Frank Gaffney, 9/11 Commission's Failure, Fox News
9/11 Commission Fails to Connect Terror Dots Friday, June 18, 2004 By Frank J. Gaffney, Jr. The9/11 Commissions (search)conclusion that We have no credible evidence that Iraq and Al Qaeda cooperated on attacks against the United States does not augur well for the rest of the panels inquiry. If the members of the commission could not connect dots that are all too obvious or recognize their staffs inability to do so it seems likely that their work will fall short in other important areas as well. The commission has allowed itself to be used as a political instrument by critics of President Bush and his liberation of Iraq. This is the ineluctable result of the shortcomings of its staff report, so brilliantly illuminated byAndrew McCarthyin an essay published today by National Review Online. The staffs statement concerning Iraq andAl Qaeda (search)is internally inconsistent; it ignores key facts; it selectively addresses others; and it effectively condemns as incredible the considerable amount of evidence that suggests Saddam Hussein and Usama bin Laden did indeed have a collaborative relationship as President Bush and Vice President Cheney have insisted. Particularly egregious is the supposedly conclusive finding thatMohammed Atta (search)could not have been in Prague for his final meeting with an Iraqi intelligence officer simply becausecalls were made in Florida onAtta's cell phone during thetime period the meeting was to have occurred.Czech intelligence contends Atta was in Prague and attended the meeting, and Mr. McCarthy observes that it would be entirely possible (to say nothing of prudent tradecraft) to have someone perhaps his co-conspiring roommate use the phone at a time whenAtta could not, becausehe wasoverseas wherethe phonewould not work. This sort of proof-by-assertion is all too familiar to those who used to confront the unwillingness of some in the U.S. intelligence community to recognize that the Soviet Union was a state sponsor of terror and a serial violator of arms control agreements. Perhaps, as the communists used to say, the similarity is no accident. As it happens, the staff member who reported to 9/11 Commission members yesterday that there was no collaborative relationship betweenIraq and Al Qaedawas none other thanDouglas MacEachin (search) a man who once held seniorpositions at the CIA, including posts with the Office of Soviet Analysis from 1984-1989, the Arms Control Intelligence Staff for the next few years, andthe job of Deputy Director for Intelligence from 1992 until 1995. In these capacities, MacEachin appeared to colleagues to get things wrong with some regularity. For example, he was reflexively averse to conclusions that the Soviets were responsible for supporting terrorism. He reportedly rejected as absurd analyses that suggested Moscow was illegally developing bioweapons. And, as DDI, he forced CIA analysts to tailor their assessments to please Clinton administration policy-makers. In short, in the old days, MacEachin refused to believe the Soviets were a threat.Now, he offers support to those who insist that Iraq was no threat.There may be a role for a "see-no-evil" sort of guy, but it should not be at the Central Intelligence Agency and certainly not at a commission whose charter is to connect the dots, no matter where they lead. Even as the press had a feeding-frenzy over MacEachins statement absolving Saddam of ties to Al Qaeda, fresh evidence ofmalevolent intentions toward the United States that would have madeanti-American collaboration between Saddam and Al Qaeda only naturalwas supplied by an unlikely source: another old intelligence hand, Russian PresidentVladimir Putin (search). According to Putin, his intelligence agencies shared sensitive information with the Bush administration after theSept. 11attacks and before the United States went to war with Iraq in March of 2003.According to Putin's intelligence, Saddam Husseins regime was crafting plans to execute terror attacks against America, both inside and outside of this country. Thus far, Putin has not elaborated on whether Al Qaeda was also involved with these particular plans.At the very least, however, this information confirms the Bush teams contention that Saddam dealt deeply in terror and its judgment that to leave Saddam in power would be to invite murderous attacks in the future. One wonders whether the 9/11 Commission was exposed to the Putin intelligence before it effectively dismissed the possibility that Saddam Hussein had a hand in the 2001 attacks. For that matter, did they review the information contained in three highly informative books providing credible evidence of at least a circumstantialnature that Saddam had already acted on his desire to strike this country? Dr. Laurie Mylroies The War Against America: Saddam Hussein and the World Trade Center Attacks A Study of Revenge, whichconcerns
Jim Hoagland, UN Plan for Iraq Elections Gravely Flawed, Wash Post
