On 3/24/08, [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
http://bugs.winehq.org/show_bug.cgi?id=9484
--- Comment #9 from Austin English [EMAIL PROTECTED] 2008-03-24 12:43:54
---
Can anyone test this in wine 0.9.58? Some other copy protections are working
better, and if this isn't working
On Mon, Mar 24, 2008 at 12:51 PM, James Hawkins [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On 3/24/08, [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
http://bugs.winehq.org/show_bug.cgi?id=9484
--- Comment #9 from Austin English [EMAIL PROTECTED] 2008-03-24
12:43:54 ---
Can anyone test this in wine
On Mon, Mar 24, 2008 at 1:02 PM, Austin English [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Mon, Mar 24, 2008 at 12:51 PM, James Hawkins [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On 3/24/08, [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
http://bugs.winehq.org/show_bug.cgi?id=9484
--- Comment #9 from Austin
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Just a thought but it may be a good idea to add a keyword to Bugzilla
for issues related to debuggers or copy-protection, that would help
group them all together as at the moment there seem to be many bugs
related to breakages from obscure debugger
On Thursday 29 November 2007 14:00:00 Ben Hodgetts (Enverex) wrote:
Just a thought but it may be a good idea to add a keyword to Bugzilla
for issues related to debuggers or copy-protection, that would help
group them all together as at the moment there seem to be many bugs
related to breakages
associated with it. If it doesn't (c: doesn't), then either don't
allow it or simulate it. That easily covers both cases since copy
protection would presumably work on c: and disk utilities would work
with real disks.
If it's really about what drives the program can see and not drive
letters
trouble than it's
worth then to make disk utilities run in Wine. It doesn't seem to be
something a lot of people want to do. It's not something they should
want to do if it's with disks that they care about. And, well, virtual
machines are much more suited to this than Wine is. So if copy
protection
On Friday 06 October 2006 10:19, Tim Schmidt wrote:
Again, works for me. I believe the only part missing for this case is
the simulation. Of course, there's the added possibility that apps
will go mucking about with data other apps care about, in which case a
per-executable simulated device
On 10/6/06, Kai Blin [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Friday 06 October 2006 10:19, Tim Schmidt wrote:
Again, works for me. I believe the only part missing for this case is
the simulation. Of course, there's the added possibility that apps
will go mucking about with data other apps care about,
Tim Schmidt wrote:
Again, works for me. I believe the only part missing for this case is
the simulation. Of course, there's the added possibility that apps
will go mucking about with data other apps care about, in which case a
per-executable simulated device would be best.
Wouldn't such a
there is a bug in wine causing it to happen.
The only way to fix this whole MBR issue, is to find an application with
copy protection, and actually get it to work. We will then have 100%
accurate data regarding what feature we would actually need in wine to
allow these copy protected applications
On Wed, Oct 04, 2006 at 07:10:41PM +0200, Kopfgeldjaeger wrote:
2. raw disk access normally requires root rights. It's very unlikely
that Alexandre would permit anything which requires to run wine as root
(even if those are only additional features)
and its very unlikely, that a sane person
here is a class of applications that expect
raw (or nearly-raw) disk access:
- copy-protection that writes mysterious things to or near the MBR
- various utility software (virus scanners, disk defragmenters,
forensic tools, etc.)
- other possibilities?
Some of these tools - the forensic tools
It sounds like a general framework for routing these kind of raw disk
i/o would be useful... probably configurable by app would be most
useful.
thoughts?
I agree, a sandbox system where the 'litter box' (a sand box to put
all your crap) would hold potentialy dangerous direct disk accesses to
Tim Schmidt wrote:
It sounds like a general framework for routing these kind of raw disk
i/o would be useful... probably configurable by app would be most
useful.
UML has a COW (copy-on-write) layer [1]. If we had something like this,
conceivable we could allow Wine to read raw disks (or
On Thu, Oct 05, 2006 at 04:25:38AM -0400, Tim Schmidt wrote:
What we're talking about here is a class of applications that expect
raw (or nearly-raw) disk access:
- copy-protection that writes mysterious things to or near the MBR
- various utility software (virus scanners, disk
Mike McCormack wrote:
Tim Schmidt wrote:
It sounds like a general framework for routing these kind of raw disk
i/o would be useful... probably configurable by app would be most
useful.
