-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512
On 2018-08-25 16:50, Rusty Bird wrote:
> Rob Fisher:
>> I'm wondering when we can expect information on the impact of XSA-273 (1) on
>> Qubes R4?
>
> I'd guess early next month:
> https://groups.google.com/d/msg/qubes-users/Isn_hko7tQs/PcqIuUleEQAJ
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512
Ivan Mitev:
> On 08/26/2018 12:50 AM, Rusty Bird wrote:
> > Rob Fisher:
> >> what are the best options for a Qubes user right now?
> >
> > - - Add smt=off as a Xen boot parameter (which disables hyperthreading)
>
> smt=off doesn't seem to work
On 08/26/2018 12:50 AM, Rusty Bird wrote:
> -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
> Hash: SHA512
>
> Rob Fisher:
>> I'm wondering when we can expect information on the impact of XSA-273 (1) on
>> Qubes R4?
>
> I'd guess early next month:
>
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512
'awokd' via qubes-users:
> > Rob Fisher:
> >> what are the best options for a Qubes user right now?
^
> Get Qubes running on non-x86 architectures less prone to
> vulnerabilities!
Don't hold
On Sat, August 25, 2018 9:50 pm, Rusty Bird wrote:
> Rob Fisher:
>> what are the best options for a Qubes user right now?
>
> - - Add smt=off as a Xen boot parameter (which disables hyperthreading)
> to make the attack harder? - - If you're worried that some VM might want to
> steal data from
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512
Rob Fisher:
> I'm wondering when we can expect information on the impact of XSA-273 (1) on
> Qubes R4?
I'd guess early next month:
https://groups.google.com/d/msg/qubes-users/Isn_hko7tQs/PcqIuUleEQAJ
> what are the best options for a Qubes user
I'm wondering when we can expect information on the impact of XSA-273
(1) on Qubes R4? I can't help but notice it's absence from the Qubes
XSA-tracker page (2).
Some OS Vendors have implemented kernel patches in an attempt to
mitigate these vulnerabilities, but as of yet I haven't seen any
