THE NEW REPUBLIC
TRUST THE IRAQIS.
Silent Majority
by Michael Rubin
Post date: 05.27.04
Issue date: 06.07.04

Last August, I participated in a town-hall meeting hosted by the
administrative council of Dibis, an ethnically mixed town 22 miles northwest
of Kirkuk. Locals complained about everything from sporadic electricity to
fertilizer shortages to potholes, and their Iraqi representatives listened
attentively. It was an encouraging sight, all the more so because the month
before, Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) head L. Paul Bremer had
proudly announced, in a televised speech, that "all of Iraq's main cities,
and dozens of other towns, now have administrative councils."

But there was a problem. Soon after his announcement, Bremer--not wanting to
complicate planning for the Iraq donor's conference to be held in Madrid in
October--refused to give the councils budgetary authority. As a result,
council members in places like Dibis could listen to complaints but lacked
the means to respond to them. Iraqis quickly decided that their local
representatives were little more than props.

In many other areas, the story has been the same. Iraqi farmers missed this
year's planting season because the CPA's senior American adviser for
agriculture (later fired) repeatedly refused the Iraqi minister of
agriculture's request to order fertilizer. Despite problems restoring Iraq's
electrical infrastructure, CPA electricity advisers never bothered to
consult Saad Shakir Tawfiq, who oversaw its reconstruction after the Gulf
war in 1991.

In fact, they didn't even return Tawfiq's calls, a tiny example of the
paternalism that has characterized the American occupiers' treatment of the
Iraqi people. Iraqis, contrary to what many in Washington now believe, were
not anti-American from the beginning. Many troops were greeted as
liberators. The Boston Globe reported, the day after the fall of Baghdad,
that "[j]ubilant Iraqis greeted US troops with cheers, victory signs, and
flowers." Many are anti-American today because the United States has
refused, in ways big and small, to give them real control over the country.
Unless that changes, the June 30 handover will be a fiasco and a farce.

The paternalism began even before the war did. Fearing it could undermine
prewar diplomacy, the State Department resisted efforts to create a "Free
Iraqi Force" of exiles committed to fighting Saddam Hussein. On the first
night of the war, the Free Iraqi Force huddled around radios at the Taszar
Air Base in Hungary, 1,600 miles away from the country they were supposed to
help liberate. The United States paid a price. Iraqi cheers turned to
stunned silence when, on April 9, 2003, Corporal Edward Chin draped an
American rather than an Iraqi flag over the face of Saddam's statue in
Baghdad. The person climbing the statue should not have been an American
carrying an Iraqi flag, but an Iraqi. Unfortunately, the forces most likely
to have realized this were left cooling their heels in Central Europe.

Occupation brought more of the same. Heeding Iraqis' pleas, the United
States formed the Iraqi Governing Council in July 2003. Unfortunately,
Bremer soon dashed Iraqi hopes by proclaiming his veto power. "At the
bottom, the [Coalition Provisional] Authority still has the ultimate
authority here until we have a government in place," Bremer said five days
before the Council's inauguration. As created, the Council presidency
rotates each month, and no one leader gained the kind of longer-term power
needed to negotiate with the CPA. When the Council tried to elect a prime
minister, Bremer refused, saying it might undercut his own authority. Even
the symbolism has been paternalistic. Rather than use Governing Council
members to deliver weekly radio addresses, Bremer delivered them himself,
and the CPA's "Strategic Communication's Office" focused more on outreach to
The New York Times than to Iraqis. Many Iraqis are upset that, more than a
year after Saddam's overthrow, they still see CPA spokesman Dan Senor and
General Mark Kimmitt, rather than an Iraqi, delivering the daily briefing to
reporters.

In the U.S. press, the CPA is often portrayed as a force for liberalism,
battling Iraqis' instinct for theocracy. But, in truth, liberal Iraqis have
been given no more authority than their conservative countrymen. Kanan
Makiya, one of Iraq's leading liberal intellectuals, spent the year
following Saddam's overthrow developing the Iraq Memory Foundation, a museum
that would commemorate the victims of Baathist tyranny and allow Iraqis to
reflect on their history. Makiya's team catalogued documents and applied for
CPA permits to build a museum accessible to all Iraqis. But, on April 23,
2004, with the stroke of a pen, Bremer undercut Makiya and established his
own National Commission for Remembrance. Similarly, when Dr. Raja Al Khuzai,
a liberal Shia member of the Governing Council, voiced concerns in a Council
meeting in February 2004 about some of her colleagues' endorsement of
Islamic law, one of Bremer's assistants chided her for risking an impasse in
the drafting of the Transitional Administrative Law, which the United States
needed to pass quickly. And, last week, U.S. forces raided the home of
Council member Ahmed Chalabi, undermining the authority of the Council
itself. "This is an insult," said Council President Ghazi Al Yawar. "It
could happen to any Governing Council member."

For the June 30 handover of sovereignty to succeed, the United States must
finally get serious about Iraqification. The White House proposes handing
over control of Iraqi ministries to Iraqis, putting Iraqis in charge of
crucial tasks like the rebuilding of infrastructure and the restoration of
the energy sector. It also plans to replace Bremer with an American
ambassador, John Negroponte, whom it says will be an adviser, not a
proconsul. And it pledges national elections in 2005.

But this doesn't go far enough. To make the sure the CPA doesn't morph into
a 3,000-person super-embassy, the United States should abandon most of the
four-square-mile Green Zone, which it has, so far, not committed to closing.
The bridge and road closures resulting from the U.S. cantonment in Baghdad's
center are a constant irritant for Iraqis. Driving from Baghdad's Mansour
district to its Karrada district took ten minutes before the toppling of
Saddam; now it takes an hour. Once sovereignty is transferred, not a single
American should remain inside Saddam's Republican Palace. The U.S.-run
Convention Center can suffice.

And Washington must not only give Iraqis power; it must give them the
resources to utilize that power, even if it disagrees with some of the
choices Baghdad makes. The White House plans to hand control of ministries
to Iraqis, but it must also allow Iraqis, and not American "technical
advisers," to control the ministries' budgets. The administration has vowed
to ensure that international donors fulfill their commitments to Iraq but
appears unwilling to allow the Iraqi government to determine where the aid
flows. The United States has expressed outrage at the U.N. oil-for-food
scandal but has tried to defund the Governing Council's own examination of
the problem so as not to make things awkward for U.N. envoy Lakhdar Brahimi.
If the United States thinks Iraqis will take more kindly to U.N. paternalism
than American paternalism, they are mistaken. Many Shia and Kurds remember
that Brahimi remained silent when, as undersecretary of the Arab League
between 1984 and 1991, Saddam massacred tens of thousands of Shia and Kurds.
And Iraqis have not forgotten U.N. SecretaryGeneral Kofi Annan's February
24, 1998, comment, "Can I trust Saddam Hussein? I think I can do business
with him." Iraqis, like most other peoples, are prickly nationalists. After
the handover, the Iraqi government must be able to conduct its own sovereign
investigation of the United Nations and anyone else. For Iraq to become a
stable, peaceful democracy, power must reside with people like Saad Shakir
Tawfiq. With a little luck, they'll take our calls.

Michael Rubin served as a Coalition Provisional Authority political adviser
between July 2003 and March 2004, and is now a resident scholar at the
American Enterprise Institute.






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