UML has a COW (copy-on-write) layer [1]. If we had something like this,
conceivable we could allow
On 10/5/06, Mike McCormack [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
UML has a COW (copy-on-write) layer [1]. If we had something like this,
conceivable we could allow Wine to read raw disks (or the COW file),
then write back to the COW file.
QEMU has nice support for several different COW and sparse
On 10/5/06, Christoph Frick [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
the #2 folks are proficient enough with their systems to know what they
are doing. the #1 folks hope to get away from the world of #2 things
they are forced on the windows world when they change to unix.
Not nescessarily. I'm thinking
To clarify my thoughts, and throw this out there... Here's how I'm
imagining this working:
Assuming there's no problem intercepting the raw disk i/o attempts,
the first time an app attempts a raw disk access, Wine can throw a
popup (I know, I hate them too) with something like the following
On 10/5/06, Vassilis Virvilis [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
How about a loopback device in linux?
This is potentially already possible to do with wine. I use loopbacked
CD images, so loopbacked MBR's should be easy enough, with no change
to wine. Just set the device node link for the device to
On 10/3/06, Michael [Plouj] Ploujnikov [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I'm by no means an expert on copyright law or copy protection, but I think that using any method other than writing directly to the MBR with those copy protection measures would be illegal because writing to a file (registry,
wine
On 10/3/06, Martin Owens [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On 10/3/06, Michael [Plouj] Ploujnikov [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I'm by no means an expert on copyright law or copy protection, but I think that using any method other than writing directly to the MBR with those copy
protection measures would
Le mardi 03 octobre 2006 à 15:51 -0500, Tom Spear a écrit :
[...]
I'm by no means an expert on copyright law or copy protection, but I
think that using any method other than writing directly to the MBR
with those copy protection measures would be illegal because writing
to a file
Technically yes, but the difference is that VMware actually writes
_everything_ into that one file vs wine proposing to write just what is
written to the boot sector into a file..
The reason it is different, is because it is much more difficult (if not
impossible) to tell what is boot sector and
time, but it's just a thought. Anyone care
to comment on that?
what keeps some nosy haxx0r from looking in the MBR (or some blocks
later) if he wants to find out about the copy protection? if they store
data like this unprotected (e.g. crypting them) then this is just
security-by-obscurity (which
On 10/4/06, Jonathan Ernst [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Le mardi 03 octobre 2006 à 15:51 -0500, Tom Spear a écrit :[...] I'm by no means an expert on copyright law or copy protection, but I think that using any method other than writing directly to the MBR
with those copy protection measures would
On Wed, Oct 04, 2006 at 04:09:51PM +0100, Martin Owens wrote:
Anyone techinicaly adept could find the MBR, it's the 1st sector on
the disk, this isn't about boot records but the MBR which is in a
known place. I recon you could use linux tools on your windows hard
drive to retrieve it easy.
what keeps some nosy haxx0r from looking in the MBR (or some blocks
later) if he wants to find out about the copy protection? if they store
data like this unprotected (e.g. crypting them) then this is just
security-by-obscurity (which is no security at all).
Copy protection IS security
the user decide for himself :)
On 10/4/06, Stefan Dösinger [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
what keeps some nosy haxx0r from looking in the MBR (or some blocks
later) if he wants to find out about the copy protection? if they store
data like this unprotected (e.g. crypting them) then this is just
security
What makes copy protection problematic to circumvent is not the math or the
technical stuff, it is the laws protecting it :-(
how does cedega do it?
Quoting EA Durbin [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
What makes copy protection problematic to circumvent is not the math or the
technical stuff, it is the laws protecting it :-(
how does cedega do it?
They license the code for the copy protection detection from the likes
of macrovision.
--
Darragh
On Wednesday 04 October 2006 09:25, Karsten Anderson wrote:
why not just implement the write to MBR?
