On Sa, 2009-10-24 at 22:07 -0700, Dan Kegel wrote:
This is about the fifth article of this sort, so it's not really news
anymore, but it's still fun to read about.
http://linux.slashdot.org/story/09/10/24/1759213/Now-Linux-Can-Get-Viruses-Via-Wine
The blogger mention the bad website, but the
On Mon, Oct 26, 2009 at 4:22 AM, Nicholas LaRoche nlaro...@vt.edu wrote:
Scott Ritchie wrote:
Stefan Dösinger wrote:
Am 25.10.2009 um 10:57 schrieb Scott Ritchie:
Many apps don't need to view the user folder for documents but also
employ programmable scripting engines - a good example are
On Sun, Oct 25, 2009 at 06:14:34PM -0700, Scott Ritchie wrote:
Stefan Dösinger wrote:
Am 25.10.2009 um 10:57 schrieb Scott Ritchie:
Many apps don't need to view the user folder for documents but also
employ programmable scripting engines - a good example are games. It
would be much
On Sat, Oct 24, 2009 at 10:47 PM, Nicholas LaRoche nlaro...@vt.edu wrote:
A few months ago there was a topic in wine-devel on the same subject. A
toggle switch for portions of the wine API (i.e. networking), WINEPREFIX,
and SELinux seems to make this a non-issue.
The default wine SELinux
Dan Kegel wrote:
On Sat, Oct 24, 2009 at 10:47 PM, Nicholas LaRoche nlaro...@vt.edu wrote:
A few months ago there was a topic in wine-devel on the same subject. A
toggle switch for portions of the wine API (i.e. networking), WINEPREFIX,
and SELinux seems to make this a non-issue.
The default
On Sun, Oct 25, 2009 at 10:57 AM, Scott Ritchie sc...@open-vote.org wrote:
It would be much more convenient to pass some sort of sandbox me, allow
network, deny home folder access switch to Wine than to muck about with
stuff like AppArmor profiles.
http://sandboxing.org/ was just formed to
Scott Ritchie wrote:
Dan Kegel wrote:
On Sat, Oct 24, 2009 at 10:47 PM, Nicholas LaRoche nlaro...@vt.edu wrote:
A few months ago there was a topic in wine-devel on the same subject. A
toggle switch for portions of the wine API (i.e. networking), WINEPREFIX,
and SELinux seems to make this a
2009/10/25 Nicholas LaRoche nlaro...@vt.edu:
From a usability standpoint, adding switches to wine for sandboxing is a
good thing. But it seems to only cover the APIs exported by wine. A
specially crafted win32 wine-aware malware app could leverage sys_open(1)
and sys_write(4) via int 80h to
Am 25.10.2009 um 10:57 schrieb Scott Ritchie:
Many apps don't need to view the user folder for documents but also
employ programmable scripting engines - a good example are games. It
would be much more convenient to pass some sort of sandbox me, allow
network, deny home folder access switch to
On Sun, Oct 25, 2009 at 2:18 PM, Nicholas LaRoche nlaro...@vt.edu wrote:
A specially crafted win32 wine-aware malware app could leverage sys_open(1)
and sys_write(4) via int 80h to bypass this isolation and install itself
anywhere in the users home directory.
Yes. That's why I don't think
Stefan Dösinger wrote:
Am 25.10.2009 um 10:57 schrieb Scott Ritchie:
Many apps don't need to view the user folder for documents but also
employ programmable scripting engines - a good example are games. It
would be much more convenient to pass some sort of sandbox me, allow
network, deny
Scott Ritchie wrote:
Stefan Dösinger wrote:
Am 25.10.2009 um 10:57 schrieb Scott Ritchie:
Many apps don't need to view the user folder for documents but also
employ programmable scripting engines - a good example are games. It
would be much more convenient to pass some sort of sandbox me,
This is about the fifth article of this sort, so it's not really news
anymore, but it's still fun to read about.
TFA is clueless about how to clean up a wine
installation (he thought uninstalling wine would do it),
buts lots of readers supply the missing clue.
Dan Kegel wrote:
This is about the fifth article of this sort, so it's not really news
anymore, but it's still fun to read about.
TFA is clueless about how to clean up a wine
installation (he thought uninstalling wine would do it),
buts lots of readers supply the missing clue.
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