Re: [sidr] Princeton University:: Impacting IP Address Reachability via RPKI Manipulations

2013-04-02 Thread Danny McPherson
On 2013-04-01 20:31, John Curran wrote: Indeed, there will be some that see RPKI as a possible new approach for such matters. The registry needs to be consistent (i.e. across registration data, Whois publication, and RPKI publication) and we'll certainly seek to prevent RPKI-specific actions

Re: [sidr] Princeton University:: Impacting IP Address Reachability via RPKI Manipulations

2013-04-02 Thread John Curran
On Apr 2, 2013, at 9:53 AM, Danny McPherson da...@tcb.net wrote: Speaking of inconsistencies in the RPKI, what's ARIN and the NRO's status on getting to a single trust anchor? I believe that ICANN and the RIR technical staffs are busy trying to document a proposed structure and operation to

Re: [sidr] Princeton University:: Impacting IP Address Reachability via RPKI Manipulations

2013-04-02 Thread Shane Amante
John, See below. On Apr 2, 2013, at 8:26 AM, John Curran jcur...@arin.net wrote: On Apr 2, 2013, at 9:53 AM, Danny McPherson da...@tcb.net wrote: [--snip--] Yeah, they were nonsensical in the past and present role of ARIN, not in an RPKI-enabled world where revocation or transfer or

Re: [sidr] Princeton University:: Impacting IP Address Reachability via RPKI Manipulations

2013-04-02 Thread John Curran
On Apr 2, 2013, at 10:53 AM, Shane Amante sh...@castlepoint.net wrote: You keep repeating that assertion, but note that even in today's world we could be ordered to reclaim and reassign a block with similar effect. It may not be real time but there are plenty of folks who follow both the

Re: [sidr] Princeton University:: Impacting IP Address Reachability via RPKI Manipulations

2013-04-02 Thread Danny McPherson
On 2013-04-02 09:30, John Curran wrote: Indeed. Of course, that same outcome can effectively be had today (for any given IP address block) via one handful of court orders directed to the larger ISP backbones. Assuming those backbones operate within jurisdictional or MLAT reach, as

Re: [sidr] Princeton University:: Impacting IP Address Reachability via RPKI Manipulations

2013-04-02 Thread Danny McPherson
On 2013-04-02 08:26, John Curran wrote: On Apr 2, 2013, at 9:53 AM, Danny McPherson da...@tcb.net wrote: Speaking of inconsistencies in the RPKI, what's ARIN and the NRO's status on getting to a single trust anchor? I believe that ICANN and the RIR technical staffs are busy trying to

Re: [sidr] Princeton University:: Impacting IP Address Reachability via RPKI Manipulations

2013-04-02 Thread Shane Amante
On Apr 2, 2013, at 9:58 AM, Danny McPherson da...@tcb.net wrote: On 2013-04-02 09:30, John Curran wrote: Indeed. Of course, that same outcome can effectively be had today (for any given IP address block) via one handful of court orders directed to the larger ISP backbones. Assuming

Re: [sidr] Princeton University:: Impacting IP Address Reachability via RPKI Manipulations

2013-04-02 Thread John Curran
On Apr 2, 2013, at 12:27 PM, Shane Amante sh...@castlepoint.net wrote: IMO, there is still one key difference. ISP's are _directly_ involved in receiving such orders, evaluating them for validity, applicability and then carrying them out. This can also include providing a heads-up to

Re: [sidr] Princeton University:: Impacting IP Address Reachability via RPKI Manipulations

2013-04-02 Thread Stephen Kent
Danny, The architecture permits overlapping allocations to accommodate transfers that involve address space that is in use. I've been told by several operators that, for this sort of transfer, such overlap is required. Steve On 4/2/13 12:02 PM, Danny McPherson wrote: ... As for today, the

Re: [sidr] Princeton University:: Impacting IP Address Reachability via RPKI Manipulations

2013-04-02 Thread Stephen Kent
Shane, As one operator whose worldwide routing/operations could be negatively impacted by the above, it would be nice to have a concise statement about what is/was the original intent of the design of the RPKI with respect to the above. In addition, it would be useful to see if any potential

Re: [sidr] Princeton University:: Impacting IP Address Reachability via RPKI Manipulations

2013-04-02 Thread Christopher Morrow
On Tue, Apr 2, 2013 at 1:59 PM, Stephen Kent k...@bbn.com wrote: Danny, The architecture permits overlapping allocations to accommodate transfers that involve address space that is in use. I've been told by several operators that, for this sort of transfer, such overlap is required.

Re: [sidr] Princeton University:: Impacting IP Address Reachability via RPKI Manipulations

2013-04-02 Thread Stephen Kent
Shane, IMO, there is still one key difference. ISP's are _directly_ involved in receiving such orders, evaluating them for validity, applicability and then carrying them out. This can also include providing a heads-up to operations teams, in that SP, that a change in configuration to effect

Re: [sidr] Princeton University:: Impacting IP Address Reachability via RPKI Manipulations

2013-04-02 Thread Stephen Kent
Sharon, ... Nonetheless, all of the methods for whacking a ROA described in the paper are detectable by anyone who monitors the RPKI. One might argue that each resource holder should monitor his/her RPKI pub point to detect any action that causes one's ROA to become unverifiable. We

Re: [sidr] Princeton University:: Impacting IP Address Reachability via RPKI Manipulations

2013-04-02 Thread Stephen Kent
Chris, Yes, the example you provided matches what I had in mind. Steve - On Tue, Apr 2, 2013 at 1:59 PM, Stephen Kent k...@bbn.com mailto:k...@bbn.com wrote: Danny, The architecture permits overlapping allocations to accommodate transfers that involve address space that is

Re: [sidr] Princeton University:: Impacting IP Address Reachability via RPKI Manipulations

2013-04-02 Thread Shane Amante
John, On Apr 2, 2013, at 11:22 AM, John Curran jcur...@arin.net wrote: On Apr 2, 2013, at 12:27 PM, Shane Amante sh...@castlepoint.net wrote: IMO, there is still one key difference. ISP's are _directly_ involved in receiving such orders, evaluating them for validity, applicability and then

Re: [sidr] Princeton University:: Impacting IP Address Reachability via RPKI Manipulations

2013-04-02 Thread Stephen Kent
Danny, No, I didn't realize you were referring to the current multi-TA environment. I thought that John Curran was alluding to plans to create an ICANN-managed global TA, which is why I didn't realize the context you had in mind. Steve -- On 4/2/13 3:20 PM, Danny McPherson wrote: On

Re: [sidr] Princeton University:: Impacting IP Address Reachability via RPKI Manipulations

2013-04-02 Thread John Curran
On Apr 2, 2013, at 2:59 PM, Shane Amante sh...@castlepoint.net wrote: So, in the future of the RPKI, as a resource holder, how am I able to shop around as per the above, to mitigate one or more of the concerns that I've illustrated above? Hint: given the, at present, limited number of RIR's