On 01/02/2011 07:40, Scott Bennett wrote:
I just tried to sign up for the tor weather email service. Clicking
on the subscribe button after entering the information requested in various
places earlier on the page yielded,
Forbidden (403)
CSRF verification failed. Request aborted.
Currently Tor traffic is sent in packets of 512 bytes (which setevents bw
shows as 586), which makes it easy to recognize even though it's all TLS
encrypted. I propose implementing the following on each connection from one
Tor node to another:
1. Allocate a 2048-byte buffer.
2. When the relay
mi nt wrote:
On Mon, Jan 31, 2011 at 08:39:29PM -0500, Gregory Maxwell wrote:
The chances of having your traffic logged by malicious operators, known or
unknown, allowing traffic on 443 or not, can be minimized by not using
Tor.
Just saying! :-)
--
m...@sdf.lonestar.org
SDF Public
El 01/02/11 16:37, cmeclax-sazri escribió:
Currently Tor traffic is sent in packets of 512 bytes (which setevents bw
shows as 586), which makes it easy to recognize even though it's all TLS
encrypted. I propose implementing the following on each connection from one
Tor node to another:
1.
On 1 February 2011 00:45, Aplin, Justin M jmap...@ufl.edu wrote:
Until Firefox provides a way to isolate tabs as individual processes, I
don't see such a feature being implemented.
Is there a bug filed with Mozilla which requests this feature?
On Tuesday 01 February 2011 13:18:28 Andrew Lewman wrote:
There is a fine thread on or-dev about this, starting here,
http://archives.seul.org/or/dev/Jan-2011/msg00029.html
All that is about making the handshake not stand out, by using TLS
certificates and cryptographic primes more typical of
Currently, 5 nodes exit to *only* plaintext ports for web and email.
There are about 50 others that exit to the plaintext versions for web
or email.
I don't see what the issue is here. Not all e-mail services support
HTTPS. Or are you saying: if there is a HTTPS option as for Gmail the 50
We already filter exit nodes based on suspicion by defaulting
ExcludeSingleHopRelays to true (the reason for that being that single
hop exits are more likely to be passively monitoring data).
Can you please say a little more about this for all of us who are not au
fait with all command
Can you please say a little more about this for all of us who are not au
fait with all command options?
Relays have an option to allow single hop connections through them,
which is off by default. If relays *do* set this and allow single hop
circuits through themselves then Tor clients by
On Tue, Feb 1, 2011 at 6:31 PM, Damian Johnson atag...@gmail.com wrote:
In both of those cases we took harder measures based on suspicion of
malicious intent than we are with these plaintext-only relays. Despite
its name, the BadExit flag really isn't a big whoop - the relays are
still
https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/blob/HEAD:/doc/spec/dir-spec.txt#l1285
On Tue, Feb 1, 2011 at 4:10 PM, Joseph Lorenzo Hall joeh...@gmail.com wrote:
On Tue, Feb 1, 2011 at 6:31 PM, Damian Johnson atag...@gmail.com wrote:
In both of those cases we took harder measures based on suspicion of
Hello!
I have the following lines in my torrc file:
ExitNodes node1
AllowDotExit 1
MapAddress .site.com .site.com.node2.exit
When I connect to site.com, node2 is used as exit. I believed it should be
node1, as ExitNodes is a global directive, no?
Or are the lines processed in order they are
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