Hans-Christoph Steiner wrote:
On Jul 13, 2007, at 1:43 AM, Frank Barknecht wrote:
Debian with libpam-modules 0.79-4.
I wonder how to set up something like this in a package. Too bad
i daresay you don't.
how about adding documentation to the README that explain how to setup
the
IOhannes m zmoelnig wrote:
just for the archives i repeat the steps:
make sure, your /etc/security/limits.conf holds these 3 lines:
oops, should have read the entire thread before answering. so i know
that frank has already posted this (i thought that miller was probably
referring to an older
Hallo,
Miller Puckette hat gesagt: // Miller Puckette wrote:
Pd does a seteuid(setuid()) to un-get root priveliges if run as
setuid, after its priority gets promoted, so that it runs as the
user who started it. But there are apparently loopholes, as Mathieu
has found.
I'm trying to repeat
On Jul 13, 2007, at 1:43 AM, Frank Barknecht wrote:
Hallo,
Miller Puckette hat gesagt: // Miller Puckette wrote:
Pd does a seteuid(setuid()) to un-get root priveliges if run as
setuid, after its priority gets promoted, so that it runs as the
user who started it. But there are apparently
Aha, on the next boot it worked. Thanks!
Miller
On Fri, Jul 13, 2007 at 07:43:10AM +0200, Frank Barknecht wrote:
Hallo,
Miller Puckette hat gesagt: // Miller Puckette wrote:
Pd does a seteuid(setuid()) to un-get root priveliges if run as
setuid, after its priority gets promoted, so that
On Thu, 12 Jul 2007, Hans-Christoph Steiner wrote:
This is only possible if you are running Pd as root, which is general is not
a good idea. If Pd is running as a different user, then you wouldn't be able
to gain root access.
We are *only* talking about setuid (chmod +s) and not starting pd
On Fri, 13 Jul 2007, Frank Barknecht wrote:
Regarding patco's problem with realtime mode: chmod +s is not a good
idea as it's a potentially big security hole opening up your system for
all kind of local exploits.
Frankly, on the average machine, almost all important files are in the
same
On Fri, 13 Jul 2007, Frank Barknecht wrote:
Hans-Christoph Steiner hat gesagt: // Hans-Christoph Steiner wrote:
This is only possible if you are running Pd as root, which is general
is not a good idea. If Pd is running as a different user, then you
wouldn't be able to gain root access.
On Fri, 13 Jul 2007, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Pd does a seteuid(setuid()) to un-get root priveliges if run as
setuid, after its priority gets promoted, so that it runs as the
user who started it. But there are apparently loopholes, as Mathieu
has found.
what you mean is that your pd does a
On Jul 12, 2007, at 3:18 PM, Mathieu Bouchard wrote:
On Thu, 12 Jul 2007, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
would it be possible to add an option to ask the user if he wants
to chmod +s pd? some people told me it's dangerous. is it really?
pd is already a powerful (read dangerous) software with
-list@iem.at
Sent: Thursday, July 12, 2007 5:11 PM
Subject: Re: [PD] Pd-0.39.2-extended-rc4 released on ubuntu
Hmm... setuid root by default on Pd is kind of scary. It's very far from
secure. I wonder if there isn't any other way. Have you tried jack?
.hc
On Jul 12, 2007, at 4:06 PM
Hallo,
Hans-Christoph Steiner hat gesagt: // Hans-Christoph Steiner wrote:
On Jul 12, 2007, at 2:45 PM, Georg Holzmann wrote:
Hallo!
the other thing is only related to my setup i guess. i would like to
know if anyone experience this. if i don't chmod +s /usr/local/bin/pd
then i have
Pd does a seteuid(setuid()) to un-get root priveliges if run as
setuid, after its priority gets promoted, so that it runs as the
user who started it. But there are apparently loopholes, as Mathieu
has found.
I'm trying to repeat Frank's trick with /etc/security/limits.conf, so
far without
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