So held a Kansas state trial judge in Purdum v. Purdum, 2011 WL 1430279 (Kan.
Dist. Ct. Apr. 11, 2011), which dealt with a slander claim based on statements
made in a church annulment proceeding. I doubt that this is right; I would
think that the First Amendment ban on religious decisions by secular courts
should preclude slander or libel lawsuits that require evaluation of religious
statements (e.g., "X is a sinner," "X violated God's law," "X is not a true
Christian," etc.), but I don't think the First Amendment should preclude such
lawsuits based on ordinary secular assertions ("X had sex with Y," "X lied to
me about this secular subject," etc.). But I was wondering what other list
members thought. An excerpt:
[T]he Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment ... appl[ies] in this
case to protect the defendant's confidential communications with her church or
its representatives ....
The Court finds that, in this case, the statement is absolutely privileged
as made pursuant to the defendant's First Amendment right to Free Exercise of
her religion. This case is virtually identical to that of Cimijotti v. Paulsen,
230 F. Supp. 39 (N.D. Iowa 1964). In Cimijotti, the plaintiff filed a slander
suit against his ex-wife and two other women serving as witnesses in the
religious tribunal for separate maintenance and divorce, and the plaintiff did
not allege any publication outside of the religious proceeding.
The Cimijotti court held that,
"[t]o allow slander actions to be based solely upon statements made to the
Church before its recognized officials and under its disciplines and
regulations would be a violation of the First Amendment. The law withdraws from
the State any exertion of restraint on the free exercise of religion. The
freedom of speech does not protect one against slander, yet a person must be
free to say anything and everything to his Church, at least so long as it is
said in a recognized and required proceeding of the religion and to a
recognized official of the religion. This does not mean that in some instances
it may not have to be disclosed, but nonetheless the person must not be
prohibited, by fear of court action either civil or criminal against his person
or property, from actually making the communication. Also, the court is not
holding that it would not be actionable if communicated to other third persons.
Likewise, it might be actionable if made outside strictly religious activities."
In this case, the plaintiff does not allege that the statement was made to
anyone other than the Archdiocese and the plaintiff himself. Disclosure to the
plaintiff allowed the plaintiff notice and an opportunity to participate in the
ecclesiastical proceeding. Furthermore, neither party disputes that the
annulment of a sacramental marriage in the Catholic Church is a required
religious proceeding if the Catholic individual ever wants to enter into a
sacramental marriage again. As held by the Cimijotti court, an individual's
right to engage in the free exercise of his or her religion is protected by the
First Amendment; this is especially true when a penitent communicates with his
or her minister. To hold otherwise, would require individuals to defend
themselves in civil court for statements made during required religious
proceedings, even if the statements are later determined to be true.
Therefore, the statements made by the defendant under the circumstances of
this case, even if false, are absolutely privileged by the First Amendment
right to free exercise....
_______________________________________________
To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu
To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see
http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw
Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private.
Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can
read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the
messages to others.
