Does anyone have any comments or sugestions for the person that posted the
below, about one month ago ? I was very interested in this topic, but
there were no follow-ups ...
-
I am currently planning to build a private TOR network for 50 users. The
goal of the network is to provide
Hello David,
On Thu, 24 Sep 2009, David Jevans wrote:
What we have contemplated is operating the exit nodes, and mixing into
the public Tor network for either the middle or both middle and entry
nodes. You could select high bandwidth middle-nodes for this, which
would give you reasonably
On Thu, 24 Sep 2009, Flamsmark wrote:
On Thu, 24 Sep 2009, Flamsmark wrote:
If you limit yourself to a small set of nodes, you
will definitely compromise your anonymity against a powerful attacker.
But
What would you (loosely) define as a small set of nodes vs. a large set
of
nodes ?
First, am I to understand that this list is referring specifically to ISPs
that allow exit nodes ? Presumably a relay node is not deteted and your
ISP does not care ...
https://wiki.torproject.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/GoodBadISPs
One problem with this list, however, is that it deals
On Wed, 30 Sep 2009, t...@bitonion.net wrote:
For residential IPs it is not possible to distinguish a tor node from a
person. Only recently I was thinking that German police probably learned
from their first raid. Now this is coming along, but again, they
couldn't know it was a tor node until
On Tue, 29 Sep 2009, grarpamp wrote:
Finally, what generalizations can be made about the behaviors that
eventually lead to a police interaction ?
Carding, cracking, death threats, piracy, all the usual things and more.
Seems pretty obvious. Tor just makes it interesting because it's
simply
They run a high profile irc server (irc.lightning.net) and they encourage
bittorrent usage, etc.:
http://www.he.net/faq/bittorrent.html
as well as the ipv6 tunnel broker, and so on. They seem to be a very
clueful, progressive organiztion.
Does anyone know how they feel about tor exit
I can see notes like this in the changelog:
Solve a bug that kept hardware crypto acceleration from getting
enabled when accounting was turned on. Fixes bug 907. Bugfix on
0.0.9pre6.
and I can see command line options like:
HardwareAccel 0|1
I would like hardware acceleration for my
(replying to my own post to pass on what I've learned in the last day)
On Mon, 12 Oct 2009, John Case wrote:
I can see notes like this in the changelog:
Solve a bug that kept hardware crypto acceleration from getting
enabled when accounting was turned on. Fixes bug 907. Bugfix
On Mon, 12 Oct 2009, Wyllys Ingersoll wrote:
tor is actually cpu-bound rather than ram-bound on the fast relays i
think you should be able to push 10MB/s in 1G of ram
So crypto-acceleration appears to be useful.
The symmetric-key processing is very fast and takes up little CPU time.
On Sun, 18 Oct 2009, Jacob Todd wrote:
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2009/10/16/kaspersky_rebukes_net_anonymity/
In Kaspersky's world, services such as??Psiphon??and??The Onion Router
(Tor)??- which are legitimately used by Chinese dissidents and Google
users alike to shield personally
On Mon, 19 Oct 2009, Karsten Loesing wrote:
On 10/19/2009 04:10 PM, John Case wrote:
It would be interesting if someone in the know could let us know how
many bridges are running ... I'd further be interested in the total
number that have been submitted over time, vs. the number
This is interesting:
http://www.linux-cisco.org/index.php/Cisco_3600_Series
It's only a R4700 with 128 MB of ram ... but they have Linux up and
running on it.
Is anyone running Tor on a Cisco router, or more generally, on networking
infrastructure hardware of any kind ?
On Sun, 25 Oct 2009, basile wrote:
This is interesting:
http://www.linux-cisco.org/index.php/Cisco_3600_Series
It's only a R4700 with 128 MB of ram ... but they have Linux up and
running on it.
Is anyone running Tor on a Cisco router, or more generally, on
networking infrastructure hardware
On Wed, 11 Nov 2009, Sharif Olorin wrote:
Bids like Kaspersky's are exceptionally unlikely to be successful. The
people who keep the Internet running are, for the most part, the
people who are most opposed to this kind of control.
If The Internet
is restricted in such ridiculous ways as
On Thu, 12 Nov 2009, Andrea Ratto wrote:
The only problem I am facing is the lack of speed. Can something be done
about it? I was thinking to reduce the circuit lenght, but it seems
there is no option for that. Any suggestion is welcome.
