[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > Some yes, some no. The cotton gin in the south transformed cotton production > almost over night. However, the sewing machine was around for a few decades > before it came into wide use in shoe binding and ready made clothing. > Crompton's mule (mechanized yarn spinning) and other technology only took > hold in Britain years after being installed in factories in the United > States. I think with the case of computers that most businesses truly did > not realize how they could be applied to their particular circumstances for > many years. Finally, fiber cable has been around for years and yet it is > only in the past couple of years that it is being used extensively to replace > old copper runs. > > maggie coleman [EMAIL PROTECTED] > > In a message dated 97-01-10 11:42:12 EST, [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Doug Henwood) > writes: > > > > >- that asserted that it took decades for the electric motor to have an > >impact on productivity. But what about the other world-transforming > >gadgets? Did they operate with a delay of 30 or 40 years? > > > >Doug > > --------------------- > Forwarded message: > From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Doug Henwood) > Sender: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Reply-to: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Multiple recipients of list) > Date: 97-01-10 11:42:12 EST > > I don't know my Schumpeter very well, or long-wave theory either, but > computers and related instruments have been around for quite a long time > now - in use by governments since the 1950s, and by business since the > 1960s. Did earlier transformative technologies - steam engine, railroad, > car, radio - take so long to have a long-wave upkick? > > Greenspan was citing a paper recently - is this what Rakesh meant by: > > >Paul David makes in his widely circulated paper > >comparing the dynamo and the computer > > - that asserted that it took decades for the electric motor to have an > impact on productivity. But what about the other world-transforming > gadgets? Did they operate with a delay of 30 or 40 years? > > Doug > > -- Amplifying on Maggie's comments, the cotton gin changed things overnight because it did not require any substantial changes in other parts of the production system. Electricity took decades to affect productivity substantially because the mills were fitted out to take power from a central source and to distribute it via elaborate systems of belts and pulleys. Electricity did not help much until after the factories were rebuilt. > > Doug Henwood > Left Business Observer > 250 W 85 St > New York NY 10024-3217 > USA > +1-212-874-4020 voice > +1-212-874-3137 fax > email: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > web: <http://www.panix.com/~dhenwood/LBO_home.html> -- Michael Perelman Economics Department California State University Chico, CA 95929 Tel. 916-898-5321 E-Mail [EMAIL PROTECTED] >From "LYNN TURGEON, PROFESSOR EMERITUS OF ECONOMICS, HOFSTRA UNIVERSITY, >[EMAIL PROTECTED]"@anthrax.ecst.csuchico.edu Sat Jan 11 10:57:35 1997 Received: from anthrax.ecst.csuchico.edu (anthrax.ecst.csuchico.edu [132.241.1.25]) by csf.Colorado.EDU (8.7.6/8.7.3/CNS-4.0p) with ESMTP id KAA21457 for <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; Sat, 11 Jan 1997 10:57:34 -0700 (MST) Received: from anthrax (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by anthrax.ecst.csuchico.edu (8.8.2/8.8.2) with SMTP id JAA25313; Sat, 11 Jan 1997 09:50:42 -0800 (PST) Date: Sat, 11 Jan 1997 09:50:42 -0800 (PST) Message-Id: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Errors-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Originator: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sender: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Precedence: bulk From: "LYNN TURGEON, PROFESSOR EMERITUS OF ECONOMICS, HOFSTRA UNIVERSITY, [EMAIL PROTECTED]"@anthrax.ecst.csuchico.edu To: Multiple recipients of list <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Subject: [PEN-L:8181] fyi X-Listprocessor-Version: 6.0c -- ListProcessor by Anastasios Kotsikonas X-Comment: Progressive Economics From: VAXD::ECOELT "LYNN TURGEON, PROFESSOR EMERITUS OF ECONOMICS, HOFSTRA UNIVERSITY, [EMAIL PROTECTED]" 11-JAN-1997 11:59:47.51 To: IN%"[EMAIL PROTECTED]" CC: IN%"[EMAIL PROTECTED]",ECOELT Subj: Report from ASSA Meetings in New Orleans, January 4-6, 1997 (Long) Two important papers were presented at the URPE/ACES meeting on "Economic Reform in Russia." The first was by David M. Kotz ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) entitled "Lessons from Five Years of Economic Transition" and the second by Stanislav Menshikov ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) "An Alternative Program for the Russian Economy." Kotz, whose new book "Revolution From Above" was also available from Routledge in the book exhibit for about $15, present ed a contrast between Russia's macroeconomic performance over the past five years as compared with the record of China since 1978. It contrasts NLTS (leo-liberal transition strategy, sometimes called the "Washington