to log the start and end of a user dial-in with
time stamp and IP address. They have not to log any content.
2: Public provider of electronic mail have to log all connections of
users with time
Dieter Zinke schrieb:
Tor developers: I demand to ban all german tor server per /1/1/2009 from
the tor network. Don' t trust the german regulators.
I perceive this as overkill which may severely impair the tor network
without real need at this stage of affairs.
BTW: Although we are talking
Tor developers: I demand to ban all german tor server per /1/1/2009
from the tor network. Don' t trust the german regulators.
Great joke, as Germany isn't alone, all the EU is concerned. Also US has his
Big Brother, Russia his SORM2, China his commies, etc etc
But there is one requirement
Am 18.10.2008 um 10:49 schrieb Karsten N.:
Some papers of non-gouverment organizations like ULD: Tor and JAP are
not affected by the telecommunication law, because it is not a
telecommunication service (in the case of law) and tor nodes have NOT
to log.
That's not true, the ULD is a 100%
On Sat, Oct 18, 2008 at 10:49:08AM +0200, Karsten N. wrote:
Together with the JonDos GmbH (JAP) the GPF try to get a legal
non-logging solution for tor, but the result is open and we are late.
The JonDos folks are nice people, but they seem to be taking the approach
let's work with law
Roger Dingledine wrote:
snip
Otherwise, all german nodes have to switch to middle man.
snip
1. Given that the ISP will have logs anyway, why disallow German exit
nodes?
2. How about changing all TOR port useage - including relays and entry
ports - to 443?
'Twould be hard to know
On Sat, Oct 18, 2008 at 06:43:34PM -0400, 7v5w7go9ub0o wrote:
Roger Dingledine wrote:
snip
Otherwise, all german nodes have to switch to middle man.
snip
To be clear, I didn't write the above line.
1. Given that the ISP will have logs anyway, why disallow German exit
nodes?
A
Roger Dingledine wrote:
On Sat, Oct 18, 2008 at 06:43:34PM -0400, 7v5w7go9ub0o wrote:
Roger Dingledine wrote:
snip
Otherwise, all german nodes have to switch to middle man.
snip
To be clear, I didn't write the above line.
1. Given that the ISP will have logs anyway, why disallow German
Am 18.10.2008 um 22:13 schrieb Roger Dingledine:
2) Maybe, consider starting circuits unpredictably before we want to
attach a stream to them (we already mostly do that, since we build
circuits preemptively), and closing circuits unpredictably after we
are
done using them. The idea there is
30 matches
Mail list logo
