Can someone make sure all the new lists get submitted/added
to markmail?
As official archives in Maildir or Mbox are not yet provided (under
the curious guise of spam prevention), some alternative indexes
to the ones provided by the list engine would be valuable to
the community.
Thus spake Matthew (pump...@cotse.net):
On 13/02/11 19:09, scroo...@lavabit.com wrote:
I've been fighting two different Tor users for a week. Each is
apparently having a good time trying to see how quickly they
can get results from Scroogle searches via Tor exit nodes.
The fastest I've seen
scroo...@lavabit.com wrote:
I've been fighting two different Tor users for a week. Each is
apparently having a good time trying to see how quickly they
can get results from Scroogle searches via Tor exit nodes.
[snip]
As the person who (recently) raised the question about the availability
of
I never made the claim this was safer.
Of course, not quoted as such. Plaintext anywhere is risky. Yet
this entire thread is about sniffing. How plaintext-only exits
somehow equate to sniffing. And how badexiting plaintext-only exits
somehow equates to reducing that risk. Both are weak premises.
So, with everything said, could we now please Un-BadExit the nodes
that were affected?
Thanks!
morphium
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Thus spake morphium (morph...@morphium.info):
So, with everything said, could we now please Un-BadExit the nodes
that were affected?
Sure, dude. Since you've read everything that was said, I take it
you're volunteering to contact the other node operators and ask them
to give reasons for why
Am 14.02.2011 14:41, schrieb morphium:
So, with everything said, could we now please Un-BadExit the nodes
that were affected?
the whole discussion didn't change my mind. I still support the idea of
flagging them as bad exit.
regards Olaf
the whole discussion didn't change my mind. I still support the idea of
flagging them as bad exit.
Same. Mike gave some good reasons for flagging them weeks ago and I've
yet to see much else besides ranting that seems to ignore most of this
thread. -Damian
Sure, dude. Since you've read everything that was said, I take it
you're volunteering to contact the other node operators and ask them
to give reasons for why they chose their exit policy?
So please BadExit all nodes without contact email, if they don't
explain why they chose the default exit
On Mon, 2011-02-14 at 14:41 +0100, morphium wrote:
So, with everything said, could we now please Un-BadExit the nodes
that were affected?
Sorry, but this has been a long thread and I want to try to make sure I
understand something important.
Is it true or false that traffic was actually
On Mon, 14 Feb 2011, morphium wrote:
Sure, dude. Since you've read everything that was said, I take it
you're volunteering to contact the other node operators and ask them
to give reasons for why they chose their exit policy?
So please BadExit all nodes without contact email, if they don't
The final entries in a consensus document are a number of directory-
signature entries.
dir-spec.txt says:
cite
directory-signature SP identity SP signing-key-digest NL Signature
This is a signature of the status document, with the initial item
network-status-version, and the
I suppose the anarchist genes in me are not strong enough. I have to agree
with Mike Perry's arguments, given his credibility, and his clearer
perspective than most of the rest of us. If this BadExit policy is being
made up ad-hoc, that's fine by me. If the offending Tor node operators want
to
On 2011-02-14 19:46, Nick Mathewson wrote:
snip/
Does that mean The hash from the network-status-version entry to the
*first* directory-signature entry including a SP?
It means everything beginning with the string network-status-version
and ending with the first string directory-signature
On Mon, 2011-02-14 at 17:41 +, John Case wrote:
On Mon, 14 Feb 2011, Ted Smith wrote:
Sorry, but this has been a long thread and I want to try to make
sure I
understand something important.
Is it true or false that traffic was actually exiting through
gatereloaded et all?
I
On 2/14/2011 7:48 AM, grarpamp wrote:
[snip]
If another example is needed, not that one is; Corporate, edu and
other LAN's sometimes think they can block 'ooo, encryption bad'
ports so they can watch their user's plaintext URL's with their
substandard vendor nanny watch tool of the day. All the
On Monday 14 February 2011 14:17:45 Aplin, Justin M wrote:
However, I see no reason why providing an anonymous contact email would
be so hard. Certainly if you're going out of your way to avoid [insert
conspiracy of choice] in order to run a node, you have the skills to use
one of the hundreds
Hello Julie,
On Mon, 14 Feb 2011, Julie C wrote:
I suppose the anarchist genes in me are not strong enough. I have to agree
with Mike Perry's arguments, given his credibility, and his clearer
perspective than most of the rest of us. If this BadExit policy is being
made up ad-hoc, that's fine
On 2011-02-14 John Case wrote:
Where's the answer to this ? I chose edge-case scenarios above, for
sure, but this is the real meat of the implementation of your plans,
and I'd like to know if you've given any thought to this whatsoever.
What _is_ the proper corresponding open port for 25 ?
On Mon, Feb 14, 2011 at 4:32 PM, John Case c...@sdf.lonestar.org wrote:
Hello Julie,
On Mon, 14 Feb 2011, Julie C wrote:
I suppose the anarchist genes in me are not strong enough. I have to agree
with Mike Perry's arguments, given his credibility, and his clearer
perspective than most of the
On Mon, 14 Feb 2011, Gregory Maxwell wrote:
Then they need to not run an exit. If running an exit is probably
going to get you killed or put in jail you should not be running one.
If you're right and the decision to allow wacko exit policies
discourages people with their life on the line from
Some have wondered why anyone would want to abuse Scroogle
using Tor. Apart from some malicious types that may be
doing it for their own amusement, it looks to me like they
are trying to datamine Google -- arguably the largest,
most diverse database on the planet.
If you can manage to run a
On 02/14/2011 06:29 PM, scroo...@lavabit.com wrote:
Some have wondered why anyone would want to abuse Scroogle
using Tor. Apart from some malicious types that may be
doing it for their own amusement, it looks to me like they
are trying to datamine Google -- arguably the largest,
most diverse
Thus spake scroo...@lavabit.com (scroo...@lavabit.com):
My efforts to counter abuse occasionally cause some
programmers to consider using Tor to get Scroogle's
results. About a year ago I began requiring any and all
Tor searches at Scroogle to use SSL. Using SSL is always
a good idea, but
On Mon, 14 Feb 2011 20:19:50 -0800
Mike Perry mikepe...@fscked.org wrote:
2. Storing identifiers in the cache
http://crypto.stanford.edu/sameorigin/safecachetest.html has some PoC
of this. Torbutton protects against long-term cache identifiers, but
for performance reasons the memory cache
Thus spake Robert Ransom (rransom.8...@gmail.com):
On Mon, 14 Feb 2011 20:19:50 -0800
Mike Perry mikepe...@fscked.org wrote:
2. Storing identifiers in the cache
http://crypto.stanford.edu/sameorigin/safecachetest.html has some PoC
of this. Torbutton protects against long-term cache
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