Of course they're struggling. It's the height of stupidity to even consider
trying terrorists under civil/criminal laws and procedures. There are too
many "rights" afforded the terrorists under these laws - as if they were
petty thieves instead of mass murders and hate-mongers.

 

 

 

Germany’s Struggle To Prosecute Terrorists

SPIEGEL ONLINE - November 17, 2006, 04:00 PM 
URL: http://www.spiegel.
<http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel/0,1518,449003,00.html>
de/international/spiegel/0,1518,449003,00.html 


DEAD ENDS


 

By Dominik Cziesche 

Germany has had little success in jailing suspected accomplices of Mohammed
Atta, largely for lack of evidence. A risky foreign mission launched by its
security services went badly awry.

On that fateful morning of September 11, 2001, Mohammed Haydar Zammar and
Mamoun Darkazanli must have known that their lives were about to change
forever. The moment the first images of the blazing World Trade Center hit
the screens, Zammar, considered a mentor to the attack's ringleaders by
Germany's security services, and Mamoun Darkazanli, long suspected of
supporting al Qaeda, were speaking on the phone. Shortly afterward, they met
up. For about an hour, Darkazanli later recalled, he and Zammar followed the
coverage on TV.

Mzoudi on trial (before Hamburg's Higher Regional Court, 2003): Sharing
quarters with Mohammed AttaDPA

Mzoudi on trial (before Hamburg's Higher Regional Court, 2003): Sharing
quarters with Mohammed Atta

It was to be their last meeting. For almost five years, Zammar has been
<http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel/0,1518,386033,00.html>
languishing in a Middle Eastern prison cell. Darkazanli still lives in his
Hamburg apartment, despite the authorities' best efforts to indict him. The
fate of these two Islamists epitomizes the dilemma faced by Western
democracies in their war against terror. Can it be won without impinging on
civilians' constitutional rights? And can a state governed by the rule of
law afford to cooperate with countries that use torture in their
interrogations? 

Zammar was abducted by CIA officers during a trip to Morocco at the end of
2001 and taken to Syria, a country that practices torture. That made
Syrian-born Zammar, who had acquired German citizenship in 1982, one of the
first victims of "rendition," a U.S. practice that rides roughshod over
fundamental legal principles. He is now incarcerated in a 6x3 foot cell, a
gaunt shadow of his former 300-pound self.

The German authorities have long been aware of Zammar's circumstances. Back
in November 2002, officials from Germany's federal investigative agencies
embarked upon a top-secret mission to interview him in Damascus. Their
superiors had stipulated in their brief that "under no circumstances may
German agencies and their personnel take part, either actively or passively,
in torture." If at any time they discovered that a detainee was being
treated "inappropriately," they were to halt the mission immediately.

Back in Germany, just after the 9/11 attacks, Zammar had mocked a judge at
his trial, saying: "The law obligating me to testify here is not an Islamic
law. As a consequence, I do not feel bound by it." But in Damascus, he was
proving almost garrulous. Clad in a dark-gray jalabiya and a green army
anorak, he chatted to his visitors over pistachios and tea about things that
had never passed his lips in Germany. He volunteered, for example, how he
had encouraged the 9/11 attackers to enroll at a terrorist training camp.

But Zammar also bemoaned being left to vegetate in his tiny cell. The German
officials noted that he looked emaciated, but could discern "no visible sign
of infirmity."

The dubious Syrian jaunt did little to further the Germans' 9/11
investigation. Evidence obtained through the efforts of Syrian torturers is
inadmissible in a German court. Details of the trip leaked late in 2005
placed Merkel's fledgling government in an embarrassing bind - and left
ministers groping for explanations: "It was the unanimous view of all the
officials involved" that proper interviewing conditions were "not violated,"
a spokesperson for the country's new grand coalition said. 

In fact, the previous coalition - comprising the Social Democrats and Green
Party - had struck a very questionable bargain to secure permission for the
interrogation in the first place. In return for access to the prison, the
German authorities suspended espionage proceedings against some Syrian
intelligence agents. "We wouldn't do that again," says one official today.

The government got itself into trouble of a different kind over Zammar's
associate, Darkazanli. In his case, the German investigators played it
strictly by the book, but an entire army of German and American experts were
unable to produce enough evidence to indict him in Germany.

Probably no other case has damaged Germany's reputation as much as this one,
especially in Washington. Intelligence services had to explain why they had
not monitored Darkazanli more closely in the build-up to 9/11, while the
German federal prosecutor's office was accused of doing too little too late.
For weeks on end, the government faced a barrage of media accusations that
top suspects had nothing to fear in Germany.

But Darkazanli is by no means the only suspected terrorist to escape
prosecution, compounding the impression of legal lethargy. The state's
attorneys failed to build cases against most of the hijackers' associates. A
handful have quit the country in the interim; some left voluntarily, others
were deported. Only one - Ramzi bin al-Shibh - is being held by the U.S. at
an undisclosed location.