The user running Wine more than likely won't have such write access to the
disk. Only root would be able to do that, and running Wine as root is far
from encouraged. Plus, fooling around with
Hi,
Karsten Anderson wrote:
why not just implement the write to MBR? figure out how the copy
protector does it and just implement it. as long as you know what
you're doing and where the O/S stores its stuff you should be alright.
put a few warnings on the instaeller and whatnot that this
Maybe someone from FSF could provide legal guidance on this issue.
http://www.fsf.org/about/contact.html
On 10/4/06, Karsten Anderson [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
why not just implement the write to MBR? figure out how the copy
protector does it and just implement it. as long as you know what
you're doing and where the O/S stores its stuff you should be alright.
put a few warnings on the instaeller
Jesse Allen wrote:
Guys, Wine programs can write to the MBR already with correct
permissions...
http://bugs.winehq.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4672
I hope nobody needs to explain why that's a very bad idea...
It's a very very bad idea, I don't understand why linux doesn't
protect normal users corrupting the disk at byte level that just seems
really bad for security.
On 10/4/06, Aaron Slunt [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Jesse Allen wrote:
Guys, Wine programs can write to the MBR already with correct
On Wed, Oct 04, 2006 at 09:41:16AM -0500, Tom Spear wrote:
I agree that we shouldn't write to the MBR, but I definitely think that we
should get some legal guidance before we proceed with writing anything to a
file (in this case), because
If it isn't a silly question, which part of the mbr
On 04/10/06, Jesse Allen [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Guys, Wine programs can write to the MBR already with correct permissions...
I think that should read with wrong permissions :-)
Le mercredi 04 octobre 2006 à 21:14 +0100, Martin Owens a écrit :
It's a very very bad idea, I don't understand why linux doesn't
protect normal users corrupting the disk at byte level that just seems
really bad for security.
Every distro does AFAIK. However if people mess with their user's
On 10/4/06, H. Verbeet [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On 04/10/06, Jesse Allen [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Guys, Wine programs can write to the MBR already with correct permissions...
I think that should read with wrong permissions :-)
Yes, very wrong from a security standpoint :P
for the kinds of work the Wine
devs need to do.
--tim
Part 3 Applies, however it could be read as being permissible for the purpose
of implementing a compatible interface. IE for the purpose of making the copy
protection work under Wine. I think it would be much safer to make the
protection
On Tuesday 03 October 2006 02:18, James Courtier-Dutton wrote:
Martin Owens wrote:
Re Copy Protection.
be quite hard to make this work I think?
It would be quite dangerous to make this work.
What about creating a file say with a fake data map, wine thinks it's
the direct access
On 10/3/06, Robert Lunnon [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Part 3 Applies, however it could be read as being permissible for the purpose
of implementing a compatible interface. IE for the purpose of making the copy
protection work under Wine. I think it would be much safer to make the
protection work
On 10/3/06, Robert Lunnon [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Tuesday 03 October 2006 02:18, James Courtier-Dutton wrote: Martin Owens wrote: Re Copy Protection. be quite hard to make this work I think? It would be quite dangerous to make this work.
What about creating a file say with a fake data
Hello
Sure there are tools out there that crackers use
that read the mbr and store it in a file, so that they can circumvent the
copy protection, but that has nothing to do with wine.
IANAL but curcumventing for personal use using generic tools (wich wine is)
and with no bad intentions can't
I'm by no means an expert on copyright law or copy protection, but I think
that using any method other than writing directly to the MBR with those copy
protection measures would be illegal because writing to a file (registry,
wine-only proprietary db or any other type of file) as opposed
On 10/3/06, Michael [Plouj] Ploujnikov [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I'm by no means an expert on copyright law or copy protection, but I think
that using any method other than writing directly to the MBR with those copy
protection measures would be illegal because writing to a file (registry
Am Montag, 2. Oktober 2006 04:49 schrieb Vitaliy Margolen:
EA Durbin wrote:
So the short story is that copy protection support is the
gating issue here, and it's a serious PITA.
What specifically keeps most copy protection from working with wine?
Why does it work in some applications
Re Copy Protection.
be quite hard to make this work I think?
It would be quite dangerous to make this work.
What about creating a file say with a fake data map, wine thinks it's
the direct access to the hard drive where all this information is
held. all we do is add the place where the data
Martin Owens wrote:
Re Copy Protection.
be quite hard to make this work I think?
It would be quite dangerous to make this work.
