Hi All,
Any comments on the unraveling of the "new Russia" and its peacekeeping
foray in the Balkans?
Seth Sandronsky
WSWS : News & Analysis : Europe : Russia
The state attorney general and the fate of
the Russian president
By Vladimir Volkov
5 May 1999
The April 21 vote in the Federal Council on the fate of chief public
prosecutor Yuri Skuratov reveals a new relation of forces within Russia's
highest political circles. The Senate majority's refusal to agree to a
presidential decree removing Skuratov from office signals the beginning of
new political moves against the Kremlin and weakens even further the power
base of President Boris Yeltsin. Since the shelling of the White House in
1993 the latter has been one of the pillars of the Russian political system.
The "Skuratov incident" centres on the basic contradiction of the ruling
regime: the claim to return the country to the "road of civilised
development". Behind a proclaimed "rule of law" stands a different reality:
the waging of a virtual civil war against one's own people, criminality and
corruption protected by the highest governing circles and the absence of any
strategy to assist the country out of its crisis.
Skuratov is one of many chief public prosecutors named in Yeltsin's
reform period. The others were all either ensnared in corruption scandals or
became victims of political intrigues. Skuratov was a compromise figure, who
managed to manoeuvre longer than the others between the different interest
groups. The failure to solve even one of the well-known contract murders in
recent years and the uninterrupted growth of crime and corruption eventually
forced him to take visible steps in this direction. He was supported by the
state Duma and by Prime Minister Primakov in those legal proceedings which
became the key issue in recent developments: an investigation into the
legitimacy of the business activities of Boris Berezovsky, the biggest among
the "oligarchs".
The presidential decree over Skuratov's dismissal coincided with the start
of investigations into a Berezovsky-controlled company in late January,
early February. An article in the Moskowskii Komsomolets reporting on the
firm "Atoll" founded by Berezovsky, served as the motive for initiating the
investigation. Atoll was situated behind Kremlin walls and allegedly
listened into phone conversations of Kremlin residents--among them the
"family members" of the president.
In response to those judicial proceedings a video was made public
shortly afterwards showing someone "resembling Skuratov" in bed with
two prostitutes. The presidential edict that followed was the official
response to this video, which supposedly jeopardised the moral
reputation of the nation's highest lawmakers.
>From then on the Skuratov scandal has dominated Russian politics.
Rather than serving to bury the scandal, events which followed--such as
credit negotiations with the IMF, the commencement of NATO's
bombing of Yugoslavia, as well as ever more detailed discussions over
plans to impeach the Russian president--only served to further heighten the
whole affair.
Central to the crisis is the impossibility of dealing with corruption at the
highest levels without threatening the foundations of the new Russian state.
In Berezovsky's case it appears that the most powerful of the oligarchs to
emerge so far managed to entangle Yeltsin and his "family" in a network of
corruption. At every attempt to clean up Berezovsky's intrigues, pressure
bears down upon Yeltsin, forcing him to block every move directed against
Berezovsky's personal interests. Whether he wants to or not, Yeltsin has
become Berezovsky's political hostage while the latter doubles as an alter
ego of the president.
According to the current constitution the dismissal of the chief public
prosecutor falls under the jurisdiction of the Federal Council, the highest
chamber of parliament. There the vote was put for the first time in
mid-March. Then, the majority of the senate voted against Skuratov's
dismissal, and the voting outcome hit like a bomb. "The country stands on
the brink of a severe political crisis," wrote Isvestia, "and the
fundamental, if not the only, political achievement of Primakov's
government, political stability, is turning into its opposite. The
president, the premier and the majority of Russian politicians, including
the closest circles around Yeltsin and Primakov, are suffering an
unparalleled blow. One can go so far as to say that the central authority
received a ringing box on the ears from the united regional princes."
In reality, the senators were mainly concerned not to get caught up in the
dirty intrigues of the Kremlin. Their vote made clear that they did not want
to find themselves in an adverse situation with their regional constituents
by taking on the responsibility for the actions of a president completely in
the embrace of the oligarchs. During the events of February/March the idea
circulated in the liberal media that the next round of IMF credit would only
be forthcoming if key figures of the Primakov government, Maslyukov and
Kulik, were sacked. The sacking of Skuratov could thus be followed by the
removal of the entire Primakov government and an unequivocal revenge by
sections of the liberal reformers. The regional governors wanted nothing to
do with such a suicidal step. On the contrary, the majority feared a new
round of reforms carried through for the benefit of international capitalist
firms.
The commencement of NATO's bombing of Serbia led to a greatly
increased mood of nationalism, which also found expression in both
chambers of parliament. In order to secure Skuratov's sacking under
such circumstances, Yeltsin felt forced to grant concessions to the
regional districts. Shortly before the second vote on Skuratov's dismissal,
Yeltsin organised a meeting with governors from 19 regions who were close to
him. At the meeting he stated that he counted on their support: "I am
relying and hoping on you."
The president presented a proposal to engage in discussions over
granting greater authoritative powers to the separate federal parts. He
declared he was ready to reconsider the agreements which had
previously restricted regional powers in favour of a centralised Moscow.
Yeltsin proposed to the governors that they "hand over their proposals,
including what you still wish to be granted from the Federation centre". "I
will follow this line and stick to it," he vowed.
For the same purpose, the president issued further statements. For
instance, he announced the granting of governmental guaranties for
foreign contracts and offered to devolve on the regional chiefs'
independent foreign initiatives. According to the latest presidential
positions, the regions and not the federal centre have priority. This is to
become the strategic line in 1999.
Despite all his attempts, Yeltsin has not been able to achieve his ends. On
the second vote on April 21 the majority of senators rejected Skuratov's
sacking. This has created a precedent, having never occurred in the history
of the "new Russia". Since the presidential edict to dismiss the chief
public prosecutor remains in force, Skuratov is unable to carry out his
duties. Furthermore, a criminal charge has been initiated against him
personally. Effectively a stalemate exists and Skuratov's fate cannot be
decided until after the proceedings against him have been finalised.
One thing is clear: if Skuratov goes, the case against Berezovsky will be
thrown out of court and those demanding Yeltsin's impeachment will lose an
important lever for the continuation of this process, which is
exclusively bound up with their concern for Russia's "national security".
In April, while Berezovsky was in France, a warrant was issued for his
arrest. The absence of a reciprocal agreement between the two countries
meant that the Russian warrant could not be delivered. Berezovsky, however,
deciding against the step taken by both S. Stankyevich and A. Sobchak to
remain in Poland and France, returned to Russia. Shortly after his re-entry,
just prior to the second Federal Council vote, he admitted himself to
hospital "for treatment" and awaited the decision.
The outcome was not in his favour. The senators failed to provide an
unequivocal vote along the president's line. In reality, the decision
reached by the governors can be interpreted as unfavourable to Yeltsin. The
Russian ruling class is aware that, against a background of economic and
social crisis, their only chance of maintaining maximum stability for their
own circles remains the consolidation of the ruling elites. In this
situation Yeltsin is becoming more and more a destabilising factor. They are
no longer prepared to bolster his authority at every turn. On the eve of
parliamentary and presidential elections they are attempting to bring to the
fore compromise figures who will not bear the responsibility for the
terrible harvest of Yeltsin's reforms.
See Also:
Russia: The end of a world power
What lies behind the domestic crisis?
[30 April 1999]
Top of page
Readers: The WSWS invites your comments. Please send e-mail
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>.
Copyright 1998-99
World Socialist Web Site
All rights reserved
_______________________________________________________________
Get Free Email and Do More On The Web. Visit http://www.msn.com
