Dear list members,
some time later maybe I will work on my idea, that there are three kinds of systems hierarchy, besides the Salthean composition and subsumption also determination, so it is composition (1ns), determination (2ns) and classification (3ns). I call subsumption classification,
List,
I learn that Jon Schmid (henceforth JS) has proposed an ordering of the
three interpretants which differs from one that I suggest in a paper
published in *Semiotica *(which is indeed the published version of the text
mentioned by John Sowa in a private conversation). As JS states in his
Helmut, list
According to Peirce, the definition if "renders definitely to be such as it
will be"
*"We thus learn that the Object determines (i.e. renders definitely to be
such as it will be) the Sign in a particular manner.*(CP 8.361)342-379
M-20b *(1908))*
Within the MS 611, p.67-68, Peirce
Robert, List,
Thank you! And is that definition different from my Boolean assumption? Boole is about true/false, but "renders definitely to such as it will be", and "particular manner" sound like something between true or false, but is that so? "Not particular" and "not definitely" might
This is a discussion we’ve had with JAS before - and I agree with Dr. Jappy
[TJ]. .
I agree with his view of semiosis as ’thought in action’ . My own view of
Peircean semiosis is that it outlines an active, adaptive, evolving process of
mind-as-matter formation; ie, an agapastic process.
This
Edwina, Tony, Jon, List,
I'd like to emphasize the first word of the subject line: Evolution. I
believe that is the best single word to describe Peirce's developments in from
1903 to 1906 to 1908 to 1911 to his last long letter of 1913, in which he
highlighted the features he considered
Jon,
I forgot to thank you for including the link to Peirce's definition of 'mark':
Peirce presents in his entry for it in Baldwin's Dictionary of Philosophy and
Psychology (https://gnusystems.ca/BaldwinPeirce.htm#Mark)
Yes indeed. That definition shows that two things that have the same
List:
It is telling that this rebuttal does not address my first and most
important reason for equating "the Destinate Interpretant" to the final
interpretant and "the Explicit Interpretant" to the immediate interpretant
(SS84, EP 2:481, 1908 Dec 23), namely, because the terms themselves clearly
John, List:
JFS: That definition shows that two things that have the same mark are two
tokens of the same type.
This is another reason why "tone" is a better choice than "mark" for "an
indefinite significant character such as a tone of voice." Two things can
have *different *tones, yet be
John, List:
JFS: I noticed that Tony also adopted Peirce's final choice of 'mark'
instead of 'tone'.
Again, going by the manuscript dates, Peirce's *final *choice was "tone" (R
339, 27 Dec 1908,
https://iiif.lib.harvard.edu/manifests/view/drs:15255301$636i), not "mark"
(CP 8.363-364, EP 2:488,
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