What about creating a file say with a fake data map, wine thinks it's
the direct access to the hard drive where all this information is
held. all we do is add
On 10/2/06, James Courtier-Dutton [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
The easiest way round this is to simply recognise the executable with
the copy protection, and simply install a hook to catch the appropriate
file system or registry calls and divert them to a special handling
routine to satisfy
On Mon, Oct 02, 2006 at 05:18:57PM +0100, James Courtier-Dutton wrote:
Martin Owens wrote:
Re Copy Protection.
be quite hard to make this work I think?
It would be quite dangerous to make this work.
What about creating a file say with a fake data map, wine thinks it's
the direct access
On 10/2/06, Marcus Meissner [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
We can't, this kind of circumvention is likely to be illegal in the US.
The relevant portion of the DMCA reads as follows:
(http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/F?c105:6:./temp/~c105bzNC4v:e11559:)
`(2) No person shall manufacture,
So the short story is that copy protection support is the
gating issue here, and it's a serious PITA.
What specifically keeps most copy protection from working with wine? Why
does it work in some applications, such as Star Wars Jedi Academy and not
others?
EA Durbin wrote:
So the short story is that copy protection support is the
gating issue here, and it's a serious PITA.
What specifically keeps most copy protection from working with wine?
Why does it work in some applications, such as Star Wars Jedi Academy
and not others
On Sun, Aug 06, 2006 at 02:32:23PM -0700, Jesse Allen wrote:
On 8/6/06, Marcus Meissner [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Tue, Aug 01, 2006 at 11:25:12AM -0700, Jesse Allen wrote:
Does anyone have HAL and SecuRom copy protection working? I'm starting
to get support questions with people using HAL
On 8/7/06, Marcus Meissner [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
HAL should be of no importance here, there will be no visible
difference to static CDROM configuration.
Otherwise, no clue.
Ciao, Marcus
I'm going to try setting up ubuntu with HAL on a spare machine and see
what it does. I use slack and
traced to be a cause of a problem with
copy protection before when using wine compiled with it. You could be
right that HAL has nothing to do it. I will check it all out when I
get that version of GCC running too.
Jesse
Ok, I just verified that HAL works perfectly fine for what we want. In
fact, it does make thing easier for people as you don't have to mess
with those device symlinks :)
I don't suspect anything wrong with GCC 4.xx now, as I think the
ubuntu package is compiled with 4.0.3. I think the report on
On Tue, Aug 01, 2006 at 11:25:12AM -0700, Jesse Allen wrote:
Does anyone have HAL and SecuRom copy protection working? I'm starting
to get support questions with people using HAL and I'm not sure how to
help them. I need information now that HAL support is in Wine on
whether SecuRom works
Does anyone have HAL and SecuRom copy protection working? I'm starting
to get support questions with people using HAL and I'm not sure how to
help them. I need information now that HAL support is in Wine on
whether SecuRom works with it and how to get it to work as I don't
have HAL.
Jesse
On 8/1/06, Martin Owens [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
the important part is not that HAL supports SecuRom (which it won't IMHO)
but if wine can use the direct access to the hardware in order to allow
securom to work through wine.
Yes, that is correct. However I'm not sure if Wine interprets the
On 8/1/06, Jesse Allen [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On 8/1/06, Martin Owens [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
the important part is not that HAL supports SecuRom (which it won't IMHO)
but if wine can use the direct access to the hardware in order to allow
securom to work through wine.
Yes, that is
Jonathan Wilson wrote:
From what I understand, there are 3 ways to do copy protection in WINE
(at least for copy protection that needs a kernel driver to work):
1.Implement a WINE implementation of that kernel driver (in the same way
various stock windows kernel drivers have been implemented
From what I understand, there are 3 ways to do copy protection in WINE (at
least for copy protection that needs a kernel driver to work):
1.Implement a WINE implementation of that kernel driver (in the same way
various stock windows kernel drivers have been implemented). Problem
Dustin Navea wrote:
Guys, bug 2895 got me thinkin.. If we only support a handful of games
that use copy protection, shouldnt we file a bug in Bugzilla and append
that to 1434 (Get games working perfectly)? That way we can attach any
copy protection related bugs to this metabug?
