Custody and religion - non believers are going to hell
From todays Tuscaloosa News- Court's custody order draws Parker dissent on religious grounds By SAMIRA JAFARI Associated Press Writer November 21. 2005 5:46PM Email this story. Print this story. The Alabama Supreme Court upheld a lower court's decision granting a Madison County father custody of his 6-year-old daughter, based in part on evidence the child had been beaten and alienated from her family. But Justice Tom Parker, the lone dissenter in the 8-1 ruling Friday, took issue with the majority's view of the mother's strong religious convictions, saying the decision restricted the mother's right to teach her child the worship of God. http://www.tuscaloosanews.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20051121/APN/511210910 _ Case found at 2005 WL 3082278 (Ala.) Ex Parte Snider Joel L. Sogol Attorney at Law 811 21st Avenue Tuscaloosa, Alabama 35401 ph (205) 345-0966 fx (205) 345-0971 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Ben Franklin observed that truth wins a fair fight -- which is why we have evidence rules in U.S. courts. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: Bronx Household of Faith v New York Schools
In a message dated 11/21/2005 6:28:34 P.M. Eastern Standard Time, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: Many of the church-planting initiatives involve using the school the entire weekend, or at least almost all of Sunday. In 1992, at Garfield Elementary School, a church planting initiative here in Fairfax County, Virginia, gave birth to the inaugural Sunday service of New Hope Church. Thirteen years and counting, we have finally located and purchased property that the county agrees can sustain our permanent facility. During the interim, we have met only twice at locations other than public school buildings, both occasions were Xmas eve services when the school facilities were unavailable. During that time we grew from a tiny congregation very comfortably fitting inside the small facility of an elementary school. We have moved four times, first to a nearby public high school and then twice while that public school underwent reconstruction (if you watched Remember the Titans, then you saw the Titans take on the Hayfield Hawks, the Hawks are the home team where our church meets again, now that the school's reconstruction is complete). And we hope to move twice more, first to the new, south county high school which is situated near our property, and finally, when we can get Phase One started and finished, into our own facility. During the entire time we have been in various county school facilities, we have adopted, in cooperation with the schools' social services support staff, various low income families to provide needed school supplies and clothing at the start of the school year, and to provide Thanksgiving dinners and Christmas gifts. During the reconstruction project, we spent time at an alternative public high school site, whose student population includes many pregnant teens and new moms. There, our church adopted the expectant moms and the babies and provided Christmas gifts for the moms and for the moms to give to their little ones (even after the time we left the school, we maintained that relationship). Every October, at no expense to the surrounding community, we host, on the school's grounds a "Fall Fun Fest." This event runs to the tune of some $20,000.00 expense, not including donated materials from local merchants, and puts about two hundred church volunteers to work running carnival booths, moon bounces, and grills. On average, some 3000 to 4000 visitors enjoy the festival, which we put on to thank the community for the use of their school building. And, so far as pigging the space, we actually do not do that either. We use the auditorium, starting at 8:00 a.m. and are cleared out by noon. We use a large lecture hall for Kids Time (Sunday school) group activities. We use about 12 classrooms to host the meetings of individual age groups of Kids Time. Our use of the facilities, leaves the high school cafeteria free. It leaves the junior high school cafeteria free. It leaves the library free, the planetarium, all the other large lecture halls and the hundred or more other classrooms free. On 15 or more occasions during the year, we share the lobby outside the auditorium with others, typically organizers of youth sports activities including basketball and wrestling leagues (not, I note, the school systems sports activities). This happens because we also do not interfere with the use of the gymnasium. I can't really say whether our decade plus experience is the norm or not. I can't imagine that we really are all that special, but I suppose it is possible. But if we are the norm, than Marci's concerns about domination of the forum are misplaced. Jim Henderson Senior Counsel ACLJ ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: Discrimination
Professor Laycock, James Madison did discuss the establishment and free exercise clauses in his Report on the Virginia Resolutions and explained the obvious, that is, the First Amendment was a limitation on the power of the national government, specifically Congress. Regardless of any wording of the First Amendment in respect to abridging or prohibiting, the First Amendment specifically restricted the national Congress and did not give Congress a power to legislate or regulate on the subject of religion or the press: no power over the press and no power over the exercise of religion. Madison specifically argued the First Amendment was unnecessary because the national government had only delegated or enumerated powers. As Professor Leonard W. Levy asserted, Black magic and only that can turn the First Amendment into a repository of government power (The Establishment Clause, second edition, p.140). In fact, both the 1788 Constitution and the 1791 First Amendment restrict federal government power in respect to religion. As recently as 1947 Justices of the Supreme Court (Everson v. Board of Education) unanimously agreed on the historical question and the constitutional restriction of governmental power over religion. Therefore, the question I asked of you was not about history or the power of the federal government in respect to religion. The assertion I made and the question I asked was: Madison did not leave specific commentary as to the significance of the use of the different words prohibiting and abridging in the same First Amendment. I guess he figured most Americans would understand the meaning of the words used or would use Webster's. The fact is the word abridging (which means reducing) is not the word used in regard to the free exercise of religion, but it is the word which accommodationists prefer and promote as if there is no difference in meaning between prohibiting and abridging. I welcome your input as to a definition of prohibiting having a meaning different from totally. Gene Garman ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: Discrimination
