Re: Security in Sling

2009-04-22 Thread Torgeir Veimo
The servlet container usually have default security policies defined, which can easily be changed. Eg for tomcat, look at conf/catalina.policy. Am not sure what facilities ogsi containers provide in this area though? 2009/4/22 Jukka Zitting jukka.zitt...@gmail.com Hi, I was thinking about the

Re: Security in Sling

2009-04-22 Thread Felix Meschberger
Hi, Jukka Zitting schrieb: Hi, I was thinking about the implications of giving a user write access to a subtree of the repository. With that access the user could now upload a new script and create a node that invokes that script when rendered. What if the script contains something like

Re: Security in Sling

2009-04-22 Thread Ian Boston
This is an interesting one for us, since all users will have write access to the repository. Is there an 'execute' permission in sling, or perhaps even an equivalent to the no execute mount option in posix. I see some extensions to the DefaultAccessControlManager looming. Ian On 22 Apr

Re: Security in Sling

2009-04-22 Thread Jukka Zitting
Hi, On Wed, Apr 22, 2009 at 12:40 PM, Torgeir Veimo torg...@pobox.com wrote: The servlet container usually have default security policies defined, which can easily be changed. Eg for tomcat, look at conf/catalina.policy. What would such a policy file look like, i.e. what codeBase should be

Re: Security in Sling

2009-04-22 Thread Felix Meschberger
Hi, Torgeir Veimo schrieb: The servlet container usually have default security policies defined, which can easily be changed. Eg for tomcat, look at conf/catalina.policy. Am not sure what facilities ogsi containers provide in this area though? OSGi containers basically also depend on standard

Re: Security in Sling

2009-04-22 Thread Felix Meschberger
Hi, Ian Boston schrieb: This is an interesting one for us, since all users will have write access to the repository. Is there an 'execute' permission in sling, or perhaps even an equivalent to the no execute mount option in posix. I see some extensions to the DefaultAccessControlManager

Re: Security in Sling

2009-04-22 Thread Bertrand Delacretaz
Hi Jukka, On Wed, Apr 22, 2009 at 12:25 PM, Jukka Zitting jukka.zitt...@gmail.com wrote: ...I was thinking about the implications of giving a user write access to a subtree of the repository. With that access the user could now upload a new script and create a node that invokes that script

Re: Security in Sling

2009-04-22 Thread Carsten Ziegeler
Bertrand Delacretaz wrote: Hi Jukka, On Wed, Apr 22, 2009 at 12:25 PM, Jukka Zitting jukka.zitt...@gmail.com wrote: ...I was thinking about the implications of giving a user write access to a subtree of the repository. With that access the user could now upload a new script and create a

Re: Security in Sling

2009-04-22 Thread Felix Meschberger
Hi, Carsten Ziegeler schrieb: Bertrand Delacretaz wrote: Hi Jukka, On Wed, Apr 22, 2009 at 12:25 PM, Jukka Zitting jukka.zitt...@gmail.com wrote: ...I was thinking about the implications of giving a user write access to a subtree of the repository. With that access the user could now

Re: Security in Sling

2009-04-22 Thread Bertrand Delacretaz
On Wed, Apr 22, 2009 at 1:42 PM, Felix Meschberger fmesc...@gmail.com wrote: Hi, Carsten Ziegeler schrieb: ...scripts are only picked up from configured paths (libs and apps by default). So as long as the user is not allowed to write in these locations, everything should be fine. Well,

Re: Security in Sling

2009-04-22 Thread Ian Boston
Felix, That sounds like it would address the issue of accepting scripts from trusted sources but would not, make the scripts safe as per your original post. On System.exit itself I cant remember if the runtime shutdown handler can veto System.exit, although the damage will already be

Re: Security in Sling

2009-04-22 Thread Tobias Bocanegra
On Wed, Apr 22, 2009 at 12:41 PM, Felix Meschberger fmesc...@gmail.com wrote: Hi, Jukka Zitting schrieb: Hi, I was thinking about the implications of giving a user write access to a subtree of the repository. With that access the user could now upload a new script and create a node that

Re: Security in Sling

2009-04-22 Thread Jukka Zitting
Hi, On Wed, Apr 22, 2009 at 2:22 PM, Tobias Bocanegra tri...@day.com wrote: System.exit() bears IMO no real risk, since it can be prevented by java security. I'd like to see the relevant java security settings. With all the OSGi stuff, JCR bundle loading, and script compiling in place I think

Re: Security in Sling

2009-04-22 Thread Felix Meschberger
Hi, Jukka Zitting schrieb: Hi, On Wed, Apr 22, 2009 at 2:22 PM, Tobias Bocanegra tri...@day.com wrote: System.exit() bears IMO no real risk, since it can be prevented by java security. I'd like to see the relevant java security settings. With all the OSGi stuff, JCR bundle loading, and

Re: Security in Sling

2009-04-22 Thread Bertrand Delacretaz
On Wed, Apr 22, 2009 at 2:44 PM, Jukka Zitting jukka.zitt...@gmail.com wrote: Hi, On Wed, Apr 22, 2009 at 2:22 PM, Tobias Bocanegra tri...@day.com wrote: System.exit() bears IMO no real risk, since it can be prevented by java security. I'd like to see the relevant java security settings.