Yes I think
Guys, bug 2895 got me thinkin.. If we only support a handful of games
that use copy protection, shouldnt we file a bug in Bugzilla and append
that to 1434 (Get games working perfectly)? That way we can attach any
copy protection related bugs to this metabug?
If you are agreeable
, or
because I'd just upgraded to a 2.6 kernel, or because of the Wine
version (20040309), but having upgraded Wine to 20040505 it no longer works.
Some work was done to load the copy protection drivers, it would be very nice to
get this working again. Can you try wine-20040408 to see if it works
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Hi all,
Le Lundi 10 Novembre 2003 08:11, Marcus Meissner a écrit :
On Fri, Nov 07, 2003 at 07:46:58PM +0100, Lionel Ulmer wrote:
On Fri, Nov 07, 2003 at 10:32:02AM +, Mike Hearn wrote:
Lionel, could QEMU be used here? I guess the driver
-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Behalf Of Raphaël Junqueira
Sent: 10 November 2003 08:05
To: Lionel Ulmer; Marcus Meissner
Cc: Alexandre Julliard; Wine Devel
Subject: Re: copy protection - was: Re: Is it time for playing games on
WINE?
Well
: Alexandre Julliard; Wine Devel
Subject: Re: copy protection - was: Re: Is it time for playing games on
WINE?
Well it's not really easy as the NT_HEADER only declare:
Characteristics: 0306
EXECUTABLE_IMAGE
LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED
32BIT_MACHINE
DEBUG_STRIPPED
So
Hi,
On Mon, 10 Nov 2003 20:19:45 +0100, Raphal Junqueira wrote:
...
BTW, I have got as far with loading secdrv.sys as crashing on unimplemented
IoCreateDevice. I believe the Io* functions will be the biggest problems.
It is no problem loading it and initializing it by Captive NTFS for
On Thu, 6 Nov 2003 20:00, Shachar Shemesh wrote:
I don't get it. As far as I understand, so long as the code in the Wine
archives does not allow running copied discs, we are not violating the
DMCA. If someone else takes Wine code and modifies it, that's where the
DMCA violation happens.
I
On Fri, 7 Nov 2003 05:59, Alexandre Julliard wrote:
The DMCA does not require copyright violation, what is illegal is
circumventing the protection measure, it doesn't really matter if
the replacement code has the same functionality or not.
Decryption is a different matter - that's banned
At 18.17 09/11/2003, Steven Edwards wrote:
The problem is how emulate windows kernel internal behavior (ie assembly
tips as NtCurrentTeb)
We have been looking in to loading this driver under ReactOS and all of
the functions are implemented but it still returns STATUS_UNSUCESSFULL. I
think that
At 02.11 11/11/2003, Steven Edwards wrote:
Further run fails for Captive as 'secdrv.sys' is somehow broken driver as
it does not provide any way to mount a filesystem. :-?
secdrv isn't a filesystem, nor a volume driver. Filesystems and volume
drivers, in Windows NT, are special, and secdrv is
for drivers. There is prior art in this area, it could
be done, but might be an awful lot of work.
* Maybe use QEMU to allow the driver to be run in a VM. Even if we can't
invoke code directly here, RPC shims would work, I doubt a copy
protection driver has high throughput requirements.
Alexandre - do
Geoff Thorpe wrote:
On November 5, 2003 01:00 am, Jonathan Wilson wrote:
Basicly as long as our code:
A.cant run copied safedisk disks (perfect copies and no-cd cracks
aside) and B.cant be modified to run copied safedisk disks (e.g. by
disabling some parts of the WINE code that performed
values is not
circumventing part of the copy protection, even if the resulting
behavior is identical to the original. OTOH you can make a pretty good
case that a generic Windows driver loader is not circumventing
anything, it's just doing what any Windows replacement is supposed to
do.
If this becomes
running,
there can be no problem.
I think you would have a hard time convincing
someone that a dummy driver that returns magic values is not
circumventing part of the copy protection, even if the resulting
behavior is identical to the original.
If the resulting behaviour is that copied CDs don't work
Shachar Shemesh [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
If the code in Wine still doesn't allow unprotected CDs from running,
there can be no problem.
No, it's not that simple. By providing a replacement driver, you are
circumventing a technical measure controlling access to the work. The
fact is that
have a hard time convincing
someone that a dummy driver that returns magic values is not
circumventing part of the copy protection, even if the resulting
behavior is identical to the original.