Can one use a node listing like this:
On Fri, 13 Nov 2009, Andrew Lewman wrote:
Second, it sounds like you want to protect against a local attacker from
seeing your traffic. If so, go to proxy.org, find an https:// or
vpn-based provider and enjoy your encrypted protection against your
local ISP seeing your destination.
If you
On Fri, 13 Nov 2009, Paul Syverson wrote:
But lets say one sets up X Tor nodes in X different locales and configure
my Tor to use one of those X for my entry, and one of those X for my exit
... I'm still throttled by my middle hop, but the odds are much higher in
my favor, and I may only need
On Mon, 7 Dec 2009, thomas.hluch...@netcologne.de wrote:
for my Sun Hosts I would like to have a Crypto Hardware Accelerator Card. At
ebay.com there are some. Especially this one is what I want to get:
On Sat, 17 Apr 2010, krishna e bera wrote:
https://wiki.torproject.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/GoodBadISPs
Please fee free to update that page under the appropriate region heading
if your ex-ISP is not listed. Laws and practice and availability vary
quite a bit with country and ISP. I think
Let's say you run a tor relay with no exit policy:
reject *:*
And then later you alter that exit policy a bit:
accept *:80,reject *:*
My understanding is that this system will continue to be used as a
non-exit relay, but will then also be used as an exit. That is, it's not
going to be
On Sat, 8 May 2010, Dyno Tor wrote:
Let's say you run a tor relay with no exit policy:
reject *:*
And then later you alter that exit policy a bit:
accept *:80,reject *:*
(snip)
What do you mean, not an exit node at all? As long as the Tor
process receives a HUP signal or is restarted
On Sat, 8 May 2010, Mike Perry wrote:
This means that your non-Exit flagged node will be weighted like an
Exit flagged node for the exit position, but will be weighted as if
you were a non-scarce middle or guard node for the other positions.
In sort, you would in theory get slightly more
If I run a relay with no exit policy at all:
reject *:*
and I personally, as a logged in local user of the system, initiate
traffic (like, say, download the wikileaks torrent or posting on a website
using lynx, or whatever), I suspect that traffic sticks out VERY clearly
to an outside
Also, afaik, zero people in the wild are actively running Tor with any
crypto accelerator. May be a very painful process... I'm not really
interested in documenting it unless its proven to scale by actual use.
I want this document to end up with tested and reproduced results
only. You know,
On Sun, 7 Nov 2010, Scott Bennett wrote:
Scott Bennett, Comm. ASMELG, CFIAG
What do those two acronyms (ASMELG, CFIAG) mean ?
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On Fri, 19 Nov 2010, Theodore Bagwell wrote:
On Fri, 19 Nov 2010 08:11 -0500, Paul Syverson
syver...@itd.nrl.navy.mil wrote:
Your reactions are good. It's just that many people have had the
same reactions so we've explored this, and nobody in all of the research
done has yet produced a viable
On Sat, 20 Nov 2010, coderman wrote:
On Fri, Nov 19, 2010 at 6:10 PM, John Case c...@sdf.lonestar.org wrote:
...
How does the on-chip encryption feature set of the i7 compare to the very
latest sparc processors and their on-chip encryption features ?
the latest i5 / i7 with AES-NI can
Hi Damian,
On Tue, 30 Nov 2010, Damian Johnson wrote:
Hi. After over a year it's about time that I announced an arm release
so here it is! What's new since August of 2009 [1], you ask? Lots. The
project has been under very active development, continuing to add
usability improvements to make
On Wed, 1 Dec 2010, Maciej Zbierski wrote:
I was going through the Coding Projects site the other day and spotted
that Tor is in need of a simulator for slow connections. I have written
something similar as a part of my M.Sc., so I thought I could contribute by
adapting my code to Tor's needs.
On Wed, 1 Dec 2010, Damian Johnson wrote:
Arm should work just fine under BSD with the exception of the
connection listing.
The problem there is that FreeBSD's netstat lacks the flag to list the
pids associated with connections (so I can't narrow the list to tor
connections), ss is a
On Fri, 3 Dec 2010, Fabian Keil wrote:
- Be available to test a potential fix.
