<http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/site/index.asp?lang=En> Intelligence and
Terrorism Information Center
The Meir Amit
Intelligence and Terrorism
Information Center
March 3, 2011
Terrorism from the Gaza Strip since Operation Cast Lead Data, Type and Trends 1
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Map of the rocket threat to the Israeli home front from the Gaza Strip
<http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/Hebrew/heb_n/html/img/ipc_169_2e.jpg>
Map of the rocket threat to the Israeli home front from the Gaza Strip
Overview
1. In the two years since Operation Cast Lead there has been a significant
reduction in the extent and severity of terrorist attacks carried out by Hamas,
the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and the other Palestinian terrorist organizations
operating in the Gaza Strip. That created a new security situation, and
improvement on that before Operation Cast Lead. The decrease in terrorism
reflects Israel's power, restored by Operation Cast Lead, to deter the
terrorist organizations. However, even the current level of rocket and mortar
shell fire and the frequent attacks on IDF forces along the border fence
disrupt the daily lives of the western Negev residents.
2. The relative quiet has been exploited by Hamas and the other terrorist
organizations for the as yet incomplete process of rehabilitating and upgrading
their military capabilities. The process is implemented by the vast support
provided by Iran and Syria. In any case, Hamas continues to make it possible,
sometimes with its own involvement or through its proxies, for low-signature
shooting attacks and other terrorist activities to be carried out, and tries to
keep a balance between preventing escalation and waging a campaign of attrition
against Israeli civilians.
3. Hamas, to enforce its strategic policy of restraint on the other terrorist
organizations operating in the Gaza Strip, some of which occasionally try to
challenge it, uses its security (and sometimes military) enforcement
apparatuses. Hamas also coerced other terrorist organizations into accepting
its policies through agreements meant to preserve the lull. Its enforcement
apparatuses reduced rocket fire and showcase attacks from the Gaza Strip and at
the same time tried to channel the rogue organizations into accepting the
ground rules deemed suitable by hamas.
4. Those Hamas policies have been carried out with varying levels of
effectiveness and determination. Judging by the results, it can be said that
Hamas has generally succeeded in enforcing its policy of restraint on the other
organizations, including its rivals. However, at the end of 2010 and the
beginning of 2011 there was been an erosion in the willingness of the various
organizations to obey Hamas' policy, and there was a certain increase in
shooting and other terrorist attacks against Israel.
5. On the ground, in 2009 and 2010 Hamas' restraint policy was effective both
quantitatively and qualitatively. The number of showcase attacks decreased and
there was significantly less rocket and mortar shell fire from the Gaza Strip.
In the two years since Operation Cast Lead, 261 rocket hits were identified in
Israeli territory, 158 in 2009 and 103 in 2010. One hundred sixty-one mortar
shell hits were identified, 108 in 2009 and 53 in 2010 (half of them in
December). In addition, several hundred rockets and mortar shells misfired and
landed in the Gaza Strip. The numbers are far lower than those recorded in the
years preceding Operation Cast Lead, illustrated by the following graphs:
Multi-Annual Distribution of Rocket Fire in Israeli Territory
Multi-Annual Distribution of Rocket Fire in Israeli Territory
<http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/Hebrew/heb_n/html/img/ipc_169_3e.jpg>
Multi-Annual Distribution of Mortar Shell Fire in Israeli Territory
Multi-Annual Distribution of Mortar Shell Fire in Israeli Territory
<http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/Hebrew/heb_n/html/img/ipc_169_4e.jpg>
6. To "compensate" for the need to restrain attacks along the Gaza-Israeli
border, Hamas and the other terrorist organizations looked for indirect routes
into Israel through the Sinai Peninsula and naval routes from the sea. Efforts
were made to hide them and on occasion to deny their existence, especially to
avoid complicating relations (complex in any case) with Egypt, which regards
the exploitation of the Sinai Peninsula for terrorist attacks as detrimental to
its national security and economy.
7. The use of indirect routes in 2010 was manifested by two instances of
launching of 122mm Grad rockets from the Sinai Peninsula at Eilat, Israel's
southernmost city. Responsible for both attacks were operatives from Hamas' Izz
al-Din al-Qassam Brigades in the Gaza Strip. Hamas, however, did not admit
responsibility for the attacks and in one instance even denied the attack had
been carried out. In other instances Hamas and the other terrorist
organizations operating in the Gaza Strip sent terrorist squads into Israel
through the Sinai Peninsula to carry out various types of attacks. Those plans
included the abduction and murder of an IDF soldier, his body to be used as a
bargaining chip, and mass-casualty attacks in crowded population centers.
