Sorry to those of you receiving multiple copies of this email. This was
posted to another list that I subscribe to and the author said it was ok to
post his comments elsewhere. I thought the issues he raised would make for
interesting discussions in our classes.
Gary
Gary J. Klatsky, Ph. D.
At 8:33 AM -0500 3/28/05, Gary Klatsky wrote:
Sorry to those of you receiving multiple copies of this email. This was
posted to another list that I subscribe to and the author said it was ok to
post his comments elsewhere. I thought the issues he raised would make for
interesting discussions in
Exactly the issue we'll be discussing in my Consciousness class
tomorrow. :)
But I would comment, though, on a couple of Randall's points.
One, a good case can be made that scientific truth just is consensus.
The data are *rarely* unambiguous (else we wouldn't have so much
literature to wade
Gary Klatsky wrote:
Sorry to those of you receiving multiple copies of this email. This was
posted to another list that I subscribe to and the author said it was
ok to
post his comments elsewhere. I thought the issues he raised would make for
interesting discussions in our classes.
I didn't reply
At 11:42 AM -0500 3/28/05, Christopher D. Green wrote:
So finally we come to the real complaint, which has little to do
with either Terri Shiavo or consciousness. Every school of thought
discovered more than those before. Functionalism took on questions
ignored by sturcturalism. Behviorism,
Paul Brandon wrote:
Let's just say that radical behaviorists reject the concept of
'consciousness' on the grounds that it assumes a mind/body dualism: that
the mind is an entity that has a nonphysical existence separate from the
body and from natural laws.
It does? I'm fairly confident that
At 11:15 AM -0600 3/28/05, Paul Smith wrote:
Paul Brandon wrote:
Let's just say that radical behaviorists reject the concept of
'consciousness' on the grounds that it assumes a mind/body dualism:
that the mind is an entity that has a nonphysical existence
separate from the body and from natural
Paul Brandon wrote:
This is the position that mind is simply a shorthand for brain function.
I'd agree that most neurophysiologist and neuropsychologists agree with
this.
I'm not sure that this is true of cognitive psychologists.
Well, it's an empirical question, but I'd be pretty surprised (and
At 11:47 AM -0600 3/28/05, Paul Smith wrote:
Pure curiosity: do you believe that cognitive psychologists
are generally mind/body dualists? Do you think that's a common
assumption among behaviorists?
Lacking data
It is a common assumption among behaviorists.
Personally I'll withhold
Paul Brandon wrote:
Lacking data
It is a common assumption among behaviorists.
Personally I'll withhold judgement pending data.
I would not be surprised if most cognitive psychologists denied being
dualists, but they often talk in ways that are consistent with dualism
Well, lacking data here
Dear Paul,
Thanks for a highly stimulating exchange of ideas. For what they are worth just
a two quick and rather minor comments:
a) at the risk of being picky, note that there are two types of dualism--i.e.,
onthological and functional. Figure-background is an example of a rather strong
Paul Brandon said:
This is the position that mind is simply a shorthand for brain
function.
I'd agree that most neurophysiologist and neuropsychologists agree with
this.
I'm not sure that this is true of cognitive psychologists.
To say that we have something treats that thing as an entity, not a
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