Comrade Max, that's not a healthy state of mind, when we're talking
about something as basic as the privatization of the air!
On Sat, Jan 26, 2008 at 09:35:32PM -0500, Max B. Sawicky wrote:
I can't speak on offsets. Don't know anything about them.
So join me for a seminar at
That's logical if you think an ultimate target of zero is reasonable.
Another problem, since we're in an international context and countries
have vastly different fiscal systems etc., an agreement among nations
would seem to entail some kind of equalization in terms of emissions
or other
Nobody ever accused me of having a healthy state of mind, but I will
read the piece.
Patrick Bond wrote:
Comrade Max, that's not a healthy state of mind, when we're talking
about something as basic as the privatization of the air!
On Sat, Jan 26, 2008 at 09:35:32PM -0500, Max B. Sawicky
I don't know what carbon credits are. Emissions rights are the right to
throw off CO2, and if you aren't operating, you don't need any rights.
Michael Perelman wrote:
You don't get carbon credits for shutting down a plant?
Max wrote:
Emissions rights are the right to
throw off CO2, and if you aren't operating, you don't need any rights.
I agree, and this gives yet another perverse implication of emissions
rights. If you take the rights away if a plant shuts down, then you
discourage shutdowns of old plants.
Greetings Economists,
On Jan 27, 2008, at 9:05 AM, Max B. Sawicky wrote:
Another problem, since we're in an international context and countries
have vastly different fiscal systems etc., an agreement among nations
would seem to entail some kind of equalization in terms of emissions
or other
ehrbar wrote:
Max wrote: Emissions rights are the right to throw off CO2, and if you aren't
operating, you don't need any rights.
I agree, and this gives yet another perverse implication of emissions
rights. If you take the rights away if a plant shuts down, then you
discourage shutdowns of
I'm the wrong person to ask about details of international CO2 reduction
agreements.
Doyle Saylor wrote:
Greetings Economists,
On Jan 27, 2008, at 9:05 AM, Max B. Sawicky wrote:
Another problem, since we're in an international context and countries
have vastly different fiscal systems etc.,
Greetings Economists,
On Jan 27, 2008, at 11:47 AM, Max B. Sawicky wrote:
I'm the wrong person to ask about details of international CO2
reduction
agreements.
Doyle;
Well that's understandable. I'd like to see what the implications for
agreements imply.
I could speculate that removing
Thanks for responding, Max and Robert. First about the complexity of
taxes and the measurement problem which Robert addresses. As I see
it, the measurement problem is greatly diminished by the following
fact: the activity which creates externalities and which needs to be
taxed is the injection
Well the main point could be true but the vignette glosses over the cost
of running the inspectors, how easy it is to see the scrubber (do you
have to climb to the top of each smokestack?), how many scrubbers,
whether they work, who knows what else. Most important, the cost
minimizing location
Agreed. The main point is that all of the options have complex transactions
costs. Neither regulation nor auctioning pollution rights nor anything else
will always have the lowest.
Well the main point could be true but the vignette glosses over the cost
of running the inspectors, how easy it is
Giving polluters property rights is ridiculous. The abuses of carbon trading
are so
flagrant that the trade of cap trade should be an obvious non-starter.
Patrick
Bond gave us a good example of the Durban garbage dump trade some time ago.
Some kinds of regulation do seem workable. Many
On Jan 26, 2008 7:15 AM, ehrbar [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Again, I am trying to argue that cap and trade is bad because
it creates something new that has its own life, and that a tax
regime does not have this drawback. Taxes protect the commons
without privatizing them. I may be wrong, I am
Max just gave one of the prime arguments used in favor of quantity
constraints:
Setting the target in and of itself by the way is easier than trying
to figure out the tax rate that gets you to the target.
I think this is a red herring. The target is 100 percent renewable
energy, i.e, zero
Shutting down a plant doesn't get you any points in a cap and trade scheme.
If the emissions target is set and enforced, it doesn't matter who shuts
down what
or what equipment they buy. Setting the target in and of itself by the
way is easier
than trying to figure out the tax rate that gets you
You don't get carbon credits for shutting down a plant?
On Sat, Jan 26, 2008 at 09:35:32PM -0500, Max B. Sawicky wrote:
Shutting down a plant doesn't get you any points in a cap and trade
scheme.
If the emissions target is set and enforced, it doesn't matter who shuts
down what
or what
The carbon tax center http://www.carbontax.org/ says that cap and
trade is inferior to a carbon tax for the following reasons:
(1) Cap and trade is extremely complex. This complexity allows
stakeholders to manipulate the policies and game the process, and it
defers action because of the time
I'm partial to a carbon tax, but . . .
ehrbar wrote:
The carbon tax center http://www.carbontax.org/ says that cap and
trade is inferior to a carbon tax for the following reasons:
(1) Cap and trade is extremely complex. This complexity allows
stakeholders to manipulate the policies and game
Lee S. Friedman (no intellectual relation to Milton) wrote a textbook called
Microeconomic Policy Analysis some years ago. It is now in a new edition under
a slightly different title. In it he claims that a transactions-cost analysis
could easily show that regulation is the most efficient
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