Your repeated invocation of Webster's seems to claim that there is a One True Dictionary, which is to be accepted as legal authority. Webster's Third International does not contain the word totally in either definition of prohibit. But perhaps that is not the Webster's that Madison purportedly expected people to use? At 03:34 PM 11/21/05 -0600, you wrote: Professor Laycock, Without use of the word totally I understand the meaning of prohibiting as meaning totally. I do not find a different definition of what prohibiting means in Webster's. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: Custody and religion - non believers are going to hell
Joel Sogol wrote on 11/22/2005 05:16:14 AM: The Alabama Supreme Court upheld a lower court's decision granting a Madison County father custody of his 6-year-old daughter, based in part on evidence the child had been beaten and alienated from her family. The only relevant thing I saw here in terms of custody was the assertion that the child had been beaten. The article, though, later refers to it as corporal punishment, which I've always understood to mean a spanking, which is a far, far cry from a beating. If the child was truly beaten, then, without question, the child should be removed from the mother's custody. If the child merely received a spanking, then that's no reason to take the child away from the mother. There are a couple things in this article that are more troubling to me from the standpoint of religious freedom: The Sniders also told the child her father and maternal grandfather are 'going to hell,' even though the Sniders knew the father and grandfather 'are loved and cared for very much by the child,' according to trial court documents. The trial court said the mother, Laura Snider, should be teaching religion 'by example,' and not in a way that would be disparaging or critical of the father's beliefs. The question of whether or not a person is going to hell is a theological question. Some would answer it one way, some would answer it another. It's got nothing to do with whether that person is loved and cared for. And how does the trial court justify telling any parent what means they should use to teach their children religion? If the mother's faith teaches that the father's beliefs are wrong, is she supposed to lie to the child or pretend that it doesn't matter? I do hope the mother takes this back to the trial court to raise the religious issues (if the beatings were actually only spankings). The trial court is setting a precedent here that is seems clearly hostile to the beliefs of any evangelcial that would comes before it, and I can't imagine how the judge telling the mother how to practice her faith could be anything less than an unconstitutional entanglement that violates the establishment clause. Brad___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: Discrimination
In a message dated 11/22/2005 9:09:05 A.M. Eastern Standard Time, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: Webster's Third International does not contain the word "totally" in either definition of "prohibit". But perhaps that is not the "Webster's" that Madison purportedly "expected" people to use? Well, can Madison be faulted for failing to use a dictionary that wasn't available, even in its first edition? As a general principle, I would note that the Supreme Court does seem to rely on the Webster's Third Edition International Dictionary for definitions of common and ordinary language. Is the Court's insistence on use of an international dictionary further evidence of our loss of national boundaries (he queries mischieviously). Jim Henderson Senior Counsel ACLJ ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Madison on Abridge and Prohibit
You can't duck by pointing to the Article I part of Madison's argument and ignoring the First Amendment part. The structure of his argument was that speech and religion were equally protected by the lack of any Article I power to regulate them, and that the First Amendment could not be read to reduce the equality of that protection. So his premise was equal lack of Article I power, but his conclusion was equal treatment in the FirstAmendment.We now know the premise was wrong; exploring the full implications of Article I powers led Congress to discover many ways to get at speech and religion under powers that did not mention speech or religion explicitly. But the premise was widely assumed when the First Amendment was drafted, and the later failure of the premise does not do much to undermine Madison'scontemporary interpretation of the First Amendment. And he did speak directly to "abridge" and "prohibit." He argued that the difference between "prohibiting" and "abridging" is entirely parallel to the difference between "abridging" and "respecting," which the Federalists claimed enabled them to make laws "respecting" freedom of speech, including the Sedition Act.He was rejecting the Federalistdistinction, so his parallel plainly requires him to reject both distinctions, and the appeal of his argument at the time is precisely that he thought it would be unthinkable to much of his audience to distinguish between "prohibiting" and "abridging." Quoting just the most specific part now, without the larger argument that gives it context and inadvertently gave a means of avoiding the issue: Fourth. If the words and phrases in the amendment are to be considered as chosen with a studied discrimination, which yields an argument for a power over the press under the limitation that its freedom be not abridged, the same argument results from the same consideration for a power over the exercise of religion, under the limitation that its freedom not be prohibited. For if