Re: [tor-dev] Update on 259

ill we hit a guard that satisfies us, or should we sample > directly from the correct set (e.g. only from the set of IPv6 guards). I'm > still not sure about this. I'm much more in favor of sampling in general, rather than trying to hit the specific thing. If we sample in general, we will not skew the

Re: [tor-dev] Update on 259

ear more frequently than we would like. I'm not sure we can do this - a lot of the filters will be based on backwards compatibility with the existing Tor configuration options, things such as ReachableAddresses - I'm not sure how to reasonably enumerate all possibilities in a useful way. Cheers --

Re: [tor-dev] Update on 259

ems you don't like that idea - there seems to be some dissent among the Tor devs which approach is best for this situation. Cheers -- Ola Bini (https://olabini.se) "Yields falsehood when quined" yields falsehood when quined. signature.asc Description: PGP signature _

Re: [tor-dev] Update on 259

dcode > their guard. It's used a lot by people currently. Yeah. Is the guard picked randomly from this list, or using something more complicated? > > - UseEntryGuardsAsDirGuards > > I don't understand exactly what this settings does. > > I'm not sure either. I'd just let it keep t

Re: [tor-dev] Proposal 259: New Guard Selection Behaviour

-- Ola Bini (https://olabini.se) "Yields falsehood when quined" yields falsehood when quined. signature.asc Description: PGP signature ___ tor-dev mailing list tor-dev@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-dev

Re: [tor-dev] Next version of the algorithm

too many guards or too many of them disappear. > > I don't have a strong opinion here. Me neither. I think a percentage is a good starting point - it feels easier to tweak in different ways. > It seems to me that the value 20 here could get reduced to something like 5 or > even less. Of course 5 is also an arbitrary value and to actually find out the > "best" number here we should test the algorithm ourselves in various network > types. Arbitrarily changed to 5. =) Cheers -- Ola Bini (https://olabini.se) "Yields falsehood when quined" yields falsehood when quined. signature.asc Description: PGP signature ___ tor-dev mailing list tor-dev@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-dev

Re: [tor-dev] Next version of the algorithm

Great, lots of good comments. I'll respond in depth once the fever has left my brain! =D On Thu, Mar 03, 2016 at 03:15:26PM +0100, George Kadianakis wrote: > Ola Bini <ob...@thoughtworks.com> writes: > > > Hi, > > Here are some more comments to the latest version

Re: [tor-dev] Next version of the algorithm

e in STATE_RETRY_ONLY and > we manage to connect to a non-primary guard, we hang up the connection, and go > back into STATE_PRIMARY_GUARDS. Maybe. Should we do this only in STATE_RETRY_ONLY or for the UTOPIC and DYSTOPIC states as well? Cheers -- Ola Bini (https://olabini.se) "Yield

Re: [tor-dev] Next version of the algorithm

. - We might be able to start implementing this in tor proper tomorrow - or wednesday hopefully. From now, the team will take over most communication. Cheers -- Ola Bini (https://olabini.se) "Yields falsehood when quined" yields falsehood when quined. signature.asc Description: PGP

Re: [tor-dev] Next version of the algorithm

dystopic conditions, then this heuristic will make it more likely we will faster find a guard to connect to. > > ALGO_CHOOSE_ENTRY_GUARD_END: > > If circuit is set up correctly, let algorithm know > > Algorithm marks the guard chosen as used and makes sure i

Re: [tor-dev] Next version of the algorithm

Hi again, Here is the newest version of the algorithm: https://gist.github.com/olabini/343da01de8e01491bf5c The biggest change is the addition of the state STATE_TRY_ONLY_TRIED. Once it enters this state, it will never exit it again. Cheers -- Ola Bini (https://olabini.se) "Yields fals

Re: [tor-dev] Entry guards, primary guards, dir guards

Ah, good point. So, it seems N_PRIMARY_GUARDS is an argument to the algorithm. Cheers -- Ola Bini (https://olabini.se) "Yields falsehood when quined" yields falsehood when quined. signature.asc Description: PGP signature ___ tor-dev ma

[tor-dev] Next version of the algorithm

Hi, Here is the next version of the algorithm - put it in a gist to make it easier to look at: https://gist.github.com/olabini/343da01de8e01491bf5c Cheers -- Ola Bini (https://olabini.se) "Yields falsehood when quined" yields falsehood when quined. signature.asc Descri

Re: [tor-dev] Detailed algorithm

me till we manage to recover from flaky network > > and I can also think of security related stats like: > > * Number of guards we tried before succeeding first circuit > * Number of guards we exposed ourselves to after time t Haven't thought abou that yet - we currently only