But many continue to live in Germany - because they are married to German
nationals, or still enrolled at universities. And above all because nobody
can prove they were complicit in Mohammed Atta's plans.

In the wake of 9/11, the Federal Prosecutor launched proceedings against
just two of the terrorists' associates: Abdelghani Mzoudi and Mounir
al-Motassadeq, known in Hamburg's department of interior affairs simply as
"M & M."

Hamburg's higher regional court sentenced al-Motassadeq to 15 years for
being a member of a terrorist organization and an accessory to 3,066 counts
of murder. The conviction was then quashed by the country's Supreme Court.
In a second trial, the sentence was reduced to seven years. But Germany's
Federal Court of Justice this week affirmed his conviction and extended the
charges to include 246 counts of abetting murder for the deaths of the
passengers and crew members of the airlines used by the hijackers. The court
said the evidence proved that al-Motassadeq had been aware that attacks were
being planned. It turned the case back to the lower court and said the
thousands of deaths in New York and Washington could be taken into
consideration when al-Motassadeq is sentenced. 

In the original trial - an attempt to convict al-Motassadeq of belonging to
a German-based terrorist organization - the courts resorted to sleight of
hand. Since supporting foreign terrorist groups was not punishable before
September 11, the judges simply reversed the sequence of events. In the
court's version, a terror cell based in Germany had decided to carry out
attacks in the U.S., before its members traveled to Afghanistan to drum up
support. In other words, bin Laden hadn't recruited henchman Atta. Atta was
the global mastermind and bin Laden his loyal follower.

The German Supreme Court rejected this theory as implausible, and overturned
the sentence. The lack of statements from key witnesses, including that of
Chalid Sheikh Mohammed, also affected their ruling. The strategist behind
the attacks is being held by the Americans at an undisclosed location -
outside the range of normal jurisdiction, and beyond the reach of even the
longest arm of the law. Although German intelligence is privy to some of his
testimony, German courts are not - as is also the case with Zammar's
statements to the Syrians.

Klaus Tolksdorf, the presiding judge at Germany's Supreme Court, warned that
terrorism did not justify "barbarous, uninhibited war." In doing so, he
clearly rejected the strong-arm methods advocated by Washington, which
former CIA antiterror chief Cofer Black once euphemistically referred to as
"taking off our kid gloves." Tolksdorf's words expose the (self-imposed)
limitations of the German state, but leave its prosecutors on the horns of a
dilemma.

Islamist Zammar (2001 in Hamburg): "The law is not an Islamic law; as a
consequence, I do not feel bound by it"Knut Müller / DER SPIEGEL

Islamist Zammar (2001 in Hamburg): "The law is not an Islamic law; as a
consequence, I do not feel bound by it"

Like his friend al-Motassadeq, Abdelghani Mzoudi also underwent weapons
training at an al Qaeda camp in Afghanistan. He even spent some time living
at Marienstrasse 54 in Hamburg, the house where the student terrorists
hatched their plot. But Hamburg's higher regional court was forced to acquit
him, too - again for lack of evidence. 

At the trial, the federal prosecution service and representatives of the
country's security services had entangled each other in a web of
contradictions. While one was insisting that Mzoudi had been in Hamburg when
the attacks were planned, the other was claiming the terrorists had hatched
their conspiracy in Afghanistan in his absence. Mzoudi was acquitted, and
now lives in Morocco, where he unfailingly sings the praises of Germany's
legal system.

According to the Hamburg judge Ernst-Rainer Schudt, Germany's criminal law
is designed to handle clubs and associations, but is powerless to stop
"sporadic fundamentalist cells springing up," organizations that fail to
elect treasurers and submit regular reports.

This plays into the hands of men like Mohammed B. and Abderrazek L., just
two of scores of students from Islamic fundamentalist circles.

Mohammed B. was an electrical engineering major who flunked his exams twice
as long ago as 1995. After that he reported sick before each further test,
to avoid being thrown off his degree program. He was friends with two of
Atta's alleged accomplices, Said Bahaji and Zakariya Essabar, both of whom
are still at large. In March 2000, his Internet connection was used twice to
access a website containing information on U.S. flying schools. But not by
him, he claims.

He once wrote to his uncle in Morocco that the Germans were waging war on
Islam, but would never win. In the fall of 2003 he returned to Morocco of
his own free will; there was no evidence to justify deportation.

Abderrazek L., a short, stocky man, once shared an apartment with Mzoudi.
Among his possessions the police found one video showing Chechen Mujahideen
beheading a captive. And another in which imams encourage good Muslims to
"kill the children of the unbelievers ... drag off their women and destroy
their homes."