Consensus" or "shock therapy" with SDTS (state-directed transition strategy) of China. Kotz is highly critical of the World Bank's recent "From Plan to Market," (referred to as FPTM). The latter publication, feeling the pressure of China's successful transition, concedes that "the need to privatize is not equally urgent in all settings." (It should be mentioned that Marshall Goldman's paper also sharply criticized Russian's privatization.) In his critique of FPTM, Kotz maintains that "China did not delay in dismantling central planning, privatizing, or introducing an orthodox stabilization policy - after 18 years it has simply not done those things." Kotz outlines the possibility of a State-Directed Transition Strategy, realistically concluding that "a shift to a SDTS in Russia is imaginable only in the event of a change in the government, led by either Zyuganov or Lebed. Menshikov is also highly critical of the World Bank study. He also concentrates on some of the most needed reforms, concentrating on the "non-payment of wages and pensions as the crucial issue." He would pay these arrears promptly, as promised by Yeltsin in his Presidential campaign last June. When this is shown to be non-inflationary, it will be evidence that the Federal deficit is "passive and non-inflationary." (It should be noted that the IMF has already decided to include the arrears in the total debt as a percentag e of GDP, on which the monetarists put their emphasis in releasing monetary support for Russia.) While active deficits might be controlled by reducing spending, passive deficits are explained mainly by depleted revenues due to underutilization of capacity. Menshikov frankly admitted that his prediction of stabilization two yearsago in Washington was premature and that the decline of GDP in the past year was roughly 6-7 percent, making the decline since 1991 greater than the decline in the U.S. economy from 1929-1933. IMHO, there are two other similarities between Russia today and the U.S. in the early thirties. There issomeevidence that deflation has already hit the domestic Russian economy and the continued official 1-2 percent inflation is "imported inflation" brought about by the secular planned weakening of the ruble (ina so-called corridor) relative to Western currencies. The best measure of domestic inflation is the farmers'market prices. Formerly, these prices were higher than those in the stores for the same goods, while at present they are lower. The only increases in the farmers' market prices in the past two years are found among imported meat, bananas, kiwis and pineapplies. The second similarity is the high real interest rates. In 1932 they averaged 12 percent in the U.S.,while today the Russians have the real (inflation-adjusted) interest rates in the world (outside of pawn-shops), well into the double digits. In a later session, featuring Menshikov and Alan Gelb of the World Bank. Gelb'spaper stressed the differences between Russia and China at the beginning of the transition. In a table, he showed that the "real discount rate" for 1992-94 averaged -5 percent for China and -17 percent for Russia. If he had continued his comparison to 1995-1996, he would have found extremely high positive real discount rates for Russia and a continuation of negative rates for China. As China has brought down their annual inflation to single-digits, they have also lowered their nominal interest rates, thereby preserving their negative real int erest rates - a characteristic they share with Malaysia. I have finished reading Kotz's new book since returning from New Orleans and find it pretty much on target. It is actually a combined work of Kotz and Fred Weir, who writes regularly in "In These Times," and the Hindustan Times. Weir is married to a Soviet Armenian woman on the intelligentsia and blames the intelligentsia generally for the relatively peaceful revolution away from socialism towards the market and capitalism. In Moscow in 1991, he told me that his wife expected a Canadian way of life in Moscow. I was teaching in Moscow at the time and can vouch for the complete lack of criticism of Yeltsin by the intelligentsia and his emerging shock therapy. I was especially impressed with Kotz's recognition of the Russian inventory build-up in 1992 - the first year of shock therapy under Gaidar. Less than half of the automobiles produced were purchased. This hardly supports Gelb's assumption of more excess purchasing power in Russia than in China. Never was the monthly inflation rate greater than 50 percent, the somewhat arbitrary definition of hyperinflaton. In my view, there never was a danger of hyperinflation predicted by Gaidar and his IMF advisers. Thus, worry about the deficit was misplaced. I might have put more emphasis on the unnecessary self-destruction of Comecon in Sofia in January, 1990, than Kotz does. Or the role of keeping up with Reagan's arms build-up or the reduction of Russian foreign exchange by one-half as a result of Bill Casey's secret agreement with the Saudis in 1981. But,in general, this is a fine work combining the strengths of two talented writers. Lynn Turgeon [EMAIL PROTECTED] Iotz does.