Congress may regulate the freedom of the press, provided they do not abridge it, becuase it is said only "they shall not abridge it," and is not said, "they shall make no law respecting it," the analogy of reasoning is conclusive that Congress may regulate and even abridge the free exercise of religion, provided they do not prohibit it; because it is said only "they shall not prohibit it," and is not said, "they shall make no law respecting, or no law abridging it." (emphasis in original). The General Assembly were governed by the clearest reason, then, in considering the Sedition Act, which legislates on the freedom of the press, as establishing a precedent that may be fatal to the liberty of conscience; and it will be the duty of all, in proportion as they value the security of the latter, to take the alarm at every encroachment on the former. Douglas LaycockUniversity of Texas Law School727 E. Dean Keeton St.Austin, TX 78705 512-232-1341 (phone) 512-471-6988 (fax)-Original Message-From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] On Behalf Of Gene GarmanSent: Tuesday, November 22, 2005 7:59 AMTo: Law Religion issues for Law AcademicsSubject: Re: DiscriminationProfessor Laycock,James Madison did discuss the establishment and free exercise clauses in his Report on the Virginia Resolutions and explained the obvious, that is, the First Amendment was a limitation on the power of the national government, specifically Congress. Regardless of any wording of the First Amendment in respect to abridging or prohibiting, the First Amendment specifically restricted the national Congress and did not give Congress a power to legislate or regulate on the subject of religion or the press: no power over the press and no power over the exercise of religion. Madison specifically argued the First Amendment was unnecessary because the national government had only delegated or enumerated powers. As Professor Leonard W. Levy asserted, Black magic and only that can turn the First Amendment into a repository of government power (The Establishment Clause, second edition, p.140). In fact, both the 1788 Constitution and the 1791 First Amendment restrict federal government power in respect to religion. As recently as 1947 Justices of the Supreme Court (Everson v. Board of Education) unanimously agreed on the historical question and the constitutional restriction of governmental power over religion.Therefore, the question I asked of you was not about history or the power of the federal government in respect to religion. The assertion I made and the question I asked was:Madison did not leave specific commentary as to the significance of the use of the different words "prohibiting" and "abridging" in the same First Amendment. I guess he figured most Americans would understand the meaning of the words used or would use Webster's. The fact is the word "abridging" (which means reducing) is
General Usage on Abridge and Prohibit
There are really two possible distinctions between abridge and prohibit. The Reagan Administration argued that "prohibit" means a criminal prohibition, and possibly express prohibitions enforced by civil penalties, but that it does not include mere burdens, such as loss of general welfare benefits. So the criminal truancy law in Yoder was a prohibiton, but the loss of unemployment compensation in Sherbert was not. But the maximum penalty in Yoder was a $50 fine (plus the risk of multiple prosecutions);Sherbert involved 26 weeks of benefits, and in other contexts, much more money could at at risk without an express prohibition. The Court said in Sherbert that there is no functional difference between a criminal fine of $X and withholding general welfare benefits of $X; the strength of any prohibition is determined more by the penalty imposed than by the wording of the rule. I think the Court got this right, and in any event, it has nothing to do with Gene Garmin's argument. His argument goes to the unit of free exercise that is subject to the prohibition. When the Tudor and Stuart Parliaments prohibited saying the Mass, there is no doubt in ordinary usage that that was a prohibition. I take Gene's point to be that such laws prohibit "an" exercise of religion, or "one" exercise of religion, but not "all" exercises of religion, and thus not "the" exercise of religion. The required assumption isthat "the" exercise of religion is a collective unit, apparently consisting of all possible exercises of religion, and that when government prohibits one exercise of religion, or a very important exercise of religion, or many but not all exercises of religion, or 99% of all exercises of religion, it has not yet prohibited "the" exercise of religion, because some fragment of "the" exercise of religion remains unprohibited. The collective unit has been "abridged," but not yet "prohibited." That is not how we speak or write, especially when we are writing general rules to cover a wide range of possible cases. If I ask whether the Mass is "the exercise of religion," I think most speakers of English would say yes. If I ask whether it is an example that isincluded in "the exercise of religion," I think even Gene would say yes. Under the first answer certainly, and under the second quite plausibly,the Tudor and Stuart prohibitions of the Mass prohibited the exercise of religion. Under Gene's reading, prohibiting the Mass is permitted, and the Free Exercise Clause failed to reach even the most obvious, notorious, and central example of the problem the Clause was designed to solve. Government can prohibit the central act of worship of a minority religion, and that is OK because it has not "totally" prohibited the exercise of religion. This is not a plausible interpretation either historically or linguistically. And if he wants to say that discrimination is always forbidden,even if it ismerely partial and not total, where does that come from? If "prohibiting" so clearly means totally, and if no form of theword "discrimination" appears as an object of the verb, or even anywhere in the Amendment, and if "abridging" is not used with respect to the exercise of religion, how canhe produce a ban on discriminatory abridgments? Douglas LaycockUniversity of Texas Law School727 E. Dean Keeton St.Austin, TX 78705 512-232-1341 (phone) 512-471-6988 (fax)-Original Message-From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] On