Re: [SC-L] Re: Comparing Scanning Tools (false positives)

2006-06-13 Thread David A. Wheeler
Gary McGraw wrote: Hi all (especially david), The story you repeated about ITS4 finding a vulnerability that can't happen is wrong. The tool FIST (a fault injection tool for security) which we decribed in an Oakland paper from 1998 was what you were thinking of. (FIST was also produced

Re: [SC-L] Re: Comparing Scanning Tools (false positives)

2006-06-13 Thread David A. Wheeler
Crispin Cowan wrote: I would like to introduce you to my new kick-ass scanning tool. You run it over your source code, and it only produces a single false-positive for you to check out. That false positive just happens to be the complete source code listing for your entire program :) If you

RE: [SC-L] RE: Comparing Scanning Tools

2006-06-09 Thread McGovern, James F (HTSC, IT)
Title: Re: [SC-L] RE: Comparing Scanning Tools I think I should have been more specific in my first post. I should have phrased it as I have yet to find a large enterprise whose primary business isn't software or technology that has made a significant investment in such tools. Likewise

RE: [SC-L] RE: Comparing Scanning Tools

2006-06-09 Thread Jeremy Epstein
Title: Re: [SC-L] RE: Comparing Scanning Tools At the RSA Conference in February, I went to a reception hosted by a group called "Secure Software Forum"(not to be confused with the company Secure Software Inc, which offers a product competitive to Fortify). They had a panel ses

RE: [SC-L] RE: Comparing Scanning Tools

2006-06-09 Thread ljknews
At 2:32 PM -0400 6/9/06, Jeremy Epstein wrote: Having said that, it's completely at odds compared to what I see working for an ISV of a non-security product. That is, I almost never have prospects/customers ask me what we do to assure our software. I don't even get those questions for our