Washington Post 'Mickey Mouse' and the U.N. By Jim Hoagland June 20, 2004 The U.N. won't participate in Mickey Mouse elections, sniffed Carina Perelli during a recent news conference at the United Nations. Take that, Iraq and Afghanistan. Shape up or ship out. For all the good work it does, the only political world body we have threatens to become more hindrance than help as Iraqis and Afghans try to hold elections soon and establish some political stability. At a moment when they need the support and confidence of others, besieged indigenous politicians are being told their efforts do not measure up to the hothouse standards of international civil servants. The U.N.'s commitment to good deeds is not being matched by a clear commitment to rapid democratic change in two countries liberated by the U.S. military from brutal, dictatorial regimes. Particularly in Iraq, the United Nations seems to be lending itself to efforts to disadvantage the Shiite majority, which has the most to gain from democratic elections. The United Nations must not allow itself to be used in such fashion. Perelli, director of the U.N.'s electoral assistance division, announced last month that she would recommend postponing the crucial Iraqi national elections scheduled for January if the security situation does not improve. Ignoring the near-certainty that further delay would only inflame the security situation, she then invoked Walt Disney's emblematic rodent to prejudge what will happen if Iraqis do not follow her advice. No statement could cause more angst for Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, the Shiite religious and political leader, and his followers -- except perhaps the one that Perelli uttered a few weeks later, when she decreed a controversial electoral system for Iraq based on proportional representation. Perelli is either oblivious to, or party to, the furious effort by the Sunni governments of the Arab world, led by Jordan's King Abdullah, to prevent a Shiite majority from gaining control of Iraq through elections. She follows in the footsteps of U.N. envoy Lakhdar Brahimi and U.S. proconsul L. Paul Bremer III in using concern about minority rights (for Sunnis) to allow the system to be rigged against the Shiites. That at least is the impression that Sistani's advisers are forming of Perelli's efforts, one of his aides indicated to me last week. The Kurdish minority is also disadvantaged by the party-list electoral system she proposes, but Iraqi non-Arabs are even less of a concern for the U.N.'s ruling caste. The United Nations has taken on an outsized role in Iraq given the minimal resources that its staff, traumatized by last year's bombing of its headquarters, is prepared to invest in that country today. Perelli has decided that the United Nations will not attempt to observe -- much less supervise or run -- elections in Iraq, whenever they occur. Perelli and a staff of perhaps 25 experts will work in the U.S.-protected Green Zone in Baghdad and train Iraqis to conduct registration and balloting. Like Brahimi, who rarely ventured out of the heavily fortified U.S. occupation headquarters, the members of the election team will have virtually no contact with ordinary Iraqis or a chance to determine for themselves what the security situation will or will not permit. The Green Zone has become a character in its own right in the Iraqi drama, and a nefarious one. The symbolism of American administrators moving into and converting Saddam Hussein's palaces into bunkers from which they and U.N. specialists urge Iraqis to take the lethal risks of democracy -- and then criticize the unprotected Iraqis for not getting it right -- has become noxious to many in Iraq. And so it should. The costs in delaying elections in such circumstances can be high, Afghan President Hamid Karzai warned Americans privately on his visit to Washington last week. Karzai believes that an election campaign and the act of voting would accelerate political stabilization in his country, despite the predictable imperfections and security problems of Election Day. Delay causes people to lose faith and gives corrupt and undemocratic forces more time to entrench themselves. Afghan elections are due in early October. A change in U.N.-mandated rules to allow same-day registration and voting would resolve many of the problems now being cited to argue for a six-month delay. NATO's European members could help by providing the military support they have already promised to Afghanistan. Elections educate citizens and give them a personal stake in the future of governments. They bring the promise of change, the driving force in improving the human condition. This is written not to bash the United Nations but to underscore some obvious points: Elections do not have to be perfect, or even peaceful, to bring positive change. The perfect can be made the enemy of the good. When in doubt, trust the people. [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Michael Rubin, UN Plan for Iraqi Elections Gravely Flawed, Wash Post
