Some further thoughts on an already mixed thread...
Would this increase anonymity? As pointed out previously, not much.
Attacks against Tor anonymity usually relate to entry-point/exit-point
traffic correlation... Regardless of how many segments are in the
middle, if your adversary can corner
* zzzjethro...@email2me.net schrieb am 2010-12-06 um 08:19 Uhr:
If your computer isn't online all the time, your hidden service won't
be either. This leaks information to an observant adversary. Does it
leak because it is online all the time or because it isn't online all
the time? And how or
On Mon, 6 Dec 2010, grarpamp wrote:
And what if the oponnent runs a hidden service trap?... seems that
then just watching or running the client's entry guard [1] is all that
is needed to confirm both connection and content? Yipes?!!!
I'm no expert. This sounds like a very hard and real
On Mon, Dec 06, 2010 at 05:18:21PM +, John Case wrote:
I proposed early in the previous thread that not only should a web of
trust be considered, but that this was indeed a classic case of a web of
trust ... I didn't see any comment on this from the Big Names on the
list, though...
On 2010-12-06 09:18, John Case wrote:
On Mon, 6 Dec 2010, grarpamp wrote:
[...]
Maybe there would also be benefit in a web of trust amongst nodes
not unlike a keysigning party. As with social networking, people
vouch for each other in various ways and strengths based on how
they feel that
On Mon, 6 Dec 2010, Lucky Green wrote:
The Web of Trust (WoT) concept provides for marginal security benefits
and then only in a very narrow set of circumstances that are unlikely to
hold true for the larger community of Tor node operators.
Starting with the second point, the WoT concept
From
http://www.bitcoin.org/smf/index.php?topic=1905.0
- quote -
Hello bitcoiners,
I'm investigating if here is a demand for anonymous VPS (virtual
private servers) service. I have multicore beast server lying around,
many years experiences with linux administration and also experiences
I'm too obtuse to understand, just with your footnote alone,
what a hidden service trap is - would you provide a further
explanation, or a link to one ?
A hidden service trap is a hidden service run by any one/entity
you'd rather not be doing business with. A trap, a lure, a ruse,
a sting.
I would be interested.
But how anonymous are bitcoins? With traditional money, only the
government gets to watch you spend it. With BitCoin, now the entire
community gets to watch!
On Mon, 06 Dec 2010 22:01 +0100, Moritz Bartl mor...@torservers.net
wrote:
From
This is only interesting if you are not on the Internet.
Either VPS server as a hidden service, or otherwise Tor only or you set
up a parallel (local ?) network.
Otherwise, you're just an ISP, no matter what kind of bread crumbs you
take as payment, and the hammer is going to come down on
On Mon, Dec 06, 2010 at 10:25:39AM -0800, Damian Johnson wrote:
Hazaa, many thanks for the patches! Committed with the exception of
sockstat2 (see below).
http://www.atagar.com/transfer/tmp/arm_bsdTest2.tar.bz2
One unrelated problem I noticed is that Arm tends to show local
connections
This IP serves as the internal adress to the jail when
called from a local subnet, and may show multiple connections to the
SocksPort,
usually IP:9050.
Sorry, I'm not sure if I'm following. You're saying that the check
should essentially be:
if (localPort == ORPort or localPort ==
On Mon, Dec 06, 2010 at 06:26:10PM -0800, Damian Johnson wrote:
if (localPort == ORPort or localPort == DirPort):
# treat as an inbound connection with the external ip
# this is part of arm's current behavior
elif (localPort == SocksPort and OS == FreeBSD):
# treat as an inbound
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