Hi,
I am forbidden to access the server yelp.com. Is that because I am a
Tor exit node?
Thanks
David
0xDC7C8BF3.asc
Description: application/pgp-keys
Hi,
while scrolling through the tor status page (torstatus.blutmagie.de), I
stumpled upon the following node (the reason why it came to my eye was
the long uptime):
gatereloaded 550C C972 4FA7 7C7F 9260 B939 89D2 2A70 654D 3B92
This node looks suspicious to me, because there is no contact info
On Sat, Jan 29, 2011 at 12:46 PM, Jan Weiher j...@buksy.de wrote:
Hi,
while scrolling through the tor status page (torstatus.blutmagie.de), I
stumpled upon the following node (the reason why it came to my eye was
the long uptime):
gatereloaded 550C C972 4FA7 7C7F 9260 B939 89D2 2A70 654D
Am 29.01.2011 20:13, schrieb Jon:
On Sat, Jan 29, 2011 at 12:46 PM, Jan Weiher j...@buksy.de wrote:
Hi,
while scrolling through the tor status page (torstatus.blutmagie.de), I
stumpled upon the following node (the reason why it came to my eye was
the long uptime):
gatereloaded 550C C972
On 2011-01-29 19:46, Jan Weiher wrote:
while scrolling through the tor status page (torstatus.blutmagie.de), I
stumpled upon the following node (the reason why it came to my eye was
the long uptime):
gatereloaded 550C C972 4FA7 7C7F 9260 B939 89D2 2A70 654D 3B92
This node looks
Am 29.01.2011 21:27, schrieb Gitano:
On 2011-01-29 19:46, Jan Weiher wrote:
while scrolling through the tor status page (torstatus.blutmagie.de), I
stumpled upon the following node (the reason why it came to my eye was
the long uptime):
gatereloaded 550C C972 4FA7 7C7F 9260 B939 89D2
On Sat, 29 Jan 2011 19:46:20 +0100
Jan Weiher j...@buksy.de wrote:
This node looks suspicious to me, because there is no contact info
given and the exit policy allows only unencrypted traffic:
It hasn't shown up in any of the exit scans as suspicious. Lack of
contact info isn't a concern. The
Am 29.01.2011 21:44, schrieb Andrew Lewman:
On Sat, 29 Jan 2011 19:46:20 +0100
Jan Weiher j...@buksy.de wrote:
This node looks suspicious to me, because there is no contact info
given and the exit policy allows only unencrypted traffic:
It hasn't shown up in any of the exit scans as
Hi,
I am trying to setup Tor on an Ubuntu box, but getting a little glitch
on the install - hope this is the correct list to query...
I followed the instructions from here:
http://www.torproject.org/docs/debian.html.en
In particular:
Then add this line to your /etc/apt/sources.list file:
deb
On Sat, Jan 29, 2011 at 09:55:05PM +0100, j...@buksy.de wrote 1.3K bytes in 38
lines about:
: What kind of scans do you perform? I thought these scans do only check
: for content manipulation? I dont see how to recognize if the traffic is
: recorded?
On Fri, Jan 28, 2011 at 11:29:25PM +, pump...@cotse.net wrote 2.3K bytes in
53 lines about:
: My understanding is that Tor encrypts both the content of a data
: packet and also the header. It encrypts the packet and header three
: times on the client (my computer) and then at each node one
I dont see how to recognize if the traffic is recorded?
I know people who record exit traffic, lots of it. And they
do all sorts of things with it too. Does that news trouble
you? If so, you need to readjust your thinking.
***
One could argue that recording traffic goes against the spirit of the tor
project and anonymity in general. But even if people do monitor the traffic as
long as they don't control both nodes there is little chance that the end user
can really be tracked. There is also an onus on the end user to
On Sat, Jan 29, 2011 at 9:56 PM, grarpamp grarp...@gmail.com wrote:
I dont see how to recognize if the traffic is recorded?
I know people who record exit traffic, lots of it. And they
do all sorts of things with it too. Does that news trouble
you? If so, you need to readjust your thinking.
Thus spake Gregory Maxwell (gmaxw...@gmail.com):
On Sat, Jan 29, 2011 at 9:56 PM, grarpamp grarp...@gmail.com wrote:
I dont see how to recognize if the traffic is recorded?
Various research groups occasionally experiment with using side
channels for detecting recording exits. Their results
Thus spake Mike Perry (mikepe...@fscked.org):
Thus spake Gregory Maxwell (gmaxw...@gmail.com):
As far as that exit policy goes, the RFC1918 blocks might be there in
an ignorant attempt to trigger the exit flag for completely benign
reasons, though sniffing sounds more likely.
I agree.
Forgive my ignorance but this seeks rather knee-jerk to me. Maybe I'm
missing something.
Everyone that uses TOR should acknowlege that all data that doesn't
use encryption before entering the TOR network. It's even in the FAQ
Thus spake Eddie Cornejo (corn...@gmail.com):
Forgive my ignorance but this seeks rather knee-jerk to me. Maybe I'm
missing something.
Yeah, I believe you're missing the fact that these ports also contain
plaintext passwords than can be used to gain access to information on
these and other
Tor 0.2.2.22-alpha fixes a few more less-critical security issues. The
main other change is a slight tweak to Tor's TLS handshake that makes
relays and bridges that run this new version reachable from Iran again.
We don't expect this tweak will win the arms race long-term, but it will
buy us a bit
Howdy,
Thanks for replying.
Yeah, I believe you're missing the fact that these ports also contain
plaintext passwords than can be used to gain access to information on
these and other accounts that may or may not have ever traveled over
tor. That is the difference.
Actually, no I
Tor 0.2.2.22-alpha fixes a few more less-critical security issues. The
main other change is a slight tweak to Tor's TLS handshake that makes
relays and bridges that run this new version reachable from Iran again.
We don't expect this tweak will win the arms race long-term, but it will
buy us
Thus spake Eddie Cornejo (corn...@gmail.com):
I believe that allowing these nodes sends a message that we are OK
with people monitoring plaintext traffic, because it is anonymized. We
have never been OK with this.
Ok, I accept that this might send a message to 50ish nodes (if you ban
Jan Weiher wrote:
Of course these ports are popular, but 443 is popular as well? So for me
it looked like pick all the popular _unencrypted_ ports.
best regards,
Jan
***
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grarpamp wrote:
I dont see how to recognize if the traffic is recorded?
I know people who record exit traffic, lots of it. And they
do all sorts of things with it too. Does that news trouble
you? If so, you need to readjust your thinking.
Gregory Maxwell wrote:
On Sat, Jan 29, 2011 at 9:56 PM, grarpamp grarp...@gmail.com wrote:
Instead, I think that nodes which exit _only_ to the unencrypted
version of a service (e.g. 80 but not 443) should be excluded from
operating as exits entirely (except as enclaves). In this way these
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