If you're up for that then I'm glad to have the help! Lets take
further discussion of this off the list. I don't think this is
generally of interest to the rest of the tor community. -Damian
It's at least
On Fri, 3 Dec 2010, Hans Schnehl wrote:
Sorry for jumping in , but please notice the above command might not
not work on all versions of FBSD, at least it doesn't on a 7-Stable jail.
Maybe the following just produces a similar sufficient output:
_...@ato# id
uid=256(_tor) gid=256(_tor)
On Fri, 3 Dec 2010, Hans Schnehl wrote:
specifically:
ps -Al
after polling for lsof and a foreach loop, doesn't work ?
I know it's not elegant, but it appeared to me that:
lsof + ps -Al
would work ... especially if the system in question is doing little (or
nothing) other than Tor ...
I
On Mon, 6 Dec 2010, grarpamp wrote:
And what if the oponnent runs a hidden service trap?... seems that
then just watching or running the client's entry guard [1] is all that
is needed to confirm both connection and content? Yipes?!!!
I'm no expert. This sounds like a very hard and real
On Mon, 6 Dec 2010, Lucky Green wrote:
The Web of Trust (WoT) concept provides for marginal security benefits
and then only in a very narrow set of circumstances that are unlikely to
hold true for the larger community of Tor node operators.
Starting with the second point, the WoT concept
This is only interesting if you are not on the Internet.
Either VPS server as a hidden service, or otherwise Tor only or you set
up a parallel (local ?) network.
Otherwise, you're just an ISP, no matter what kind of bread crumbs you
take as payment, and the hammer is going to come down on
On Tue, 7 Dec 2010, Roger Dingledine wrote:
Let me be even broader: if you want to be safe, you must never use Tor
with any browser except Firefox, and you must also use Torbutton. If
you don't do both, you can lose from a wide variety of application-level
attacks.
Wait, what about lynx ?
On Sun, 12 Dec 2010, Fabian Keil wrote:
Damian Johnson atag...@gmail.com wrote:
John mentioned that for him connection resolution doesn't work in the
new arm tarball (arm_bsdTest2.tar.bz2). Hans, Fabian: can either of
you confirm, and if so what sort of issue is the log indicating?
I can't
On Sun, 30 Jan 2011, Christopher A. Lindsey wrote:
Could it be that these nodes have set these policies to reduce the
possibility of being approached because of illegal activity passing
through them? It could be they believe that they're helping with the
project and limiting their exposure as
On Thu, 10 Feb 2011, Mike Perry wrote:
Exit policy is currently at the operator's pleasure, need and design.
If exit policy mandates will help solve some Tor scalability or
attack vector issues, in a substantive way, from an engineering
standpoint, fine. But please, don't claim it makes users
Hello Gregory,
On Fri, 11 Feb 2011, Gregory Maxwell wrote:
As far as I can tell this is a completely spurious strawman argument.
Where is this person with a legitimate reason why they can allow :80
and not :443? What is their reason?
I am trying to suggest two things here:
1) We cannot
Hi Geoff,
On Sat, 12 Feb 2011, Geoff Down wrote:
There are a small number of easily identifiable cons to letting an exit
run like this, and there are an unlimited number of unknown pros to
letting an exit run like this. You should know this.
Leaving aside the original question of whether
On Mon, 31 Jan 2011, Andrew Lewman wrote:
In my opinion, judging a relay based on exit policy is a slippery slope
we don't want to go down. We never claim to make using Tor alone safer
than using the Internet at large. Whether the creep is at Starbucks
sniffing the wifi or running a relay is
On Mon, 14 Feb 2011, morphium wrote:
Sure, dude. Since you've read everything that was said, I take it
you're volunteering to contact the other node operators and ask them
to give reasons for why they chose their exit policy?
So please BadExit all nodes without contact email, if they don't
Hello Julie,
On Mon, 14 Feb 2011, Julie C wrote:
I suppose the anarchist genes in me are not strong enough. I have to agree
with Mike Perry's arguments, given his credibility, and his clearer
perspective than most of the rest of us. If this BadExit policy is being
made up ad-hoc, that's fine
On Mon, 14 Feb 2011, Gregory Maxwell wrote:
Then they need to not run an exit. If running an exit is probably
going to get you killed or put in jail you should not be running one.
If you're right and the decision to allow wacko exit policies
discourages people with their life on the line from
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