Washington Post The Wrong Elections For Iraq By Michael Rubin June 19, 2004 On June 30 the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Iraq will cease to exist. A caretaker Iraqi government will run the country until elections in January. While the transfer of sovereignty is a watershed, Iraqis say true legitimacy will come only with the elections. But now technocratic decisions having to do with these elections are threatening to undercut the durability of any democracy in the country. There are two ways to hold direct elections: by party slates, with each party gaining representation according to its portion of the vote, or by single-member constituencies, somewhat like our own congressional districts. On June 4 Carina Perelli, head of the U.N. electoral advisory team in Iraq, endorsed party slates. When I was a roving CPA political adviser, I lived outside the Green Zone and interacted not only with Iraqi politicians but also with ordinary people. Voting was the topic of conversations at teahouses and mosques. Islamist parties tended to favor a party-slate system. Advocates of an Iranian-style Islamic republic were blunt: The first article in a democracy is the rule of the majority over the minority, Sayyid Hadi Modarresi, one of Karbala's most influential clerics, told the Arabic daily Al-Hayah. Liberal Iraqis favor constituency-based elections. The Transitional Administrative Law calls for a 275-member National Assembly, which translates into each district's member representing approximately 87,000 people. Contests would occur not between parties but between individuals, who would be accountable to local residents rather than party bosses. Former Governing Council members condemned as irrelevant by CPA administrator L. Paul Bremer could win some districts. Raja Khuzai, an outspoken Shiite advocate for women's rights, is popular in her home town of Diwaniyah. Residents of Khadimiya favor Iraqi National Congress head Ahmed Chalabi. A religious party leader, Abdul Aziz Hakim, is popular in Najaf. Less successful would be uncharismatic, corrupt or abusive party hacks who hope to win power on the coattails of party bosses. Older Iraqis also favor constituencies. Distrust of political parties is deeply rooted. One recent poll indicated that political parties have only a 3 percent favorability rating. Pensioners remember the 1960s as a time of pitched street battles between adherents of leftist and nationalist parties. Younger generations view parties through the lens of the Baath Party experience, in which employment depended on a party membership card. Distrust of parties extends to Iraqi Kurdistan, where I taught in the 2000-01 academic year. With few exceptions, my students associated local Kurdish parties with corruption, abuse of power and nepotism. Even Perelli, the U.N. official, acknowledged Iraqi ill feeling toward political parties. The anti-political party feeling of the population is extremely high, she told journalists in May. But at her news conference this month, Perelli explained her rationale for abandoning the accountability of single-member constituencies in favor of pursuing party-slate elections. There are a lot of communities that have been broken and dispersed around Iraq, she said, and these communities wanted to be able to accumulate their votes and to vote with like-minded people. With that one sentence, Perelli would set Iraq on the slippery slope to the failed Lebanese-style communal system. According to an Iraqi electoral commission member, Bremer agreed to a party-slate system to bypass the tricky question of who votes where, thereby trading Iraq's long-term health for short-term expediency. The U.N. endorsement of a party-slate system fails to correct the mistakes of the past year. While Bremer condemned the Governing Council as irrelevant, the truth was more nuanced. Many Iraqis adopt the same throw-the-bums-out mentality that Americans voice about Congress, even while supporting their own representatives. Distrust of the Governing Council was more pronounced in towns such as Kut, which had no representation, than in cities, such as Najaf, which were represented. Even in Iraq, politics is about patronage. The party-slate system will not bolster representation. Many Iraqis share ethnicity but not local interests. Tel Afar, a town of 160,000 east of Mosul, is 95 percent Shiite Turkmen. Its Turkish-speaking residents have little in common with Turkmen in Erbil or Kirkuk. The party-slate system might also undercut religious freedom. Christians, for example, represent less than 3 percent of Iraq's population. They remain concentrated in towns such as Alqosh, Ainkawa and Duhok. Many Christians do not support parties such as the Assyrian Democratic Movement. Without district-based elections, they may find themselves without representation. Smaller religious communities that do not have their own political parties but who live in clustered districts may find themselves without
