On Wed, 25 Nov 2009 12:21:39 -0500 Gregory Maxwell gmaxw...@gmail.com
wrote:
On Tue, Nov 24, 2009 at 8:05 PM, Ted Smith ted...@gmail.com wrote:
On Tue, 2009-11-24 at 19:49 -0500, Roger Dingledine wrote:
See especially point #1: even if we didn't tell clients about the
list of
relays
On 11/25/2009 02:20 AM, James Brown wrote:
It's like a bridge, but for exits. They would probably have to be a lot
less friend-to-friend than bridges, but it might still be doable. I
think this is what the original poster meant, anyways.
Yes, I meant exactly that.
If I understand this
On Tue, Nov 24, 2009 at 8:05 PM, Ted Smith ted...@gmail.com wrote:
On Tue, 2009-11-24 at 19:49 -0500, Roger Dingledine wrote:
See especially point #1: even if we didn't tell clients about the
list of
relays directly, somebody could still make a lot of connections
through
Tor to a test site
On Wed, Nov 25, 2009 at 12:21:39PM -0500, Gregory Maxwell wrote:
On Tue, Nov 24, 2009 at 8:05 PM, Ted Smith ted...@gmail.com wrote:
On Tue, 2009-11-24 at 19:49 -0500, Roger Dingledine wrote:
See especially point #1: even if we didn't tell clients about the
list of
relays directly,
On Wed, Nov 25, 2009 at 1:08 PM, Paul Syverson
syver...@itd.nrl.navy.mil wrote:
Two words: Hidden service
Okay. I'm now running a HTTP forwarder to LJ as a hidden service.
Email me for the hidden service address and port number.
...
I'll be posting the mapping of the LJ accounts and passwords
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In the context of the above information concerning the ban of Tor's
nodes by the LJ (and in other such cases) I have an idea to provide in
the Tor net for non-public exit-notes.
This solution will be very, very useful for residents of the countries
On Wed, 2009-11-25 at 02:51 +0300, James Brown wrote:
In the context of the above information concerning the ban of Tor's
nodes by the LJ (and in other such cases) I have an idea to provide in
the Tor net for non-public exit-notes.
This solution will be very, very useful for residents of the
On Tue, 2009-11-24 at 19:49 -0500, Roger Dingledine wrote:
See especially point #1: even if we didn't tell clients about the
list of
relays directly, somebody could still make a lot of connections
through
Tor to a test site and build a list of the addresses they see.
I guess we could
Interesting idea, but seems like it could be pretty dangerous. If an
attacker was able to figure out the subset of Tor users taking advantage of
these special exits and ran one themselves then correlation probably
wouldn't be too difficult. In addition, abuse issues makes finding exit
operators a
I'm not sure that the correlation attacks for `bridge exits' are better than
those for normal bridges. However, the `exit risk' would likely be more
discouraging to such `bridge exits'. However, as a more general question,
making the Tor network difficult to completely enumerate might be
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Roger Dingledine wrote:
On Wed, Nov 25, 2009 at 02:51:57AM +0300, James Brown wrote:
Alas, livejournal's hand here might be forced by their new owners. In
that case, the only answer I can think of is for everybody in the affected
countries to
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Ted Smith wrote:
On Tue, 2009-11-24 at 19:49 -0500, Roger Dingledine wrote:
It's like a bridge, but for exits. They would probably have to be a lot
less friend-to-friend than bridges, but it might still be doable. I
think this is what the
On Wed, 25 Nov 2009 09:09:16 +0300 James Brown jbrownfi...@gmail.com
wrote:
Roger Dingledine wrote:
On Wed, Nov 25, 2009 at 02:51:57AM +0300, James Brown wrote:
Alas, livejournal's hand here might be forced by their new owners. In
that case, the only answer I can think of is for
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