Behalf Of Gene GarmanSent: Tuesday, November 22, 2005 7:59 AMTo: Law Religion issues for Law AcademicsSubject: Re: DiscriminationProfessor Laycock,James Madison did discuss the establishment and free exercise clauses in his Report on the Virginia Resolutions and explained the obvious, that is, the First Amendment was a limitation on the power of the national government, specifically Congress. Regardless of any wording of the First Amendment in respect to abridging or prohibiting, the First Amendment specifically restricted the national Congress and did not give Congress a power to legislate or regulate on the subject of religion or the press: no power over the press and no power over the exercise of religion. Madison specifically argued the First Amendment was unnecessary because the national government had only delegated or enumerated powers. As Professor Leonard W. Levy asserted, Black magic and only that can turn the First Amendment into a repository of government power (The Establishment Clause, second edition, p.140). In fact, both the 1788 Constitution and the 1791 First Amendment restrict federal government power in respect to religion. As recently as 1947 Justices of the Supreme Court (Everson v. Board of Education) unanimously agreed on the historical question and the constitutional restriction of governmental power over religion.Therefore, the question I asked of you was not about history or the power of the federal
Kansas and Intelligent Design: A Twist
The University of Kansas is planning to teach a course on intelligent design next semester. But it's not a science class. It is a religious-studies class, and it's titled, Special Topics in Religion: Intelligent Design, Creationism and other Religious Mythologies. (The chairman of the department, in explaining the class, said this, Creationism is mythology . . . Intelligent design is mythology. It's not science. They try to make it sound like science. It clearly is not.) It's the next step in the intelligent design/evolution fight. http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20051122/ap_on_re_us/intelligent_design_course Does anyone on the listserv see a potential Establishment Clause problem here? Let me be provocative. Surely, the University of Kansas cannot teach that intelligent design is false, right? Government cannot pass directly on the truth or falsity of religious teaching. The University's teaching of ID as myth seems to suggest that it will teach (or at least imply) that ID is false. (Surely, no one would miss the point if some professor taught a class entitled, Special Topics in Religion: Christianity and other Religious Mythologies or Wicca: How Could It Be Something Other Than Mythology?) To the extent the class teaches ID is false, it is unconstitutional, no? The conclusion that this class is unconstitutional will surely be embraced by those who support intelligent design. And this the counterintuitive point: shouldn't it also be embraced by those who are earnest opponents of it? After all, opponents of ID object to it principally because they see it as inherently religious. It's therefore unconstitutional when taught by the government as true. But doesn't the same principle act to protect ID from being taught by the government as false? (The obvious analogy is perhaps prayer - the government should have no power to encourage it, but also should have no power to discourage it.) Chris Lund ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: Kansas and Intelligent Design: A Twist
A couple of quick observations: 1. Insofar as ID claims status as science, then it is fair game for any critique -- including one that claims it is myth. It cannot claim protection as religion without surrendering its claim to scientific status. 2. Religious studies programs commonly study religion as myth. I am not sure what establishment objection could arise in this case that differs from those. David - Original Message - From: Christopher C. Lund [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu Sent: Tuesday, November 22, 2005 1:56 PM Subject: Kansas and Intelligent Design: A Twist The University of Kansas is planning to teach a course on intelligent design next semester. But it's not a science class. It is a religious-studies class, and it's titled, Special Topics in Religion: Intelligent Design, Creationism and other Religious Mythologies. (The chairman of the department, in explaining the class, said this, Creationism is mythology . . . Intelligent design is mythology. It's not science. They try to make it sound like science. It clearly is not.) It's the next step in the intelligent design/evolution fight. http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20051122/ap_on_re_us/intelligent_design_course Does anyone on the listserv see a potential Establishment Clause problem here? Let me be provocative. Surely, the University of Kansas cannot teach that intelligent design is false, right? Government cannot pass directly on the truth or falsity of religious teaching. The University's teaching of ID as myth seems to suggest that it will teach (or at least imply) that ID is false. (Surely, no one would miss the point if some professor taught a class entitled, Special Topics in Religion: Christianity and other Religious Mythologies or Wicca: How Could It Be Something Other Than Mythology?) To the extent the class teaches ID is false, it is unconstitutional, no? The conclusion that this class is unconstitutional will surely be embraced by those who support intelligent design. And this the counterintuitive point: shouldn't it also be embraced by those who are earnest opponents of it? After all, opponents of ID object to it principally because they see it as inherently religious. It's therefore unconstitutional when taught by the government as true. But doesn't the same principle act to protect ID from being taught by the government as false? (The obvious analogy is perhaps prayer - the government should have no power to encourage it, but also should have no power to discourage it.) Chris Lund ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
E-mail Address