Once again, the authorities hit a brick wall. "I'd like to stress that being
someone's acquaintance doesn't necessarily mean 'knowing' them," said
Abderrazek L., detailing his links with the hijackers' associates. "We are
all Muslims, and at the mosque we are all brothers." He knew most of those
involved in the attacks, but without knowing much about them, he claimed.

And what about the videos? "I didn't watch them all from beginning to end,"
he professed. And anyway, who's to say he shares the imam's views? He didn't
think the attacks of 9/11 were "all that good" - given all the innocent
victims, he says.

Abderrazek L. has at least left the country: one of the first from the wider
group of people linked with the terrorists. But in the war on terror, his
case neither raises the German judiciary's profile nor enhances its image.

In the beginning, things had looked so different. Immediately after
September 11, the Germans seemed on the brink of dramatic breakthroughs.
Within days the police had made rapid progress, documenting the key
information and major participants. They searched Darkazanli's apartment
just 48 hours after the attacks, confiscating papers and instructing him to
report for questioning two days later. Which he did: the following Saturday
Darkazanli duly turned up and was interrogated from 11 a.m. to 1:30 p.m.

"How long have you known Said Bahaji?" he was asked about a man who
continues to evade capture. "Does the name Mohammed Zammar ring a bell?"
And: "Do you know Abdelghani Mzoudi?" They questioned him about the
hijackers and about bin al-Shibh, one of the plotters. 

They also quizzed Darkazanli about his business connections. "Don't you find
it strange that your business partners in the United States are all in jail
for their parts in bomb attacks?"

His answer: "No. I was just looking to make some money with these people. In
my line of business, I can't be expected to know what everyone else is up
to."

The authorities first took an interest in Darkazanli's unusual connections
as early as 1993, when they intercepted a wire transfer from his wife's bank
account to the suspected head of an Afghan training camp. The alleged
purpose of the payment: "child support." Then there was the discovery of a
photo showing Darkazanli wielding a submachine gun in Afghanistan's
mountainous Hindu Kush region. And then there was his alleged involvement in
the purchase of a ship for al Qaeda, contributing - according to Spanish
investigators - 152,000 deutschmarks toward the total price of 760,000
deutschmarks. Darkazanli insists that none of these transactions are
connected to terrorism.

In 1998, Mamduh Mahmud Salim - Osama bin Laden's purported financier - was
arrested in Bavaria. Since that day Darkazanli, who had power of attorney
for one of Salim's accounts in Frankfurt, has been eyed as a major catch.

Federal investigators twice asked prosecutors to institute legal proceedings
against Darkazanli prior to 9/11. But they refused.

And so he stayed in his home on a leafy side street in Hamburg's Uhlenhorst
quarter, a few steps from the Alster Lake. In the days following the
attacks, local joggers were joined by hordes of camera crews, journalists
and investigators - all demanding an explanation for the crime. But as he
has repeatedly done, Darkazanli denied any links with al Qaeda.

Today, the crowds have disappeared. It looks as if Darkazanli is living
happily ever after, having yet again slipped through the prosecution's net,
unlike his friend Zammar. And at first glance it seems as if the authorities
have suffered yet another setback in their war against terrorism.

But appearances can be deceiving. Before the German parliament retired for
its summer recess, it ratified new legislation on EU arrest warrants,
allowing the extradition of German nationals to other EU states. This could
prove crucial to the Spanish authorities who have long been demanding
Darkazanli's handover. Unlike their German counterparts, Spanish prosecutors
believe they have the evidence to prove Darkazanli's membership in al Qaeda.
They see him as an accomplice of the Islamic fundamentalist Imad Yarkas, who
was given a 27-year sentence for his role in the 9/11 attacks.

Darkazanli appealed successfully against the attempted deportation at
Germany's Constitutional Court. He was due to be put on an Iberia Airlines
flight from Berlin's Tegel Airport to Madrid's Barajas Airport, but the
judges suspended the extradition order minutes before take-off. The court
requested increased safeguards for German citizens against extradition,
which should only be permitted, they ruled, "in cases where the offense has
a typical cross-border dimension from the outset and shows a corresponding
gravity, as is the case with international terrorism or organized
trafficking in drugs or human beings." The government lawyers returned to
the drawing board.

It was a convoluted process, they say - unlike the case of Zammar, who was
simply blindfolded, bundled onto a plane, and spirited away to a torture
chamber. With Darkazanli, the legislation had to be meticulously worded,
reworded and reworded again; there were thirty-odd drafts in all. The final
law represents the German civil servants' riposte to the mob-like methods of
the war on terror. Darkazanli, they say, has yet to fully appreciate the
danger he faces.

But - they suspect - that will soon change.




  _____  

© SPIEGEL ONLINE 2006
All Rights Reserved
Reproduction only allowed with the permission of SPIEGELnet GmbH

 



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