If the resulting behaviour is that copied CDs don't work, while
original ones do
On Thursday 06 November 2003 03:31 pm, Geoff Thorpe wrote:
War crime tribunals, environmental protection treaties, privacy
legislation, ... the ability to let chilling effects meet little or no
significant organised obstacle has become the trademark of a certain
breed of freedom-loving people.
Ann and Jason Edmeades [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
[Ever had the feeling you regret asking a question...]
Possibly another question for Alexander then - Realistically do you believe
that we can ever support copy protection, and if so how?
I definitely think we can support it yes. It's just
I don't get it. As far as I understand, so long as the code in the Wine
archives does not allow running copied discs, we are not violating the
DMCA. If someone else takes Wine code and modifies it, that's where the
DMCA violation happens.
Right, I think a lot of people would be happy to host
of
secdrv.sys is to allow access to areas in kernel mode not normally
accessable to userland code, more specificly, its used to check certain
things for the presense of a kernel level debugger (e.g. SoftIce).
The actual copy protection code is (as far as I know, correct me if I am
wrong) contained
El mié, 05 de nov de 2003, a las 00:50, Raphaël Junqueira escribio:
Alexandre, is there any chance of this code *ever* being excepted into
the wine tree?
None whatsoever, the driver reimplementation is clearly a DMCA
violation. The proper way to do that is to somehow load the driver
On Wednesday 05 November 2003 6:00 am, you wrote:
None whatsoever, the driver reimplementation is clearly a DMCA
violation. The proper way to do that is to somehow load the driver and
let it perform all the checks it wants to perform; a dummy driver that
returns magic values to bypass
violation in Wine, the O/S kernel, or requiring
the copying of a closed-source driver that *itself* is irreplacable
(choosing to load it from Wine and say don't edit this Wine code to
circumvent the commercial driver in a C comment won't jive). Perhaps
I've misunderstood something about the copy
Zsolt Rizsanyi wrote:
So this is what I think that the status of copy protection is. If I'm wrong
somewhere then please correct me.
Hi,
Yea I think your correct.. here is his post...
http://www.winehq.com/hypermail/wine-patches/2002/04/0194.html
And our last exchange: Zsolt
http
but this brings fort the legal issues.
If the re-implemented driver only allows the user to play the game, and not to
make a perfect copy of the CD, there is no legal issue.
. There are no laws against
cracking copy protection unless you're in the states and it's got
encryption.
Now, pirating stuff *after* you broke the protection is illegal of
course, but we have nothing to do with that, and besides, in practice I
doubt it'd help anybody who did want to pirate stuff.
El mar, 04 de nov de 2003, a las 16:13, Ivan Leo Murray-Smith escribio:
but this brings fort the legal issues.
If the re-implemented driver only allows the user to play the game, and not to
make a perfect copy of the CD, there is no legal issue.
I think that the actual status is even worse,
It might be possible to reverse engineer the current safedisc 1 and 2
protections and include the code in wine. The problem is that the new version (a
snapshot of it was used at the time in flashpoint) is less nice. Nowadays when
you for example use a crack the game works or doesn't work. The new
Tom [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
Alexandre, is there any chance of this code *ever* being excepted into
the wine tree?
None whatsoever, the driver reimplementation is clearly a DMCA
violation. The proper way to do that is to somehow load the driver and
let it perform all the checks it wants to
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Le Tuesday 04 November 2003 23:07, Alexandre Julliard a écrit :
Tom [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
Alexandre, is there any chance of this code *ever* being excepted into
the wine tree?
None whatsoever, the driver reimplementation is clearly a
--- Roderick Colenbrander [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Perhaps the solution is to write a wrapper to load secdrv.sys and
friends.
Perhaps in a way like that ntfs emulation project works (it uses a
reactos
kernel) or perhaps using an emulator like qemu.
Yes it should be possibe to adapt the work
When you play
using an incorrect crack the game will slowly become unplayable.
Like this we can be sure that the reimplemented driver is perfect or a bit
buggy. Also, some people may prefer the idea of a open source safe disc driver
more that the idea of loading the proprietary one.
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