Chris, send me your new e-mail. It doesn't show when you come through religionlaw-bounces. I apologize to the list for bothering everyone else with this message. Douglas Laycock University of Texas Law School 727 E. Dean Keeton St. Austin, TX 78705 512-232-1341 (phone) 512-471-6988 (fax) -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Christopher C. Lund Sent: Tuesday, November 22, 2005 1:56 PM To: religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu Subject: Kansas and Intelligent Design: A Twist The University of Kansas is planning to teach a course on intelligent design next semester. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: Kansas and Intelligent Design: A Twist
Christopher C. Lund wrote: The University of Kansas is planning to teach a course on intelligent design next semester. But it's not a science class. It is a religious-studies class, and it's titled, Special Topics in Religion: Intelligent Design, Creationism and other Religious Mythologies. (The chairman of the department, in explaining the class, said this, Creationism is mythology . . . Intelligent design is mythology. It's not science. They try to make it sound like science. It clearly is not.) It's the next step in the intelligent design/evolution fight. http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20051122/ap_on_re_us/intelligent_design_course Does anyone on the listserv see a potential Establishment Clause problem here? Let me be provocative. Surely, the University of Kansas cannot teach that intelligent design is false, right? Government cannot pass directly on the truth or falsity of religious teaching. Hey, that works for me. That means that ID is, in fact, a religious teaching and not a scientific theory and means it cannot be taught in public school science classrooms. ID advocates can't have it both ways, claiming that it's not religious idea but a scientific theory when trying to get around establishment clause problems on one level, then claiming it is a religious idea and not a scientific theory to claim an establishment clause violation at another level. Of course, the entire question is based upon a false premise. Of course a public university can teach that religious ideas are false. The Noahic global flood is a religious claim, but any geology course at any public university in the nation will teach that no such global flood ever took place. Belief in a flat earth is a religious belief based upon interpretation of the bible, and so is geocentrism; both of those religious ideas are debunked in public university classrooms every day, as well they should be. The germ theory of disease completely negates the religious views of the Christian Science Church and Mary Baker Eddy; that doesn't mean that university hospitals are violating the establishment clause by teaching it. Ed Brayton ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
RE: Kansas and Intelligent Design: A Twist
Well, yes and no. Ed's examples are all cases where religions make claims about the natural world: claims within the domain of science to investigate and within the domain of government to respond to. When religion makes claims that are more exclusively religious -- claims about the supernatural, about the existence and nature of God, about God's desires for humans -- then it is true that government cannot say those claims are false. I well recognize that the examples between the dashes are a first approximation and not an adequate definition. Douglas Laycock University of Texas Law School 727 E. Dean Keeton St. Austin, TX 78705 512-232-1341 (phone) 512-471-6988 (fax) -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Ed Brayton Sent: Tuesday, November 22, 2005 3:01 PM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: Re: Kansas and Intelligent Design: A Twist Christopher C. Lund wrote: The University of Kansas is planning to teach a course on intelligent design next semester. But it's not a science class. It is a religious-studies class, and it's titled, Special Topics in Religion: Intelligent Design, Creationism and other Religious Mythologies. (The chairman of the department, in explaining the class, said this, Creationism is mythology . . . Intelligent design is mythology. It's not science. They try to make it sound like science. It clearly is not.) It's the next step in the intelligent design/evolution fight. http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20051122/ap_on_re_us/intelligent_design_cou rse Does anyone on the listserv see a potential Establishment Clause problem here? Let me be provocative. Surely, the University of Kansas cannot teach that intelligent design is false, right? Government cannot pass directly on the truth or falsity of religious teaching. Hey, that works for me. That means that ID is, in fact, a religious teaching and not a scientific theory and means it cannot be taught in public school science classrooms. ID advocates can't have it both ways, claiming that it's not religious idea but a scientific theory when trying to get around establishment clause problems on one level, then claiming it is a religious idea and not a scientific theory to claim an establishment clause violation at another level. Of course, the entire question is based upon a false premise. Of course a public university can teach that religious ideas are false. The Noahic global flood is a religious claim, but any geology course at any public university in the nation will teach that no such global flood ever took place. Belief in a flat earth is a religious belief based upon interpretation of the bible, and so is geocentrism; both of those religious ideas are debunked in public university classrooms every day, as well they should be. The germ theory of disease completely negates the religious views of the Christian Science Church and Mary Baker Eddy; that doesn't mean that university hospitals are violating the establishment clause by teaching it. Ed Brayton ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
RE: Kansas and Intelligent Design: A Twist
