On Sat, 13 Feb 2010 11:18:33 -0500 Nick Mathewson ni...@freehaven.net
wrote:
On Sat, Feb 13, 2010 at 5:33 AM, Scott Bennett benn...@cs.niu.edu wrote:
[...]
=A0 =A0 I've withheld comment on the above for a long time, mainly becaus=
e
I had intended to include it in a write-up that I still
OK, I already thought, that a node with real name (not the fingerprint)
could be identified clearly. Can someone help with my first question
(which of the circuits from getinfo circuit-status TOR will use)?
Am 14.02.2010 01:04, schrieb Damian Johnson:
Not sure about the first question (my
Thus spake Nick Mathewson (ni...@freehaven.net):
2010/2/12 ilter yüksel ilteryuk...@gmail.com:
For circuits that do not need to be fast, when choosing among multiple
candidates for a path element, we choose randomly. For fast circuits, we
pick a given router as an exit with probability
On 14 February 2010 03:15, Scott Bennett benn...@cs.niu.edu wrote:
But one big problem is that you have no guarantee whatsoever that I'm
telling you the truth about my measurements. See for example Kevin
Bauer et al's Low Resource Routing Attacks Against Tor.
Yes, I've understood that
+1. I was kinda floored at the logic behind 'since this attack hasn't
been used in the wild it should be ignored' but... for each their own.
;)
-Damian
On Sun, Feb 14, 2010 at 9:16 PM, Flamsmark flamsm...@gmail.com wrote:
On 14 February 2010 03:15, Scott Bennett benn...@cs.niu.edu wrote:
But
On Mon, 15 Feb 2010 00:16:28 -0500 Flamsmark flamsm...@gmail.com
wrote:
On 14 February 2010 03:15, Scott Bennett benn...@cs.niu.edu wrote:
But one big problem is that you have no guarantee whatsoever that I'm
telling you the truth about my measurements. See for example Kevin
Bauer et
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