8. The relative quiet was disrupted at the end of 2010 by increasing mortar
shell fire aimed at military and civilian targets and by increasing rocket
fire. In February 2011 a 122mm Grad rocket attack was carried out against
Beersheba, 42 kilometers (26 miles) from the Gaza Strip (for the first time
since Operation Cast Lead). There was also an increase in the number of
attempted attacks (IEDs, anti-tank fire, sniper attacks) on IDF forces
conducting counterterrorism activities near the border fence, both within
Israeli territory and inside the Gaza Strip (several hundred meters from the
fence).
9. In our assessment, Israel's deterrent power still exists and Hamas clearly
wants to continue its policy of restraint to keep the situation from
deteriorating. However, Hamas, its military wing and the other terrorist
organizations have increased their activities and become bolder. Their
objective is to test what they can and cannot do vis-à-vis Israel and extend
the limits of their terrorist attacks. Hamas still enforces its enforcement
actions, although on occasion it allows the other organizations slightly more
freedom of action, and infrequently even participates in attacks near the
border fence.
10. Hamas and the other terrorist organizations are exploiting the relative
quiet on the ground for a rapid process of rehabilitating and upgrading their
military capabilities. Hamas gives the process priority over rehabilitating the
civilian infrastructure, which demands greater resources. Hamas and the
Palestinian Islamic Jihad particularly emphasize improving their rocket and
mortar shell capabilities, considered Israel's home front to be its Achilles
heel, and want to be able to strike Israeli civilians while using Palestinian
civilians as human shields.
11. In the two years since Operation Cast Lead, Hamas (with aid from Iran) has
doubled and upgraded its rocket arsenal. It now has thousands of rockets of
various ranges, both standard and homemade, including Fajr 5 rockets which can
reach the center of Israel. The Palestinian Islamic Jihad has also upgraded its
rocket capabilities.
12. Hamas also particularly emphasizes rehabilitating and upgrading its
anti-tank system, which it regards as a response to the IDF's armored
advantage. In the past two years the terrorist organizations operating in the
Gaza Strip have equipped themselves with advanced anti-tank guided missile
systems with deeper penetration capabilities, such as Kornet missiles (the
first of which was fired from the Gaza Strip on December 6, 2010).
13. The process of rehabilitating the terrorist military infrastructure is
based on weapons and knowhow supplied by external sources. It entails
exploiting Sudanese territory and using border-crossing networks of smugglers
and merchants, passing through routes, most of which originate in Iran. As in
the past, Iran plays a principle role, regarding the growing military
capabilities being constructed in the Gaza Strip as a tool for advancing its
own strategic objectives.
14. Iranian and Syrian support is manifested in supplying Hamas and the
Palestinian Islamic Jihad with highly advanced weapons, logistical aid in
smuggling them into the Gaza Strip, instruction and training, transferring
funds to the organizations in the Gaza Strip and giving the de facto Hamas
administration in the Gaza Strip political and propaganda support. In addition,
Iran fosters special relations with the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, an Iranian
proxy which is not subject to some of the governmental considerations
restraining Hamas.
Contents
_____
15. Overview
16. Types and distribution of terrorist attacks from the Gaza Strip:
1) Rocket fire from the Gaza Strip targeting Israel
2) Rocket attacks originating in the Gaza Strip targeting Eilat
3) Mortar shell fire
4) Various types of terrorist attacks near the border fence (light arms fire,
anti-tank fire, IEDs)
5) Preventing terrorist attacks in Israel originating in the Gaza Strip
6) Summary of the Israel casualties resulting from terrorist attacks
originating in the Gaza Strip
17. Terrorism policy employed by Hamas and the other terrorist organizations
operating in the Gaza Strip
18. Rehabilitation and upgrade of Hamas' military capabilities since Operation
Cast Lead
1) Overview
2) Upgrade of rocket and mortar shell systems
3) Upgrade of anti-tank systems
4) Improvement of weapon self-production capabilities
5) Improvement of smuggling capabilities
6) Hamas priorities regarding the rehabilitation of military capabilities
19. The military buildup of the other terrorist organizations since Operation
Cast Lead
1) The Palestinian Islamic Jihad
2) Fatah's Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades
3) The Popular Resistance Committees
4) The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
5) The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine
6) Networks affiliated with the global jihad
20. Iranian support for the military buildup of the Gaza Strip
_____
1 This document is an overview of a study which is currently being translated
and will shortly appear on our website. The full Hebrew version has been posted
at http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/Hebsite/home/default.asp
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