Does anyone know of anything really good that's been written on this very distinction that Doug is suggesting, for purposes of Religion Clause law? Thanks Well, yes and no. Ed's examples are all cases where religions make claims about the natural world: claims within the domain of science to investigate and within the domain of government to respond to. When religion makes claims that are more exclusively religious -- claims about the supernatural, about the existence and nature of God, about God's desires for humans -- then it is true that government cannot say those claims are false. I well recognize that the examples between the dashes are a first approximation and not an adequate definition. Douglas Laycock University of Texas Law School 727 E. Dean Keeton St. Austin, TX 78705 512-232-1341 (phone) 512-471-6988 (fax) -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Ed Brayton Sent: Tuesday, November 22, 2005 3:01 PM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: Re: Kansas and Intelligent Design: A Twist Christopher C. Lund wrote: The University of Kansas is planning to teach a course on intelligent design next semester. But it's not a science class. It is a religious-studies class, and it's titled, Special Topics in Religion: Intelligent Design, Creationism and other Religious Mythologies. (The chairman of the department, in explaining the class, said this, Creationism is mythology . . . Intelligent design is mythology. It's not science. They try to make it sound like science. It clearly is not.) It's the next step in the intelligent design/evolution fight. http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20051122/ap_on_re_us/intelligent_design_cou rse Does anyone on the listserv see a potential Establishment Clause problem here? Let me be provocative. Surely, the University of Kansas cannot teach that intelligent design is false, right? Government cannot pass directly on the truth or falsity of religious teaching. Hey, that works for me. That means that ID is, in fact, a religious teaching and not a scientific theory and means it cannot be taught in public school science classrooms. ID advocates can't have it both ways, claiming that it's not religious idea but a scientific theory when trying to get around establishment clause problems on one level, then claiming it is a religious idea and not a scientific theory to claim an establishment clause violation at another level. Of course, the entire question is based upon a false premise. Of course a public university can teach that religious ideas are false. The Noahic global flood is a religious claim, but any geology course at any public university in the nation will teach that no such global flood ever took place. Belief in a flat earth is a religious belief based upon interpretation of the bible, and so is geocentrism; both of those religious ideas are debunked in public university classrooms every day, as well they should be. The germ theory of disease completely negates the religious views of the Christian Science Church and Mary Baker Eddy; that doesn't mean that university hospitals are violating the establishment clause by teaching it. Ed Brayton ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: Kansas and Intelligent Design: A Twist
Douglas Laycock wrote: Well, yes and no. Ed's examples are all cases where religions make claims about the natural world: claims within the domain of science to investigate and within the domain of government to respond to. When religion makes claims that are more exclusively religious -- claims about the supernatural, about the existence and nature of God, about God's desires for humans -- then it is true that government cannot say those claims are false. I well recognize that the examples between the dashes are a first approximation and not an adequate definition. That's a reasonable distinction. But ID is clearly in the first camp and not the second and therefore to teach that it is false would not be an EC problem. Ed Brayton ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: Kansas and Intelligent Design: A Twist
Well, a course being offered by a faculty member at a university which teaches just about anything is not going to be treated as governmental establishment is it? Surely a university professor could teach that all religions are bunk without the professor or university running afoul of the establishment clause. Steve ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
RE: Kansas and Intelligent Design: A Twist
Hmm -- would a course at a public university called Why Christianity is the True Religion be constitutionally permissible? -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Steven Jamar Sent: Tuesday, November 22, 2005 1:25 PM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: Re: Kansas and Intelligent Design: A Twist Well, a course being offered by a faculty member at a university which teaches just about anything is not going to be treated as governmental establishment is it? Surely a university professor could teach that all religions are bunk without the professor or university running afoul of the establishment clause. Steve ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
RE: Kansas and Intelligent Design: A Twist
I agree. Douglas Laycock University of Texas Law School 727 E. Dean Keeton St. Austin, TX 78705 512-232-1341 (phone) 512-471-6988 (fax) -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Ed Brayton Sent: Tuesday, November 22, 2005 3:20 PM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: Re: Kansas and Intelligent Design: A Twist Douglas Laycock wrote: Well, yes and no. Ed's examples are all cases where religions make claims about the natural world: claims within the domain of science to investigate and within the domain of government to respond to. When religion makes claims that are more exclusively religious -- claims about the supernatural, about the existence and nature of God, about God's desires for humans -- then it is true that government cannot say those claims are false. I well recognize that the examples between the dashes are a first approximation and not an adequate definition. That's a reasonable distinction. But ID is clearly in the first camp and not the second and therefore to teach that it is false would not be an EC problem. Ed Brayton ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: Kansas and Intelligent Design: A Twist
But, conversely, are all those course at public universities titled "Greek Mythology" (e.g., this link) constitutionally impermissible? Allen In a message dated 11/22/2005 1:26:17 PM Pacific Standard Time, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: Hmm -- would a course at a public university called "WhyChristianity is the True Religion" be constitutionally permissible? -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Steven Jamar Sent: Tuesday, November 22, 2005 1:25 PM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: Re: Kansas and Intelligent Design: A Twist Well, a course being offered by a faculty member at a university which teaches just about anything is not going to be treated as governmental establishment is it? Surely a university professor could teach that all religions are bunk without the professor or university running afoul of the establishment clause. Steve ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
