Re: [sidr] [Idr] A note from today's IDR/SIDR joint meeting - RPKI-RTR protocol document

2014-11-17 Thread Roque Gagliano (rogaglia)
Chis, The document is now RFC 6912 published as BCP. Regards, Roque On 14/11/14 21:00, Christopher Morrow christopher.mor...@gmail.com wrote: Also there was a question (from hannes?) about algorithm change processes and timelines.. that's covered in:

Re: [sidr] [Idr] A note from today's IDR/SIDR joint meeting - RPKI-RTR protocol document

2014-11-17 Thread Christopher Morrow
On Mon, Nov 17, 2014 at 4:32 AM, Roque Gagliano (rogaglia) rogag...@cisco.com wrote: Chis, The document is now RFC 6912 published as BCP. great! (I should have looked further along the line in the tools page I bet) Regards, Roque On 14/11/14 21:00, Christopher Morrow

Re: [sidr] [Idr] A note from today's IDR/SIDR joint meeting - RPKI-RTR protocol document

2014-11-17 Thread Matthias Waehlisch
Just to be precise, it's RFC 6916 (BCP 182). RFC 6912 is about Principles for Unicode Code Point Inclusion in Labels in the DNS - differnet topic ;). Cheers matthias -- Matthias Waehlisch . Freie Universitaet Berlin, Inst. fuer Informatik, AG CST . Takustr. 9, D-14195 Berlin, Germany ..

Re: [sidr] New version : draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol-10

2014-11-17 Thread Warren Kumari
On Sun, Nov 16, 2014 at 7:13 PM, Randy Bush ra...@psg.com wrote: Per discussion during IDR/SIDR meeting Friday, there may need to be some text in the security considerations around the attack vector of sending many updates with long (but valid) AS_Paths could you please describe how an

Re: [sidr] New version : draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol-10

2014-11-17 Thread George, Wes
On 11/17/14, 12:13 AM, Randy Bush ra...@psg.com wrote: could you please describe how an attacker can send many long bgpsec paths? how are these long paths signed? Though I'm guessing it might be possible to try it as a replay attack (grab a string of signed ASNs from the path of one or more