Some further thoughts on an already mixed thread...
Would this increase anonymity? As pointed out previously, not much.
Attacks against Tor anonymity usually relate to entry-point/exit-point
traffic correlation... Regardless of how many segments are in the
middle, if your adversary can corner
On Mon, 6 Dec 2010, grarpamp wrote:
And what if the oponnent runs a hidden service trap?... seems that
then just watching or running the client's entry guard [1] is all that
is needed to confirm both connection and content? Yipes?!!!
I'm no expert. This sounds like a very hard and real
On Mon, Dec 06, 2010 at 05:18:21PM +, John Case wrote:
I proposed early in the previous thread that not only should a web of
trust be considered, but that this was indeed a classic case of a web of
trust ... I didn't see any comment on this from the Big Names on the
list, though...
On 2010-12-06 09:18, John Case wrote:
On Mon, 6 Dec 2010, grarpamp wrote:
[...]
Maybe there would also be benefit in a web of trust amongst nodes
not unlike a keysigning party. As with social networking, people
vouch for each other in various ways and strengths based on how
they feel that
On Mon, 6 Dec 2010, Lucky Green wrote:
The Web of Trust (WoT) concept provides for marginal security benefits
and then only in a very narrow set of circumstances that are unlikely to
hold true for the larger community of Tor node operators.
Starting with the second point, the WoT concept
I'm too obtuse to understand, just with your footnote alone,
what a hidden service trap is - would you provide a further
explanation, or a link to one ?
A hidden service trap is a hidden service run by any one/entity
you'd rather not be doing business with. A trap, a lure, a ruse,
a sting.
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