RE: Bronx Household of Faith v New York Schools
Fair enough. I might add that we should also consider the practical dimensions of Eugene's proposal. These include among other issues: What religion specific exemptions and accommodations for religious expressive activities, if any, can survive rigorous free speech review? When, if ever, should such religion specific exemptions be considered content discrimination as opposed to viewpoint discrimination? How do we determine what secular expressive activities must receive equal treatment when the state accommodates worship services or other religious rituals that involve expression? Alan Brownstein -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Volokh, Eugene Sent: Tuesday, November 22, 2005 11:09 AM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: RE: Bronx Household of Faith v New York Schools I'm not sure I can add much to the discussion at this point -- it sounds like Alan and I have set out our positions pretty fully. I wonder, though, whether it might be helpful to consider the practical dimensions of Alan's proposal: What's the distinction between religious speech that is just speech (selling Bibles, distributing Bibles for free, sermons, singing hymns, televangelism, etc.) and that may not be preferred by the government, given the Free Speech Clause, and religious speech that is worship and thus could be preferred by the government? Eugene -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Alan Brownstein Sent: Monday, November 21, 2005 4:47 PM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: RE: Bronx Household of Faith v New York Schools A relatively brief response that does not do justice to Eugene's thoughtful comments -- but it is all I have time for right now. Eugene and I agree in a sense on at least one point, I think. We agree that under his interpretation of the free speech and religion clauses, religion specific accommodations of religious practices with some expressive dimension to them are unconstitutional. I think that's wrong, in significant part because I think religion is different than speech both in terms of what it actually is and for constitutional purposes -- because we are trying to accomplish different things with the religion clauses and the free speech clause and treating religion as speech distorts the distinction between those purposes. We have gone over this in the past on many prior posts. I recognize that there is an overlap in life and in constitutional law between religion and speech, so that there are some situations in which the best approach is to evaluate the promotion or regulation of religious speech under the speech clause. But the overlapping tail should not wag the dog. I look at a lot of religious practices holistically, not in terms of specific component parts -- which may involve speech to a greater or lesser degree. To me, a religious service is something different than a gathering of people who talk and sing. And I believe the constitution recognizes that difference. Those who think differently will agree with Eugene and reject religion specific accommodations of services and expressive rituals on free speech grounds. I assume that they would also reject religion specific accommodations of houses of worship and the operation of houses of worship. As for the government official who delivers a sermon in his official capacity, I think Eugene is correct that this would constitute a prohibited establishment of religion. I see no contradiction between that conclusion and the conclusion that the regulation of a similar sermon by a private individual would be reviewed under the free speech clause. The Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise serve different purposes and the lines courts draw between speech and what would be considered the establishment of religion differ in important ways from the lines courts draw between speech and what would be considered the exercise of religion. Thus, for example, the Court's cases seem to suggest rightly or wrongly that only obligatory rituals are protected by the free exercise clause. There is no comparable requirement under the Establishment Clause. Perhaps my earlier post was not as clear as I thought it was, so let me try to be clearer this time around. The question is whether we will characterize government conduct promoting or regulating religious expressive activities as accommodating the free exercise of religion, endorsing or establishing religion, or abridging freedom of speech. For any specific state action promoting or regulating religious expressive activities, we have to choose among alternatives. Some government expression of religious messages will be held to be endorsements or promotions of religion in violation of the establishment clause or they will be held to
RE: Kansas and Intelligent Design: A Twist
Title: Re: Kansas and Intelligent Design: A Twist Imagine that a religion commits itself to a phlogistonistic view of chemistry. Surely the chemistry department can teach that it is false. Would anyone seriously believe that the Establishment Clause would prevent that? Perhaps ID isn't "false" in the same way that phlogiston is, but surely the University of Kansas can teach that there is not a scintilla of what is ordinarily called "scientific evidence" for the proposition. Or, to take an example that I earlier offered (and which no one responded to), the archeology department can surely teach that there is not a scintilla of evidence for an Israelite presence in Egypt or the Sinai or for the proposition that there was a conflict between the Lamanites and the Nephitesduring the pre-Columbian period in North America. sandy From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] on behalf of Ed BraytonSent: Tue 11/22/2005 3:00 PMTo: Law Religion issues for Law AcademicsSubject: Re: Kansas and Intelligent Design: A Twist Christopher C. Lund wrote: The University of Kansas is planning to teach a course on