Re: MUSCLE Security Design for PC/SC

2000-04-03 Thread Olivier Jeannet
David Corcoran wrote: 1) All transmitted APDU's will have a trailing 8 byte hash or checksum. I may also have another hash on the response where the response not only has the received hash from the response but also the transmittal hash so that the application can link that response with

MUSCLE Security Design for PC/SC

2000-03-31 Thread David Corcoran
Hello, I'm looking for suggestions for a security design to wrap around PC/SC. The current version allows you to use RPC for IPC or you can link your application directly to the resource manager and have 1 app --- 1 reader. The multi - application (with RPC) works the best but could be much

Re: MUSCLE Security Design for PC/SC

2000-03-31 Thread Jim Rees
Secure RPC is a joke and I guess there is supposed to be another form of this coming soon - does anyone know more about this ? You mean the stuff in NFSv4? We coincidentally happen to be implementing this right now. It's a real kitchen sink, uses gss-api, with kerberos 5 as one of the

Re: MUSCLE Security Design for PC/SC

2000-03-31 Thread Naomaru Itoi
Hi, David, This is not a suggestion for PC/SC, but is kind of related. We are trying to implement a protocol called EKE on Jim's IP stack on smartcards. EKE is a key distribution protocol which establishes a session key between two parties from a weak secret, such as a password, shared