intelligent design next semester. But it's not a science class. It is a religious-studies class, and it's titled, "Special Topics in Religion: Intelligent Design, Creationism and other Religious Mythologies." (The chairman of the department, in explaining the class, said this, "Creationism is mythology . . . Intelligent design is mythology. It's not science. They try to make it sound like science. It clearly is not.") It's the next step in the intelligent design/evolution fight. http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20051122/ap_on_re_us/intelligent_design_course Does anyone on the listserv see a potential Establishment Clause problem here? Let me be provocative. Surely, the University of Kansas cannot teach that intelligent design is false, right? Government cannot pass directly on the truth or falsity of religious teaching.Hey, that works for me. That means that ID is, in fact, a religiousteaching and not a scientific theory and means it cannot be taught inpublic school science classrooms. ID advocates can't have it both ways,claiming that it's not religious idea but a scientific theory whentrying to get around establishment clause problems on one level, thenclaiming it is a religious idea and not a scientific theory to claim anestablishment clause violation at another level.Of course, the entire question is based upon a false premise. Of coursea public university can teach that religious ideas are false. The Noahicglobal flood is a religious claim, but any geology course at any publicuniversity in the nation will teach that no such global flood ever tookplace. Belief in a flat earth is a religious belief based uponinterpretation of the bible, and so is geocentrism; both of thosereligious ideas are debunked in public university classrooms every day,as well they should be. The germ theory of disease completely negatesthe religious views of the Christian Science Church and Mary Baker Eddy;that doesn't mean that university hospitals are violating theestablishment clause by teaching it.Ed Brayton___To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.eduTo subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlawPlease note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: Discrimination
A few remarks on the use of dictionaries: The word "totally" is an adverb; I could not find it in Webster's New International Dictionary, 2nd ed.,I found it in Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary. However, "prohibit" is a verb; it has a different function in a sentence. The name Webster's New International Dictionary is a brand name used by the copyright belonging to the company Merriam-Webster. The publisher uses the term "International," but I have not foundthe publisher's justification of the termin the title. Noah Webster, born October 16, 1758, about when Samuel Johnsonhad writtenthe first dictionary of English (1755), took on the task to writea spelling book,and eventuallythe Dictionary American of the English Language. In the Webster dictionary he substitutes the spelling of color in the place of the British spelling and theater and meter in the place of theatre and metre. Clearly, the most important dictionary is the Oxford English Dictionary, commonly called the OED, begun in 1857 and took twenty years to complete the twenty volumes of the first edition. Note that Shakespeare, thetranslators of the Bible on order of King James,Milton, Dryden, Pope, Fielding, and even Johnson did not have a dictionary of English. (OED has not been equaled in any language.) The writers long did not have a dictionary. The editor(s) of the dictionary has/have the task to form the definition to identify theway the word was used by the writer. Only recently will people raise issues concern whether a user of the language strays from the definition in a dictionary. By the way, Webster's New International Dictionary, 2nd ed., wasproduced conflicts when it was published. Attacks on the edition were published in major newspapers and in magazines. An anthology was published including the attacks and the responses. Bob O'Brien - Original Message - From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu Sent: Tuesday, November 22, 2005 12:18 PM Subject: Re: Discrimination In a message dated 11/22/2005 9:09:05 A.M. Eastern Standard Time, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: Webster's Third International does not contain the word "totally" in either definition of "prohibit". But perhaps that is not the "Webster's" that Madison purportedly "expected" people to use? Well, can Madison be faulted for failing to use a dictionary that wasn't available, even in its first edition? As a general principle, I would note that the Supreme Court does seem to rely on the Webster's Third Edition International Dictionary for definitions of common and ordinary language. Is the Court's insistence on use of an international dictionary further evidence of our loss of national boundaries (he queries mischieviously). Jim Henderson Senior Counsel ACLJ ___To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.eduTo subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlawPlease note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. NTMail K12 - the Mail Server for Education ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: Kansas and Intelligent Design: A Twist
I don't want to interrupt the debate, which I am enjoying. I just want to observe that Christian Scientists are not in the least offended by the teaching of the germ theory of disease, even if they may not take the class. They would prefer to have someone preface a statement that the germ theory "completely negates" their religious views with a qualifier, like "in my opinion," or some such. Christian Scientists aren't saying that, within the framework and context of material observations, the physical scientists are not seeing what they are seeing. The conflict is not at that level; it is rather in different views of reality. That is, Christian Scientists aren't saying the physical reality is different (like a flat earth), they're saying that reality isn't physical at all, it is entirely spiritual. And when this is seen (and such seeing is not limited to Christian Scientists), the perception and experience of the physical changes. Sorry for the digression. -- Daniel Bort ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
